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While speculative fiction has not yet fully realized its transgressive potential, dominated 
as it has been by white, male, techno-fantasies—Westerns and the White Man’s Burden 
in Outer Space—there is still a strong undercurrent of writing that questions and subverts 
dominant paradigms and persists in asking uncomfortable questions. No other literature, 
to my knowledge, has written with so much passion about technological and social 
issues, nuclear war, or genetic engineering. 
 
Vandana Singh, “A Speculative Manifesto” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Globalization, Postcolonialism, and Science Fiction: Nomadic Transgressions  
 
By 
Malisa Kurtz 
 
This dissertation seeks to establish science fiction as a critical framework for 
interrogating contemporary neocolonial structures. Specifically, I examine the ways an 
emerging subgenre of “postcolonial science fiction” provides valuable conceptual tools 
for imagining what postcolonial relations might look like in an era defined by 
globalization and multinational capitalism. By linking a critique of the genre’s colonial 
drive to the logic of advanced capitalism, postcolonial science fiction offers a critical lens 
through which to examine the continuation of contemporary neocolonial structures. For 
example, postcolonial science fiction questions several of the assumptions that underpin 
science fiction, including the genre’s colonial gaze, the appeal to an ideology of progress, 
focus on the “future” and the construction of an assumed cosmopolitan future, and an 
implicit faith in technological solutions or the inclination towards techno-optimism. 
Postcolonial science fiction links these generic qualities to the dominance of certain 
ideological frameworks in contemporary neoliberal culture, revealing the colonial 
underpinnings of both genre and the “real-world” socio-historical contexts from which 
genres emerge. Importantly, postcolonial science fiction is also constructivist, offering 
alternative epistemological frameworks for understanding our relationship to the future 
beyond colonial paradigms. Through the process of deconstructing and reconstructing 
sf’s colonial assumptions, I see postcolonial science fiction produced from diverse 
national contexts as expressions of a transnational desire to understand such questions as: 
what do we need to do so that tomorrow is not characterized by the violence against 
others we exhibit today? Or, more specifically, how can we create new visions of 
“postcolonialism” that will materialize into more ethical practice? By explicitly 
foregrounding these questions postcolonial science fiction transforms the genre’s world 
building into a strategy of postcolonial experimentation that strives to understand the 
complexity of problems facing diverse global communities. Postcolonial studies might 
also benefit from thinking through the lens of science fiction, where creative projects 
function as ethical experiments towards mapping out the possibilities of transnational 
affiliation. As this study emphasizes, I therefore see postcolonial science fiction as 
simultaneously a subgenre and a process, strategy, or mode of relation established 
between people committed to imagining less exploitative futures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A study on postcolonial science fiction (sf) faces a central dilemma: namely, how 
are we to understand a subgenre premised upon two terms whose definitions are often 
highly contested? “Postcolonialism,” for instance, is a field that continues to spark debate 
around its meaning and significance in our supposedly post-colonial contemporary 
moment. As Sandra Harding notes, postcolonialism can refer variously to the past and the 
end of European colonialism in the 1960s; the future, in which postcolonialism is still an 
imagined state that has not yet been achieved due to the continuation of neo-colonial 
relations; or it can refer to a “critical counterdiscourse by the colonized;” and finally it 
can refer to the borderland postcolonialism created through migration and conditions 
conducive to hybridity (15-6; my emphasis). Such diverse understandings of the term 
“postcolonialism” significantly affects how postcolonial science fiction has been 
examined by scholars and the questions that arise regarding the importance of this 
subgenre. For instance, does postcolonial sf include only those texts that emerge from 
colonized or previously colonized peoples? Or should we take a broader definition of the 
term and consider all texts that deconstruct sf’s relationship to colonialism 
“postcolonial”? What happens to the idea of postcolonial resistance in particular when 
the definition of postcolonialism becomes so inclusive that it can be stretched to 
incorporate the work of pro-military, white, North American writers such as Robert 
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Heinlein?1 Furthermore, can connections be forged between different global visions of sf, 
or does such a subgenre necessarily revert to a form of cultural relativism?  
As these questions suggest, postcolonial science fiction has been criticized for its 
incoherency and failure to represent a united subgenre or politics. This criticism is due in 
part to the ways scholars acknowledge, as well as utilize, varied definitions of 
postcolonialism in relation to science fiction, and as I will explore in more detail in 
chapter one, subsequently stake different claims for the kind of work in which sf is 
engaged. Importantly, postcolonial sf also resists a unitary, singular definition because of 
the genre’s critical stance and resistance to homogeneity. Gerry Canavan astutely points 
out that label of “postcolonial science fiction” risks associating the genre with simple and 
overdetermined definitions of “postcolonialism” that may construct the genre as a “tamed 
and domesticated genre, whose meaning and political import is always safely known to 
us in advance without our ever actually having to bother to read any of it” (496). For 
Canavan, the danger of reductive generic definitions is that labels such as “postcolonial 
science fiction” become oversimplified signifiers providing the means to easily classify 
and understand the thematic drive of these texts without ever engaging with them 
directly: “a tamed postcolonialism, reduced to a slogan, risks losing its ability to 
challenge and inspire us—it risks becoming dead theory” (496). Concrete definitions of 
postcolonial sf may therefore not only be impossible but undesirable, as the label can 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Herbert Klein’s “Loonies and others in Robert Heinlein’s The Moon is a Harsh Mistress” 
in Ericka Hoagland and Reema Sarwal’s Science Fiction, Imperialism, and the Third World: Essays on 
Postcolonial Literature and Film (2010). Despite Klein’s insightful reading, it is hard to ignore Heinlein’s 
history of pro-military, genocidal, and racially problematic narratives such as Starship Troopers (1959), 
which pits humans (the Terrans) against an alien group known as the Arachnids, or “the Bugs,” and their 
allies the “Skinnies.” 
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become a means of identifying and marginalizing texts whose subversive potential 
involves challenging centre/periphery socio-political relations. 
Despite varied approaches to the genre, one can say that a general quality of 
postcolonial sf is its focus on and exploration of “difference”—whether this is social, 
cultural, technological, or economic—in the historical aftermath of colonialism2. By 
focusing on the question of difference, however, postcolonial sf also risks perpetuating 
centre/periphery binaries and the ghettoization of international sf. Indeed, one might 
consider the ways defining postcolonial sf as a genre concerned with the “Third World” 
replicates the paradigm of ‘add women and stir’ or ‘add people of colour and stir’ that 
emerges out of second and third wave feminism (Harding 82). As many postcolonial 
scholars have recognized, ‘adding’ people of colour to conceptual paradigms constructed 
on their very exclusion only contributes to perpetuating cycles of exclusion and 
exploitation. Furthermore, to understand postcolonial sf as all sf engaged with non-
Western representations may be equally problematic. Apart from reiterating the binaries 
of East/West, the idea that a postcolonial sf is representative of all “otherness” results in a 
reification of difference within a Manichean economy. How, then, does sf criticism 
                                                          
2 “Colonialism” can refer to a wide-variety of historical situations, including, for instance, settler 
colonialism, dependent colonialism, European colonization, or specifically regional instances of 
imperialism such as Japanese imperialism in East Asia. In this dissertation, however, I use the term 
“colonialism” in a fairly broad sense. Following John Rieder, my dissertation considers colonialism to 
“refe[r] to the entire process by which European economy and culture penetrated and transformed the 
non-European world over the last five centuries, including exploration, extraction of resources, 
expropriation and settlement of land, imperial administration and competition” (25). 
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negotiate an understanding of the “postcolonial” such that explorations of difference are 
not subsumed into the logic of what Graham Huggan calls “marketing the margins”?3 
 
Purpose and Significance of the Study 
At stake in the discussion of postcolonial science fiction is whether discussions of 
cultural, ethnic, or social difference can occur in ways that do not risk appropriating 
subaltern identities or presenting idealized and mythologized “others.” This dissertation 
will contribute to discussions about the relationship between science fiction and 
postcolonialism by considering the ways postcolonial sf is not only a genre but a process, 
strategy, or mode of relation between people committed to imagining less exploitative 
futures. I argue that postcolonial sf, in fact, transforms the genre’s world building into a 
strategy of postcolonial experimentation that strives to understand the complexity of 
problems facing diverse global communities. Postcolonial sf therefore performs the 
important task of deconstructing the exploitative logic of colonialism and capitalism 
while simultaneously constructing alternative spaces of resistance by privileging a non-
imperial ethics of relationality. This process of deconstruction and reconstruction in the 
genre thereby also reveals the ways “postcolonialism” might best be conceptualized as an 
attitude or ethical view, rather than a historical time period or easily oppositional stance 
that risks reiterating centre/periphery binaries.4  
                                                          
3 See Huggan’s The Postcolonial Exotic: Marketing the Margins (2001) for a more detailed discussion of 
the global commodification of difference.   
4 Here I also draw on Graham Huggan’s distinction between postcolonialism, which “relates to an 
ensemble of loosely connected oppositional practices…and by an aesthetic of largely textualised, partly 
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Throughout this dissertation, I examine how science fiction, produced from a 
wide-range of national contexts, is in fact the expression of a transnational desire to 
understand such questions as what do we need to do so that tomorrow is not characterized 
by the violence against others we exhibit today? Or, more specifically, how can we create 
new visions of “postcolonialism” that will materialize into more ethical practice? Such 
questions are the expression of “careful forms of sociability” (Bignall, Postcolonial, 220) 
that define postcolonial sf and are also representative of the ethical drive that 
characterizes this emerging subgenre. Furthermore, by conceptualizing postcolonial sf as 
both a genre as well as a critical stance, this study aims to redress the material/discursive 
divide that currently defines scholarship on postcolonial sf. I will challenge this 
bifurcation by emphasizing the importance of three levels of postcolonial engagement in 
the genre: first, postcolonial sf interrogates questions of representation; secondly, 
postcolonial sf interrogates the supposed end of colonialism as it reflects on the transition 
to a “post-colonial” moment and the material conditions of global, multinational 
capitalism; and thirdly, postcolonial sf considers the need for a “postcolonialism” that 
sees the epistemological, material, and ethical as intimately intertwined. Accordingly, 
postcolonial sf posits the need for a specific awareness—in both genre text and reader—
of the ways colonialism frames sf tropes as well as the ways colonialism continues to 
frame the specific socio-political contexts in which texts, authors, and readers are 
immersed. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
localised resistance” and the term postcoloniality, which “is a value-regulating mechanism within the 
global late-capitalist system of commodity exchange. Value is constructed through global market 
operations involving the exchange of cultural commodities and, particularly, culturally ‘othered’ goods” 
(6). In other words, Huggan distinguishes postcoloniality from postcolonialism as the former term 
exemplifies the pervasiveness of neoliberalism in which the discourse of resistance becomes a commodity 
itself and sold as “authentic” expressions of marginal communities. 
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Outline of Chapters: From Critique to “Autoethnography” 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters beginning with a chapter on the 
development of postcolonial science fiction, followed by five chapters that examine how 
postcolonial sf critiques and re-writes specific generic tropes such as the figure of the 
alien, techno-Orientalism, future development of information communication 
technologies, and technologically altered humans. All five chapters therefore engage in a 
dialectic that first critiques the colonial ideologies and structures that underpin specific 
science fiction tropes, then explores how such science-fictional tropes can be reoriented 
towards imagining more postcolonial relations and social structures. Additionally, I 
identify two kinds of postcolonial science fiction by whether or not they use an 
“autoethnographic” narrative (an idea that will be explored in more detail below); 
ultimately, however, I see both types of postcolonial science fiction as still performing 
the dual role of deconstructing generic conventions and colonial ideologies while 
reconstructing postcolonial alternatives. The dissertation’s conclusion further emphasizes 
the importance of attending to both the deconstructive and reconstructive qualities of 
postcolonial science fiction as part of its strategy of resistance. 
In chapter one, I begin with an analysis of the development of postcolonial 
science fiction as a genre. This chapter outlines previous studies in the field and 
summarizes their major arguments in order to highlight the material/discursive divide that 
currently defines how scholars understand postcolonialism in relation to the genre. From 
this analysis I stake the claim that postcolonial sf might best be conceptualized as a 
strategy of resistance, critique, and postcolonial experimentation that requires attention to 
the epistemological and material structures of colonialism. Accordingly, it adds to 
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material/discursive critiques of postcolonial sf the question of ethics, both within the text 
itself (its representation of difference and ethics of relationality between characters) as 
well as within the reading communities interpreting these texts.  
Chapter two begins with the analysis of a text that precedes the use of the term 
postcolonial science fiction. Though Ian McDonald’s Evolution’s Shore (1995) and 
Kirinya (1997) precede the emergence of this subgenre, I contend they can still be 
considered postcolonial science fiction because both texts critique the genre’s semantic 
and syntactic structures, as well as the genre’s complicity in reiterating colonial 
structures.  Specifically, by bringing science fiction into contact with history, postcolonial 
sf such as McDonald’s novels link the genre’s colonial framework to contemporary 
imperial socio-cultural relations. Both McDonald’s novels and Gareth Edwards’s 
Monsters (2010) are therefore representative of a specific kind of postcolonial science 
fiction that remains within the boundaries of the colonial gaze but begins to challenge its 
epistemological and material framework. In fact, through the course of this dissertation 
two kinds of postcolonial science fiction texts emerge: 1) texts that still fall within sf’s 
colonial framework but do so to critique the genre’s complicity in semantic/syntactic 
structures of colonialism, and 2) texts that offer postcolonial articulations of what may be 
called autoethnographic sf narratives. 
The distinction between these two kinds of postcolonial texts—one defined by 
exploiting the colonial gaze, the other defined by a form of autoethnography—stems 
from John Rieder’s examination of the ways anthropology affects the colonial gaze of 
early science fiction, and will be explored in more detail in chapter two. Rieder contends 
that “the anachronistic structure of anthropological difference is one of the key features 
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that links emergent science fiction to colonialism” where “anthropological difference” is 
“the way late-nineteenth-century anthropology conceptualized the play of identity and 
difference between the scientific observer and the anthropological subject—both human, 
but inhabiting different moments in the history of civilization” (5). This understanding of 
anthropological difference means that for the scientific observer (colonist), the 
indigenous other is representative of a primitive past and indicative of developmental 
stages of society. Drawing on Robert Stafford, Rieder points to the ways that British 
colonists saw overseas travel as a kind of time travel to old worlds of a distant past. 
Accordingly, science fiction’s “other” worlds function through colonial reference for 
early sf readers: “when Verne, Wells, and others wrote of voyages underground, under 
the sea, and into the heavens for the readers of the age of imperialism, the 
otherworldliness of the colonies provided a new kind of legibility and significance to an 
ancient plot” (Rieder 6). The structure of anthropological difference therefore informs the 
colonial gaze in science fiction by constructing an anthropological subject, or other, who 
signifies a primitive past or the “colonizer’s own past” (Rieder 5). 
After chapter two the remainder of the dissertation focuses on texts that fall into 
the second category of postcolonial sf that I identify as having an autoethnographic 
quality. This notion of the intersection of autoethnography and the colonial gaze comes 
from Rieder’s critique of the structure of the gaze. Using Alonzo Gartley’s 1903 
photograph, Native Hawaiian Fisherman with Throw Net, Rieder shows how the picture 
epitomizes the structure of the colonial gaze. The photo depicts a Hawaiian net fisherman 
crouched in the waves as if searching for prey. He gazes off to the right of the camera, 
giving the impression that the photo is meant to represent its “subject” objectively and 
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naturally, and is a moment that has been spontaneously captured by a scientific observer. 
While this photograph clearly exemplifies how colonial anthropological frameworks 
influence the genre, it also provides a point for Rieder to explore alternatives to a colonial 
gaze. Rieder notes that, “[i]f one were to introduce a reciprocal gaze into the scene, for 
instance, so that the model could be allowed to stand up straight, look back at the camera, 
and address himself to the audience, the generic conventions would switch from those of 
the ethnographic image to what Mary Louise Pratt calls autoethnography” (10). Pratt 
defines autoethnography as “instances in which colonized subjects undertake to represent 
themselves in ways that engage with the colonizer’s own terms,” and that if 
“ethnographic texts are a means by which Europeans represent to themselves their 
(usually subjugated) others, authoethnographic texts are those the others construct in 
response to or in dialogue with those metropolitan representations” (7). For Pratt, 
autoethnography requires using the tools of the colonizer (i.e. adopting idioms or 
conventions of the colonizer) and appropriating or transforming them through 
autoethnographic texts.5 Autoethnographic expression is therefore “important in 
unraveling the histories of imperial subjugation and resistance as seen from the site of 
their occurrence” (Pratt 9), and a primary means of confronting imperialism in various 
contact zones.  
                                                          
5 By using the tools of the colonizer, autoethnography “opens up new ways of writing about social life” 
that can also emphasize the ways “identities are multiple and shifting” (Reed-Danahay 3). As Deborah 
Reed-Danahay suggests in Auto/Ethnography: Rewriting the Self and the Social (1997), autoethnography 
can therefore be “defined as a form of self-narrative that places the self within a social context” (9; my 
emphasis). The emphasis on social context in this definition of autoethnography is useful for thinking 
about the ways postcolonial sf places the “alien” other within a specific historical context thereby 
historicizing how difference is treated,  a point I will elaborate further on throughout the dissertation.  
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Thinking about Rieder’s comment regarding a reciprocal gaze functioning as a 
form of autoethnography through which the “other” engages in dialogue with the 
audience/observer, one can say that the reciprocal gaze of science fiction would most 
likely be offered through the narrative voice of an alien other. The act of “look[ing] back” 
by this reciprocal gaze is both autoethnographic and postcolonial because the subject 
which looks/speaks back “engage[s] with the colonizer’s own terms” through “partial 
collaboration with and appropriation of the idioms of the conqueror” (Pratt 7). This idea 
of alien others speaking back to a dominant history of science fiction has much in 
common with Nalo Hopkinson’s definition of postcolonial sf where she defines the genre 
as “stories that take the meme of colonizing the natives and, from the experience of the 
colonizee, critique it, pervert it, fuck with it, with irony, with anger, with humour, and 
also with love and respect for the genre of science fiction that makes it possible to think 
about new ways of doing things” (9). Indeed, Hopkinson’s definition falls into the second 
category of postcolonial sf I have identified: those texts that offer postcolonial critiques 
by re-writing the conventions of science fiction within autoethnographic frameworks. In 
these science fiction/autoethnographic narratives it is the alien figure that takes over 
narration in order to examine the consequences of colonialism as both epistemological 
and material project. In fact, the remainder of the postcolonial science fiction texts I 
examine in the dissertation fall into this secondary category, as they all have main 
characters who are in some way “alien” others.  
Chapter three is the first example of what an autoethnographic/ postcolonial sf 
narrative might be. In this chapter I examine The Windup Girl (2010), Saltfish Girl 
(2002), and The Bohr Maker (1995), novels which all tell part of their narratives from the 
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perspective of a character who is not considered “human.” Furthermore, all three have 
non-white, central characters (the recurring tendency to racialize technological others will 
be explored in more detail in the following chapter). These texts therefore use the tools of 
science fiction—involving the “partial collaboration with and appropriation of the idioms 
of the conqueror” (Pratt 7)—to question and undermine several of the assumptions that 
underpin the genre. Like the figure of the alien that I examine in chapter two, chapter 
three examines a specific generic convention (technologically altered “others”) that is 
challenged by postcolonial science fiction. The chapter examines how postcolonial sf 
brings the sf trope of technological others into contact with real histories of racial 
segregation, just as McDonald’s text links the logic of sf’s colonial gaze to the 
imperialism of the United Nations. 
Chapter four explores the techno-utopianism that often functions as neocolonial 
mechanisms in what Gilles Deleuze calls “societies of control.” While late twentieth 
century science fiction may not depict the explicitly racist frameworks of yellow peril sf 
or the colour-blind futures of colonial adventure narratives, contemporary sf can still 
reiterate colonial ideologies particularly when it exhibits a certain techno-optimism, or 
faith in technological solutions. Neill Blomkamp’s Elysium (2013) is an example of such 
techno-optimism, as the film proposes that increased access to technological resources (in 
this case advanced healthcare) will help improve quality of life for the world’s poor. By 
foregrounding technocratic solutions the film’s conclusion implies that global 
“development” will solve the environmental and social devastation in this dystopian 
world. This push towards development has been identified and increasingly critiqued by 
scholars such as John Rieder who see the ideology of progress as symptomatic of the 
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genre’s close relationship to colonialism in which the “narrative logic of growth or 
development” is used to establish a binary and imperialist relationship between 
technologically advanced civilizations and “undeveloped,” or primitive, civilizations 
(29). Importantly, this imperial dimension is not a characteristic of science fiction only 
because science fiction inevitably draws on contemporary technoscientific discourse. The 
resonance between the genre’s ideology of progress and the imperialism that scholars 
such as Andrew Ross and Wolfgang Sachs identify as characteristic of current planetary 
management ideals is thus one that warrants further examination.6 
According to Deleuze, societies of control operate through computers and 
constant technological evolution, an indication that means of production are no longer 
distinct spaces, privately or state owned. Instead, the multinational corporation replaces 
the factory, and the “coded figures” of stockholders and banks signal that “the operation 
of markets is now the instrument of social control and forms the impudent breed of our 
masters” (Deleuze 6). Sf not only reflects this shift towards societies of control but in 
many ways anticipates and contributes to its technological discourses. “The operation of 
markets” and “coded figures” of modernity are most clearly foregrounded in subgenres 
such as cyberpunk. Reflecting the space race in the 1960s and vast progress in computing 
technologies through the 1970s and 80s, cyberpunk such as Gibson’s foundational 
Neuromancer (1984) and Bruce Sterling’s Islands in the Net (1988) depict cyberspace as 
the battleground of humanity’s future. As Deleuze notes, such “invisible” mechanisms of 
control are not necessarily ones of sf only and the shift to a corporate system marks new 
                                                          
6 See Ross’s Strange Weather: Culture, Science, and Technology in the Age of Limits (1991) and Sachs’s 
Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development (1999).  
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forms of domination. Thus, beginning with the emergence of cyberpunk in the 1970s and 
extending to the current explosion of films fascinated with artificial intelligence—such as 
Spike Jonze’s Her (2014), Wally Pfister’s Transcendence (2014), and Alex Garland’s Ex 
Machina (2015)—the genre’s increasing focus on information communication 
technologies is part of a larger cultural shift towards a “capitalism of higher-order 
production” (Deleuze 6).  
Despite the supposed end of formal colonialism (indigenous communities in 
settler colonies such as Canada, the United States, and Australia might disagree), many of 
colonialism’s exploitative structures therefore continue under the emergence of a 
“technoscientific empire.” In the age of multinational capitalism, Istvan Csicsery-Ronay 
argues that, “[a]n invisible imaginary imperial regime takes shape, one for which national 
borders are secondary obstacles. It is an Enlightened empire of shared commitments to 
instrumentality, justified by its promise of an ever-greater rationality and material 
abundance in the future” (Seven 244). Csicsery-Ronay notes that this global regime is 
maintained by the colonial impulse of material expansion and technoculture (“SF and 
Empire” 236), and that sf performs a critical role in mediating the transition from 
“colonial expansion to global imperial power predicated on technological hegemony” 
(Seven 218). Such technological hegemony is therefore driven by the same ideology of 
progress (in this case in the name of “technological growth”) as early colonial narratives. 
Similarly, the expansion of information communication networks appears independent of 
overt political ideology despite affecting all of social life. In many ways Csicsery-
Ronay’s work consolidates the work of other theorists concerned with late capitalism and 
the development of information communication technologies, including, for instance, 
14 
 
Donna Haraway’s work on the “informatics of domination” (160) and Manuel Castells’s 
articulation of a network society that results in the rise of a “Fourth World” excluded 
from access to technological resources—essentially, the have-nots of the information age. 
Several postcolonial sf texts (such as Moxyland and Sleep Dealer which I explore in 
chapter four) foreground the ways the binary thinking of colonial ideology is translated 
into new forms of neo-colonial rule between developed/developing countries, the 
First/Third world, and the global North/South. In sf this ideological division reveals the 
troubling conclusion that those who are unable to afford the latest technological tools will 
be left behind. 
This study concludes with an examination of postcolonial sf as expressing a 
transversal politics, attuned to both the socio-historical differences from which texts 
emerge as well as their shared commitment to a certain postcolonial ethics. It is also 
important to note that postcolonial texts are often read very differently by different 
reading communities; Pratt makes this point in Imperial Eyes noting that, 
“[a]utoethnographic texts are typically heterogeneous on the reception end as well, 
usually addressed both to metropolitan readers and to literate sectors of the speaker’s own 
social group, and bound to be received very differently by each” (Pratt 7). These different 
readings, however, are vital to the genre, as they exemplify the ways that “[d]ialogue, 
rather than fixity of location, becomes the basis of empowered knowledge” (Yuval-Davis 
129). Some readings of Paolo Bacigalupi’s The Windup Girl, for instance, critique the 
book for its reversion to Orientalist tropes. In chapter three, however, I challenge this 
reading by suggesting that the novel’s portrayal of race relations is in fact more complex 
than simply reiterating East/West binaries. The dialogue generated between fans, 
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scholars, and science fiction communities is in fact central to the ethical commitment 
behind postcolonial sf, as it exemplifies my claim that postcolonial science fiction is a 
strategy of postcolonial experimentation. Postcolonial sf texts open up a space of 
negotiation not only within texts themselves but between reading communities who 
challenge each other’s interpretations, practice a form of “listening respect,” and seek to 
remain carefully attuned to the historical relations that define readers’ situated locations 
as well as those locations from which texts emerge. This space of negotiation between 
reading communities is also the space I identify in chapter five as premised upon an 
ethics of relationality. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Re-orienting Postcolonial Science Fiction 
To begin this study of the relationship between science fiction (sf) and 
postcolonialism I will first examine the genre’s relationship to colonialism. Such an 
examination is important because while there is much contemporary work that identifies 
imperial characteristics in sf narratives, there is less analysis that examines the 
relationship between colonialism and postcolonialism in sf. Furthermore, there are a 
wide-variety of meanings behind the term “postcolonial”; how one understands the 
relationship of sf to colonialism is thus crucial to understanding the role postcolonialism 
plays in the genre. Some scholars, such as Patricia Kerslake, for instance, see the 
relationship between genre and empire as fundamental to sf’s very core. In Science 
Fiction and Empire (2007), Kerslake argues that “[t]he theme of empire…is so ingrained 
in SF that to discuss empire in SF is also to investigate the fundamental purposes of the 
genre itself” (191). For Kerslake, sf’s close relationship to empire is a consequence of the 
incorporation of “the idea and ideals of power and imperialism” into early sf by authors 
who “lived in imperial times” (190). Empire as Kerslake sees it, is a trope of sf that is 
about the exploration of power and the construction of centre/periphery relations within 
sf texts.  
However, Kerslake also argues that empire is not necessarily a problematic trope 
in that, “[t]he best way to understand empire as it has been treated in SF is to consider 
that it does not describe a Western cultural bias, as has often been assumed, but that it 
stems from a many-sided impulse to which any one of us might be prone” (191)—that is, 
the “many-sided impulse” of “power and imperialism” (190). According to this definition 
of empire, “Empire’s intellectual presence is neither good nor bad, but neutral. Its 
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fictional peculiarities are dependent upon those actions by which the narrative defines its 
boundaries and policies” (191). Kerslake’s attempt to recuperate the potential value of sf 
and its imaginative/explorative capacities means that she ends her study with the 
troubling claim that empire is “neutral.” In order to avoid this pitfall, a more sustained 
analysis of the relationship between sf and colonialism is needed—specifically, one that 
offers a more comprehensive analysis of the structures of the genre itself and how these 
relate to, or draw on, colonial frameworks. It is only through identifying specific aspects 
of science fiction and their potentially imperial inclinations can we begin to, first, analyze 
the extent to which the genre is complicit in reiterating colonial tropes, and secondly, 
determine whether this colonial bias can be challenged without losing the utopian 
potential of the genre to imagine the world otherwise. 
Istvan Csicsery-Ronay Jr.’s work on “Science Fiction and Empire” and John 
Rieder’s seminal Colonialism and the Emergence of Science Fiction (2008) offer 
important starting points for analyzing the genre’s relationship to colonialism. Both 
scholars argue that sf is necessarily a product of colonialism, though they emphasize 
different aspects of the genre’s emergence. Csicsery-Ronay emphasizes the importance of 
technological expansion, arguing that  
the conditions for the emergence of sf as a genre are made possible by three 
factors: the technological expansion that drove real imperialism, the need felt by 
national audiences for literary-cultural mediation as their societies were 
transformed from historical nations into hegemons, and the fantastic model of 
achieved technoscientific Empire. (“Empire” 231) 
For Csicsery-Ronay, sf as a form of “literary-cultural mediation” is informed by the 
imperial project of nation states as well as technological development as it expands and 
propels the consolidation of global capitalism. Csicsery-Ronay argues this ultimately 
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culminates in the context of contemporary “Empire,” and draws on Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri’s work in particular to argue that sf “has been driven by a desire for the 
imaginary transformation of imperialism into Empire, viewed not primarily in terms of 
political and economic contests…but as a technological regime that affects and ensures 
the global control system of de-nationalized communications” (232). Hardt and Negri’s 
notion of Empire is differentiated from Kerslake’s use of the term in that it characterizes 
a “new global form of sovereignty” (Empire xii) and a new form of global governance 
established by transnational organizations such as the United Nations. For Csicsery-
Ronay, then, sf is a product of techno-culture, and its fantasies of “technoscientific 
empire” (236) that are propelled and produced by sf’s internal qualities, including the 
genre’s emphasis on technological expansion/development and imaginary world systems. 
While Csicsery-Ronay’s analysis of empire in sf emphasizes the imperialist 
dimensions of technological expansion, in 2008 and 2009, scholars, fans, and authors 
expanded discussion about the genre’s relationship to empire by engaging in one of the 
largest online discussions to date over sf’s complicity in cultural appropriation and 
representation. Known as “RaceFail 09,” or “The Great Cultural Appropriation Debate of 
Doom,” these online discussions were ignited over a series of posts by white authors on 
the subject of using and writing about characters from different cultural, ethnic, and racial 
backgrounds. Though I cannot delve into the complex series of discussions that ensued, it 
is important to note that RaceFail 09 was symptomatic of discussions that had been 
ongoing in sf communities about the genre’s complicity in reiterating problematic racial 
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representations and the genre’s acceptance of a diversity of authors’ and fans’ voices.7 
For instance, the debate around race, representation and genre soon expanded to include 
struggles within the Science Fiction Writers of America (SFWA) over charges regarding 
recurring sexism in the organization and its magazine; debate in the SFWA, again, about 
the need for encouraging more diverse authors of colour; and escalating tension over the 
Hugo Awards which was accused of being a “white boys club” (each of these struggles 
have continued since their explosion in 2009, with the latest debate being over the 2014 
Hugo Awards). RaceFail 09 and its ensuing debates therefore marked a cultural moment 
in which science fiction communities were particularly attuned to the genre’s relationship 
with colonial ideologies. If Csicsery-Ronay’s work offers the beginning of an attempt to 
map out sf’s ideological and genealogical debt to imperialism, Rieder’s Colonialism and 
the Emergence of Science Fiction (2008) is an explicit study of the relationship between 
the structures of the colonialism and the genre’s foundational characteristics. Rieder’s 
ground-breaking and in-depth study of early science fiction offers new ways for mapping 
out the relationship between sf and colonialism, and was particularly timely given the 
increased attention by fans, authors, and scholars alike to questions about diversity in the 
genre. 
Rieder notes in his introduction to Colonialism and the Emergence of Science 
Fiction that it is not a question of whether sf engages colonialism but rather how much 
and to what extent. Starting with Edward Said’s claim in Culture and Imperialism (1993) 
that the novel (as an artifact of bourgeois society) and imperialism are “unthinkable” 
                                                          
7 For more information see in particular Sarah Gatson and Robin Reid’s “Race and Ethnicity in Fandom” in 
Transformative Works & Cultures, volume 8 (2011), or Helen Young’s Race and Popular Fantasy Literature: 
Habits of Whiteness (2015).   
20 
 
without each other, Rieder argues that the generic structure of science fiction and 
colonialism are also “unthinkable” without each other (3). Rieder argues that the 
relationship between sf and colonialism is most evident in the articulation of two 
frameworks at work in the genre: the colonial gaze and the ideology of progress manifest 
in sf narratives. Accordingly, Rieder’s study analyzes how “science fiction lives and 
breathes in the atmosphere of colonial history and its discourses, how it reflects or 
contributes to the ideological production of ideas about the shape of history, and how it 
might, in varying degrees, enact a struggle over humankind’s ability to reshape it” (3). 
For Rieder, sf emerges at the height of the imperial project—a time when “colonialism 
made space into time [and] gave the globe a geography not just of climates and cultures 
but of stages of human development that could confront and evaluate one another” (6). 
Colonialism, which Rieder takes to refer to the “entire process by which European 
economy and culture penetrated and transformed the non-European world” (25), results 
in not only the expansion of imperial power but the consolidation of global capitalist 
economy that solidifies discourses about anthropological difference. This anthropological 
difference is racial, cultural, as well as an evaluation of where societies stood in relation 
to the “stages of human development” (6), in which colonized countries were seen as less 
developed, primitive symbols of a past before industrialization.  
The term “postcolonial science fiction” itself appears amidst critiques of the 
relationship between sf and colonialism, primarily in scholarly writing in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s with discussions of texts such as Amitav Ghosh’s The Calcutta 
Chromosome (1995). Even before Kerslake and Rieder’s study in 2002, for instance, a 
special issue of Ariel titled “Writing Back: Speculative Fiction and the Politics of 
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Postcolonialism” explicitly examined the intersection of genre and the field of 
postcolonial studies. A number of writers have since been identified as writing in this 
subgenre, including, for instance, Laruen Beukes, Nalo Hopkinson, Larissa Lai, and Ian 
McDonald. Arguably, however, it is not until the publication of Nalo Hopkinson and 
Uppinder Mehan’s So Long Been Dreaming: Postcolonial Science Fiction & Fantasy 
(2004) that postcolonial sf consolidates as a genre.  
An anthology of science fiction, speculative fiction and fantasy by people of 
colour, So Long Been Dreaming follows a fairly general definition of postcolonialism. As 
previously noted, in her introduction to the anthology Hopkinson suggests that 
postcolonial sf are stories that take place from the perspective of the “colonizee” (9). 
Mehan, in his conclusion to the anthology, reflects further on the term “postcolonial” 
noting that while it might refer to people exclusively from previously colonized nations, 
as a noun  
[p]ostcoloniality [also] includes those of us who are survivors—or descendants of 
survivors—of sustained, racial colonial process; the members of cultures of 
resistance to colonial oppression; the members of minority cultures which are 
essentially colonized nations within a larger nation; and those of us who identify 
ourselves as having Aboriginal, African, South Asian, Asian ancestry, wherever 
we make our homes (269).  
 
For Mehan, postcolonial sf might therefore be considered the realm of exclusively non-
white authors, even though he acknowledges the ways postcolonial sf also troubles the 
binaries of colonizer/colonizee by attending to complexities of such identity formations. 
Hopkinson and Mehan’s anthology initiated a timely discussion of the ways sf reiterates 
colonial tropes. 
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Following Rieder’s study of the close relationship between sf and colonialism as 
well as Hopkinson and Mehan’s anthology, a handful of scholarly studies emerged 
examining the specific field of “postcolonial science fiction.” These include studies such 
as Ericka Hoagland and Reema Sarwal’s Science Fiction, Imperialism and the Third 
World (2010) and Masood Ashraf Raja, Jason W. Ellis, and Swaralipi Nandi’s The 
Postnational Fantasy: Essays on Postcolonialism, Cosmopolitics and Science Fiction 
(2011). As these two collections exemplify, however, understanding the term 
“postcolonial” in relation to the subgenre proved more difficult than anticipated. Jessica 
Langer’s Postcolonialism and Science Fiction (2011) points this out clearly, noting that 
sf shares with the field of postcolonial literature an inclination towards unstable generic 
definitions and taxonomical ambiguity. Langer’s own study attempts to avoid the 
multiple definitions of postcolonial sf offered in previous collections by identifying what 
Langer sees as a theoretical framework that unites the two fields: the structuring 
framework of the “Stranger” and the “Strange Land.” In her analysis of the ways sf 
presents postcolonial critiques, Langer expands on Rieder’s work and argues that the dual 
poles of the colonial gaze—or what she calls the use of the Stranger and the Strange Land 
framework—are central signifiers for sf as well as “the very same twin myths of 
colonialism” (3). This binary is thus also symptomatic of the Manichean relations that 
define colonial contexts, where a number of other ideological divisions emerge between 
conceptualizations of civilization and savagery, modernity and its past, and biological 
determination and cultural construction. For Langer, postcolonial sf challenges the 
structuring framework of the Stranger and Strange Land in that postcolonial sf 
“hybridizes them, parodies them, and/or mimics them against the grain in a play of 
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Bhabhaian masquerade” (3-4). Thus, Langer focuses primarily on examining the ways sf 
narratives conceptualize the identity of the “Other” and perpetuate, or challenge, colonial 
discourses, assumptions, and stereotypes. 
Throughout her analysis, Langer often follows the work of Homi Bhabha by 
arguing that the power of narrative lies in its ability to aid in psychological 
decolonization. For instance, Rieder argues that the colonial gaze emerges in the ways sf 
narratives engage with difference and is often articulated through the text’s description of 
the “alien” body. Langer expands Rieder’s argument to consider racial difference 
specifically, suggesting that because the alien body is defined by its physical differences, 
the language sf uses to describe this human/alien difference inevitably dovetails with the 
discourse of colonialism where physical difference frequently connotes racial/cultural 
difference. Thus, Langer argues, postcolonial sf hybridizes this representation of the alien 
body in order to highlight the inherently exploitative nature of the colonial gaze. District 
9 (2010), for instance, re-writes the myths of sf by revealing the ways the story of alien 
colonization is also the story of the colonization and exploitation of people of colour. 
Langer argues that the film links the dehumanization of “prawns” to the dehumanizing 
effects of colonial rule and discourse. By foregrounding this relationship, the film also re-
writes the histories of people of colour into the often white or colour-blind futures of sf. 
Though Langer never explicitly defines postcolonial sf except to say that it is science 
fiction generally concerned with interrogating the “twin myths” of colonialism (the 
Stranger and the Strange Land), her work performs the important function of critiquing 
the colonial gaze and its manifestations in sf narratives. 
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In contrast to Langer’s primarily discursive approach, Eric D. Smith’s 
Globalization, Utopia, and Postcolonial Science Fiction: New Maps of Hope (2013) 
examines the ways postcolonial sf is a thoroughly historical genre that highlights the 
material conditions from which texts emerge. Smith sees sf as an extension of the 
modernist/utopian project in that he considers postcolonial sf as those texts emerging 
primarily from the so-called “Third World.” Smith argues that postcolonial sf marks the 
decline of magical realism, a mode formerly attuned to the transition between “a 
precolonial past and a post-industrial present” (11); where magical realism thrived in the 
context of the transition from pre-capitalist societies to a post Second World War and 
post Bretton Woods context, Smith argues that the contemporary global context 
(premised on, and thoroughly saturated by, informational capitalism, multinational 
corporations, etc.) finds affinity with science fiction’s spatial and historical concerns. 
Smith’s analysis enables one to consider texts such as Lauren Beukes’s Moxyland (2010), 
as sf that reflects South Africa’s transition from post-apartheid state to a nation 
transformed by its embrace of neoliberal policy and technoscientific empire. Unlike 
Langer’s primarily discursive analysis of postcolonial sf texts, Smith’s analysis is less 
concerned with the question of representation and focuses primarily on examining why a 
text like Moxyland appeals to the dystopian strain of sf in order to explore a near future 
corporate state set in South Africa. Such a materialist critique, for instance, considers the 
effects of Structural Adjustment Policies on countries in the global South, critiquing the 
ways such policies encouraged increased privatization, deregulation of human rights and 
social justice, and weakening social infrastructure. Ultimately, Smith is primarily 
interested in emphasizing the ways postcolonial sf enables a historical critique. 
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Though both are seminal works in the field and offer critical insights into the 
significance of postcolonial sf as a genre, the divide between Langer’s and Smith’s 
approaches represents a troubling bifurcation in science fiction studies. While Rieder’s 
articulation of the two major frameworks that link sf and colonialism (the colonial gaze 
and ideology of progress) is of central importance for both Langer and Smith (as it will 
also be for my examination of postcolonial sf), the authors diverge in the focus of their 
analyses. Namely, Langer focuses mostly on a critique of the colonial gaze, while Smith 
focuses on the ways postcolonial sf critiques the ideology of progress. Langer’s analysis 
represents a critical turning point in science fiction studies as it begins to fill in the “hole” 
she identifies as being a lack of scholarly attention given to representations of people of 
colour in the genre (1-2). Her study highlights the central role people of colour often play 
as literal and figurative “aliens” in science fiction. However, Langer’s emphasis on what 
Charles Taylor calls a “politics of recognition” exemplifies her primarily discursive 
analysis. While Langer’s approach is certainly useful, Smith also articulates an important 
critique of Langer’s emphasis on discursivity and hybridity; namely, that emphasis on 
representation can elide the material and economic structures that also have direct impact 
on the relationship between science fiction and the “Third World.” The division between 
their approaches is in fact indicative of a broader split in postcolonial studies often 
referred to as the discursive and materialist divide. This bifurcation is split by theoretical 
approaches to postcolonialism (such as those of Bhabha) and primarily Marxist oriented 
critiques of postcolonialism.8 
                                                          
8 Disagreement over this division was recently re-ignited, for instance, with the publication of Chibber’s 
Postcolonial Theory and the Spectre of Capital (2014).  
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 Accordingly, the division between discursive and material approaches to 
understanding postcolonial sf represents a gap in the knowledge of what exactly 
postcolonial sf is and why it is significant. I see two main issues arising because of this 
gap in the knowledge and the struggle to define postcolonial sf: first, the 
discursive/materialist divide which characterizes most approaches to the subgenre is a 
consequence of uncertainty over how postcolonialism functions in the genre’s title. 
Langer notes in her monograph that, like the definition of science fiction, postcolonialism 
is “notoriously problematic” to define (4), and though she acknowledges the various 
understandings of the term that contribute to a discursive/material divide, Langer does 
not provide an explicit definition of her own. Instead she notes that a nuanced 
understanding of the term requires acknowledgement of the various understandings of 
postcolonialism and decolonization, and that “[i]f decolonization is the process of 
disengaging from a colonizer then postcolonialism is the process by which a decolonizing 
society negotiates its identity apart from that of its colonizer, and apart from its identity 
as a colonized place or people, within the context of both colonial history and 
decolonized future” (9). Langer’s use of the term thus leans heavily towards 
understanding postcolonialism as a counter-discourse that aids in the process of 
decolonization.  
A second major problem, extending from the first, arises as a result of a gap in 
knowledge about what exactly postcolonial sf is: how does a postcolonial sf and its study 
avoid replicating the structure of the colonial gaze? Similarly, does defining postcolonial 
sf as a subgenre revert to idealistic and/or exploitative identity politics and curtail its 
subversive potential? Indeed, how we define both “postcolonialism” and “postcolonial 
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sf” may boil down to how we approach this question. As briefly noted above, there are 
several other understandings of the term postcolonialism.  
Rieder points out that in talking about science fiction from colonial contexts, there 
emerges yet another complexity that should be acknowledged between two different 
kinds of colonial societies: settler colonialism and dependent colonialism. For Rieder, 
even though the distinction between settler colonialism and dependent colonialism may 
overlap, “the crucial theoretical consequence to be drawn from recognizing the structural 
differences between the settler colony and the dependent one remains clear: the break 
represented by the historical passage from colonial to independent or ‘postcolonial’ 
society has an entirely different status in the two cases” (“Colonialism” 489). Thus, 
Rieder argues, the postcolonial moment signifies different processes of colonial 
continuity and discontinuity in different national contexts. 
 
Why “postcolonial” science fiction? 
This dissertation seeks to establish science fiction as a critical framework for 
interrogating contemporary neocolonial structures. Specifically, I examine the ways an 
emerging subgenre of postcolonial science fiction provides valuable conceptual tools for 
imagining what postcolonial relations might look like in an era defined by globalization 
and multinational capitalism. By linking a critique of the genre’s colonial drive to the 
logic of advanced capitalism, postcolonial science fiction offers a critical lens through 
which to examine the continuation of contemporary neocolonial frameworks manifest 
through particular epistemological biases and material structures. For example, 
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postcolonial science fiction questions several of the assumptions that underpin science 
fiction, including the genre’s colonial gaze, the appeal to an ideology of progress, focus 
on the future or the construction of an assumed cosmopolitan future, and an implicit faith 
in technological solutions or the inclination towards techno-optimism. Postcolonial 
science fiction links these generic qualities to the dominance of certain ideological 
frameworks in contemporary neoliberal culture, revealing the colonial underpinnings of 
both genre and the “real-world” socio-historical contexts from which genres emerge. 
Importantly, postcolonial science fiction is also constructivist, offering alternative 
epistemological frameworks for understanding our relationship to the future beyond 
colonial paradigms. Through the process of deconstructing and reconstructing sf’s 
colonial assumptions, I view postcolonial science fiction produced from diverse national 
contexts as expressions of a transnational desire to understand such questions as: what do 
we need to do so that tomorrow is not characterized by the violence against others we 
exhibit today? Or, more specifically, how can we create new visions of “postcolonialism” 
that will materialize into more ethical practice? By explicitly foregrounding these 
questions postcolonial science fiction transforms the genre’s world building into a 
strategy of postcolonial experimentation that strives to understand the complexity of 
problems facing diverse global communities. Postcolonial studies might also benefit from 
thinking through the lens of science fiction, where creative projects function as ethical 
experiments towards mapping out the possibilities of transnational affiliation. As this 
study emphasizes, I therefore see postcolonial science fiction as simultaneously a 
subgenre and a process, strategy, or mode of relation established between people 
committed to imagining less exploitative futures. 
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 What is significant about defining postcolonial science fiction though? Why 
define this subgenre in particular, especially when sf scholars increasingly share the view 
that genres are permeable categories, or as Sherryl Vint and Mark Bould put it in relation 
to sf in particular, “there never was such a thing as science fiction” (43)? Vint and Bould 
argue that attempts to define the sf canon reveal more about what is at stake when 
specific communities argue for sf as a unified, singular construct (“There” 43). Instead, 
they argue that “genres are never, as frequently perceived, objects which already exist in 
the world and which are subsequently studied by genre critics, but fluid and tenuous 
constructions made by the interaction of various claims and practices by writers, 
producers, distributors, marketers, readers, fans, critics and other discursive agents” 
(“There” 48). Rieder expands on Vint and Bould, arguing in “Defining SF, or Not: Genre 
Theory, SF, and History,” that sf studies has increasingly embraced an historical account 
of genre theory (191). He makes five propositions about how to understand sf in relation 
to a historical approach to genre:  
1) sf is historical and mutable; 
2) sf has no essence, so single unifying characteristic, and no point of origin; 
3) sf  is not a set of texts, but rather a way of using texts and of drawing 
relationships among them 
4) sf’s identity is a differentially articulated position in an historical and mutable 
field of genres; 
5) attribution of the identity of sf to a text constitutes an active intervention in its 
distribution and reception. (Rieder, “On” 193) 
 
Though Rieder’s propositions pertain to science fiction in particular, they are also 
meditations on the nature of genre itself. As Vint, Bould, and Rieder insightfully point 
out, genres are “historical and mutable;” thus, if the category of “postcolonial science 
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fiction” consolidates in the early twenty-first century, attention must be given to asking 
why such a genre emerges and what its historical significance may be. 
 A historical approach to genre thus recognizes that genres “are in a constant, 
unending process of coming into being” (Vint and Bould, “There” 43). I adopt this view 
throughout my dissertation, and by extension contend that postcolonial science fiction in 
particular highlights the permeability of genres. Importantly, postcolonial science fiction 
also shares this perspective on genre as a result of its socio-political inclinations, as it 
mobilizes generic iconography as a strategy of resistance. By this I mean that 
postcolonial sf might best be conceptualized as a certain “mode of thought” (Csicery-
Ronay, Seven 3). Csicsery-Ronay provides an important framework for understanding sf 
as not just genre but also as a “mode of response that frames and tests experiences as if 
they were aspects of a work of science fiction” (Seven 2). By seeing sf as a way of 
thinking about events, or a “mode of response,” Csicsery-Ronay suggests genres are more 
than cultural texts—they are also “complex hesitation(s) about the relationship between 
imaginary conception and historical reality unfolding into the future” (Seven 4). Science 
fiction is therefore inevitably both a genre oriented toward futurity and a “genre of the 
moment,” in that it is a reflection of “the particular historical moment in which we find 
ourselves” (Bould and Williams 7) while reflecting on our socio-cultural developments 
(to paraphrase Darko Suvin’s now infamous definition of the genre). Csicsery-Ronay 
contends that this hesitation between historical reality and future possibility functions 
both as a structuring principle of science fiction and a contemporary mode of thought that 
frames experiences of the world in science-fictional terms. 
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A main focus of this study is therefore exploring the ways postcolonial science 
fiction—as part of its “mode of response” (Csicsery-Ronay, Seven 2)—questions several 
of the assumptions that underpin science fiction, including the genre’s colonial gaze, 
ideology of progress, focus on the “future” and the assumed cosmopolitan future of much 
sf, and implicit faith in technological solutions (or techno-optimism). Postcolonial sf 
questions these generic assumptions and traditions by remaining attuned to the 
differences that define radically different welfare needs for people in the global South, 
and it challenges the idea of a cosmopolitan “we” by highlighting, first and foremost, the 
need for continued attention to the lasting impacts of colonialism on current global 
politics. As regions in the global South grapple with the environmental and economic 
debt incurred through a history of resource depletion and exploitation by colonial 
regimes, postcolonial science fiction asks whose interests are served by erasing colonial 
histories in our imaginations of the future.  
Erasing histories of colonial exploitation serves to not only deny the continuation 
of contemporary neocolonial structures, it also serves to deny our own culpability in 
reproducing these structures. As Bould points out, “by presenting racism as an insanity 
that burned itself out, or as the obvious folly of the ignorant and impoverished who would 
be left behind by the genre’s brave new futures, sf avoids confronting the structures of 
racism and its own complicity in them” (180). Postcolonial science fiction reminds us 
that the global North and South not only have different pasts and presents, but if we 
continue to ignore these fundamental differences, they will have different futures as well. 
As Susie O’Brien argues about future speculations and scenario planning, there is a 
“ludicrous quality [to] future speculations that fail to take account of the historical 
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violence that undergirds the present and, by extension, the place from which speculation 
unfolds” (3). There is a certain epistemic violence as well as material violence that is 
propagated through visions of the future that erase global differences in economic, social, 
and fundamental human rights. This violence and inequality will continue to define the 
future if left unacknowledged. 
Though this dissertation focuses primarily on those global regions subject to 
dependent colonialism as differentiated from settler colonies (such as Australia, Canada, 
and the United States), I contend that in the era of multinational capitalism and 
globalization, many of the structures of dependent colonialism inevitably affect settler 
colonies as well. Admittedly, what “globalization” means in contemporary theoretical 
discourse is highly controversial. Definitions of the term range from ideas about an 
increasingly technologically “networked” society (Castells), to theories that emphasize 
new cultural flows and increased hybridity (Bhabha; Appadurai), the development of a 
new stage of capitalism (Jameson), to theorizations of a shift in global power relations 
and the emergence of a new order of sovereignty (Hardt and Negri), to name but a few 
examples. My use of the term leans more towards Hardt and Negri’s argument that our 
contemporary moment is defined by “the production of social life itself, in which the 
economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another” 
(Empire, xiii). Throughout this dissertation, then, I take globalization to mean the social, 
cultural, political, and economic forces, which, while still influenced by the boundaries of 
nation states, also simultaneously flow between them. 
Indeed, postcolonial sf is distinguished by its recognition of both the forces of 
globalization and a recognition of the very real border struggles in specific geo-political 
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contexts. It is for this reason, for instance, that we cannot condense all “non-Western” sf 
into one category, since the power relations that define different nation states are still a 
significant determining factor of the borders and boundaries that exist. While readings of 
postcolonial sf are necessarily local and particular, mapping out shared structures of 
power and shared structures of feeling is an attempt to draw out the utopian dimension of 
science fiction. Postcolonial sf therefore also opens up a space to participate in the 
utopian project Fredric Jameson identifies as a “cognitive mapping,” which not only 
outlines the dynamics of late capitalism but also attempts to “think this development 
positively and negatively all at once; to achieve, in other words, a type of thinking that 
would be capable of grasping the demonstrably baleful features of capitalism along with 
its extraordinary and liberating dynamism simultaneously within a single thought” 
(Postmodernism 47). This utopian impulse can be found simultaneously in postcolonial 
sf’s narrative structure, adaptation of colonial tropes from early sf, and diverse reading 
communities.  
Furthermore, readings that are cognitive maps of postcolonial sf’s relationship to 
globalization can actively engage in the process of connecting shared lived experiences 
against capitalism’s tendency towards increased divisiveness, or against its tendency to 
obscure the connection between cultural and economic spaces. By “increased 
divisiveness” I do not necessarily mean class division, nor do I mean the social/ethical 
divisions that arise between different groups of people. Rather, I refer to the claims of 
theorists such as Jameson and Georg Lukács regarding the limitations of language and 
critique to analyze “a social totality which can never be fully represented” (Jameson, 
“Aesthetics“, 102). Because of this limitation, for Jameson the danger of the world 
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“culture” and analysis of cultural products is that it “presupposes some separate semi-
autonomous space in the social totality which can be examined by itself and then 
somehow reconnected with other spaces, such as the economic” (“Aesthetics” 102). The 
separation between aesthetics and historical analysis can thus elide addressing the shared 
“social totality” that inevitably permeates both and defines our contemporary moment: 
the shared condition of global capitalism as a mode of production. 
Jameson argues that “any ontology of the present needs to be an ideological 
analysis as well as a phenomenological description; and…it needs to be historical as well 
as historically and economically comparatist” (“Aesthetics” 101). Postcolonial sf 
functions as a cognitive map because it refuses to divide aesthetic analysis from historical 
analysis. By doing so, postcolonial sf also generates a sense of non-individuality and 
collective being in the face of global capitalism which unifies even as it divides us. 
Generating this sense of collectiveness might carry the very stirrings of Lukács’s “class 
consciousness” in which “[t]he superior strength of true, practical class consciousness lies 
in the ability to look beyond the divisive symptoms of the economic process to the unity 
of the total social system underlying it. In the age of capitalism it is not possible for the 
total system to become directly visible in external phenomena” (Lukács 74). 
Postcolonial sf not only maps out the shared conditions of late capitalism across 
nation states, it also recognizes that there are certain historical differences (in processes 
of colonization, for instance) that will affect how exactly nation states experience 
globalization. Postcolonial sf therefore acknowledges the complex dynamic between 
shared conditions and divergent local histories while still advocating for a common 
postcolonial ethic across national boundaries. In many ways, then, postcolonial sf shares 
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affinities with Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s notion of “feminism without borders.” That 
is, postcolonial sf is not “border-less” in the sense that it “acknowledges fault lines, 
conflicts, differences, fears, and containment that borders represent” (2). However, 
postcolonial sf also “acknowledges that there is no one sense of a border, that the lines 
between and through nations, races, classes, sexualities, religions, and disabilities are 
real” (2). Re-writing Mohanty’s claim for a transnational feminist politic, I would thus 
argue that postcolonial sf posits that “a [postcolonialism] without borders must envision 
change and social justice work across these lines of demarcation and division” (2). 
Postcolonial sf performs this very task by acknowledging both historical difference and 
attempting to link diverse structures of power that affect global socio-political struggles. 
By negotiating this dialectic between the local and global dynamic of power, postcolonial 
sf suggests the need for a more comprehensive mapping of the commonalities and 
differences in experiences of empire.  
Throughout this study, I suggest that some of the qualities postcolonial sf shares 
include an emphasis on the materiality of thought, an orientation towards mapping local 
struggles onto global movements, and a desire to foster alliances opposed to the logic of 
predatory capitalism. These qualities are examined in the project’s four main chapters 
which consider recurring themes in postcolonial science fiction, such as critique of the 
genre’s colonial gaze, the ideology of progress, the erasure of processes of racialization, 
and the appeal to techno-utopian futures. The desire to foster alliances across national 
boundaries emerges from these critiques, and it is an expression of an ethics of 
relationality that I suggest all the postcolonial sf texts explored here exemplify. Indeed, I 
argue that the most significant feature of postcolonial sf is a shared ethical commitment 
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to mapping the commonalities and differences in experiences of empire. As part of this 
study, then, I examine works situated in such diverse places as Thailand (Paolo 
Bacigalupi’s The Windup Girl), Mexico (Alex Rivera’s Sleep Dealer), and South Africa 
(Lauren Beukes’s Zoo City). 
Postcolonial sf does not just critique colonialism and neocolonial structures, it 
also seeks to enact alternatives. The texts explored here make clear that material and 
discursive critiques are necessarily intertwined because of the ways in which they re-
write the structure of the genre internally through its semantic/syntactic structure and 
externally through its publishing practices as well as writing and reading communities. 
Performing the postcolonial ethos that the genre advocates for requires acknowledging 
and redressing its failures to include people of colour, actively confronting 
epistemological violence, challenging exploitative practices, and attempting to form a 
community ethic invested in understanding what exactly “postcoloniality” might mean 
for a global sf community. Postcolonial sf cannot only transform how we see 
postcolonialism, it must also transform how we understand science fiction and our 
visions of future progress. Separately, the terms “postcolonial” and “science fiction” are 
problematic and difficult to define, but together they may create a new site of knowledge 
that asks us to think simultaneously about the continuum of history and what links past 
violences (postcolonial) to future alternatives (science fiction). Postcolonial theory might 
therefore also benefit from thinking through the lens of science fiction, where creative 
projects function as ethical experiments towards mapping out the futures of transnational 
affiliation. Indeed, such creative projects are already underway, of which postcolonial 
science fiction is but one example. 
37 
 
 While postcolonialism has often been conceptualized as a process or strategy of 
critique, doing so in the context of science fiction is particularly important as it requires 
scholars and critics to retain a self-reflexive lens necessary to avoid replicating structures 
of the colonial gaze. Defining postcolonial sf as a uniquely modern endeavour, for 
instance, risks privileging Eurocentric histories of science fiction that see “Western” sf as 
the genre’s centre and “Other” sf as peripheral responses. Indeed, Uppinder Mehan, in an 
early essay on Indian sf, points to the Orientalism of this approach; Mehan, somewhat 
satirically posits that, “Sf is as Western as Coca-Cola, big cars, and computers” and that 
“in the Orientalist scheme the West is rational and scientific; the East mystical and 
fantastic” (54). Certainly our contemporary understanding of popular science fiction 
comes primarily from examining Anglophone traditions sf. However, other writers and 
scholars have challenged the assumption that sf was not being written in the global South 
at the same time as its popularization in North America and Europe. In a post on the 
publication of the anthology AfroSF: Science Fiction by African Writers (2013), for 
instance, author Tade Thompson was asked about the significance of “bringing the genre 
of science fiction to Africa” (Omenana 30).Thompson responded by noting that 
one should be careful when using the phrase ‘bringing the genre’ to Africa. It’s 
always been here, and I’m not just talking about folk tales based on Malian 
cosmology. Our folk tales, our proverbs, our art, our culture, all of it has science 
fictional elements. We have just been trained to only see a certain kind of science 
fiction which is mainly of Western origin. We need to be taught to see, to grow 
new eyes and new minds. We also need to look back to history that is not told 
from the perspective of those who colonized us. (30-1) 
While I cannot address the possibility of alternate histories of science fiction outside of 
the North America/European contexts that are traditionally associated with the 
popularization of the genre, Thompson’s statement usefully points to the need to be 
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aware of replicating colonial assumptions about the development of science fiction in 
non-Western contexts.  
Embarking on a project of this magnitude is challenging since understanding 
postcolonial sf as an ethic or process necessitates careful and nuanced readings of texts 
from diverse regions. This study is therefore not an attempt to map postcolonial sf in its 
totality; rather, I only hope to offer an outline of the shared socio-historical conditions 
and ethical commitments expressed in postcolonial sf. As such, I have restricted myself 
to texts from a few geographic regions, delving into their local histories and global 
dynamic as much as I can within the context of my arguments. Furthermore, though I 
acknowledge the multiple definitions of postcolonialism that may inform the genre and 
its ethics, there are certain definitions which I do not engage with because of the nature of 
the genre. First, postcolonialism here is not aligned with the field of subaltern studies, as 
all of the texts I examine are written in English. Significantly, this allows postcolonial sf 
to participate in and simultaneously challenge the hegemonic structures of a genre that 
has predominately been associated with North American and European contexts. Sofia 
Samatar suggests in a roundtable with science fiction authors on the topic of “Different 
Frontiers: Taking Over English,” that perhaps the use of English in postcolonial texts is 
critical to the genre’s critique of colonialism. When moderator Benjanun Sriduankaew 
notes that the postcolonial sf anthology We See a Different Frontier (2013) is written in 
English and that “this is seen as ironic in light of the anthology’s theme,” Samatar 
responds by noting, “I don’t see anything ironic about it. English is a global language 
because of colonialism. How is it ironic to address postcolonial issues in English—a 
language of oppression and resistance, of loss and survival—a postcolonial language?” 
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(Sriduangkaew). As Samatar points out, the use of English in postcolonial sf in no way 
detracts from the genre’s counter-narratives, and is rather a testament to the enduring 
effects of colonialism and globalization as well as the potential for resistance even while 
using the ‘master’s tools’ (to paraphrase Audre Lorde). Samatar acknowledges that 
different languages might better express different “worlds” or national contexts; however, 
the “existence of these worlds does not erase the world which English expresses with 
terrible accuracy: a postcolonial world in which many people (myself among them) who 
wish desperately that they could write in another language, in their ‘own’ language, 
cannot do it” (Sriduangkaew). Future research might examine postcolonial sf in 
translation, but this project focuses solely on texts written in English as they directly 
respond to a history of Anglo-phone science fiction. 
Furthermore, though I have already suggested this, it is worth repeating that 
postcolonialism as used in this study does not refer to the end of formal colonialism, nor 
does it imply that all nation-states are politically independent from western powers. It 
would be hard to argue for the end of formal colonialism from the perspective of 
Indigenous peoples in countries such as Canada, the United States, and Australia. In these 
geographic regions, Rieder contends that settler colonialism continues as both physical 
occupation and social reformation. The dependent colonialism that defines the majority 
of previously colonized countries in Africa, South Asia, South East Asia, and South 
America occurs primarily through the economic dependency of the Third World, 
solidified after the end of the Second World War during the supposed “decolonization” of 
many of the nation-states within these geographic areas. Seeing dependent colonialism as 
functioning first through formal colonization and secondly through economic and 
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political dependency, post-colonization also aligns postcolonial studies with the emerging 
field of critical globalization studies.  
As a study that aims to reorient the discursive/material divide of postcolonial 
approaches to sf, this dissertation takes a historical and cultural studies approach in 
viewing texts as symptomatic of wider socio-political conditions. Accordingly, this study 
examines both science fiction literature and film. While each medium expresses its own 
unique sf qualities (film requires additional attention to sound, mise en scène, costuming, 
etc.), I also contend that postcolonial sf shares qualities that traverse specific literary and 
film characteristics. Though postcolonial sf film may offer unique, medium-specific 
characteristics, in this dissertation I am only able to and interested in establishing the 
similarities between film and literary postcolonial sf. Exploring their similarities is 
beneficial for a number of reasons—notably, if postcolonial sf can be seen as an ethic that 
traverses both film and literature, we might begin to think of the genre in terms of Henry 
Jenkins’s notion of “convergence culture.” 
It is also important to state here, if only briefly, that postcolonial sf as I see it in 
this study does not seek to replace Indigenous science fiction, or related fields such as 
Afrofuturism and Latinofuturism. Rather, postcolonial sf is an attempt to map affinities 
between these diverse fields, seeing this as a necessary practice for thinking about the 
relationship between dominant traditions in sf (American and European) in relation to 
“non-Western” sf or sf that represents non-Western places and characters. Doing so is not 
to proliferate difference for the sake of profit, or to paraphrase Sandra Harding ‘add 
people of colour and stir’ in science fiction, but to find spaces of affinity beyond a 
representational politics. Giving voice and/or visibility to marginalized communities is 
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crucial but it is not enough—defining postcolonial sf as an ethic and strategy of resistance 
requires the interrogation of entangled systems of colonial epistemologies, capitalism, 
militarism, and scientific rationalism in order to map the terrain of our current 
inequalities. In order to construct more sustainable futures and just communities, we must 
think of relational encounters in their complexity, rather than through the lens of 
dichotomous relations between colonial/postcolonial, West/East, or global South/global 
North only. 
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CHAPTER TWO: From Colonial Gaze to the Logic of Advanced Capitalism 
This chapter begins to outline how postcolonial science fiction draws attention to 
the colonial underpinnings of sf’s central tropes. Building on Rieder’s argument about 
science fiction and colonialism, this chapter will start with an historical analysis of the 
emergence of sf in order to highlight the ways colonial ideologies are foundational to the 
genre’s images and tropes before proceeding to examine two texts that are exemplary of 
the ways postcolonial sf deconstructs the genre’s colonial drive. In a section titled 
“Decolonizing Science Fiction’s Monsters,” I will expand on Rieder’s identification of 
the colonial gaze and ideology of progress as fundamental to the relationship between 
colonialism and sf using Rick Altman’s definition of genre as defined by semantic and 
syntactic structures. Altman’s foundational work on genre is in film; however, his 
approach is particularly useful to science fiction, because separating semantic from 
syntactic structures can reveal how science fiction’s images (both in literature and 
cinema) are invested in ideological frameworks. Furthermore, separating the semantic 
and syntactic structures of film enables a more comprehensive examination of the ways 
postcolonial sf uses the images of sf while challenging its narrative (and colonial) 
structure.  
Alien invasion narratives are a particularly useful medium through which to 
explore the semantic/syntactic dimension of science fiction as the figure of the alien 
operates within a particular ideological and epistemological framework established by the 
colonial gaze. Accordingly, I will examine two alien invasion narratives in this chapter: 
Gareth Edwards Monsters (2010) and Ian McDonald’s first two Chaga books (1995-97). 
Both texts take place at “contact zones” and both focus on the gaze of the “colonizer” in 
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that their main protagonist is not originally from the countries where these aliens land. 
Furthermore, the protagonists in both texts are linked to the media: in Monsters, Andrew 
Kaulder is a photojournalist and in Evolution’s Shore (1995) Gaby McAslan is a 
journalist. The similarities between these texts will help make clear the operation of the 
colonial gaze in sf, as well as the way both these texts begin the process of unravelling 
the colonial gaze of their protagonists. Additionally, though neither Edwards nor 
McDonald’s texts articulate the explicit racism that Rieder identifies as endemic to early 
science fiction, they do articulate the presence of the colonial gaze in contemporary 
socio-cultural relations through the exploitative logic of advanced capitalism. Rieder 
asserts a relationship between sf and racism such that, “[t]he interdependence and 
permeability between the fictional narratives and the social discourses and circumstances 
in which they circulate makes the presence of racism in early science fiction inevitable” 
(97); however, I would extend Rieder’s claim by pointing out that by reflecting current 
socio-economic relations, contemporary science fiction reveals the ‘inevitably’ 
exploitative logic of advanced capitalism (and racialized capitalism). Ultimately, I argue 
that Ian McDonald’s Chaga trilogy and Gareth Edwards’ Monsters (2010) link a critique 
of the colonial gaze in sf to the exploitative logic of advanced capitalism, revealing the 
ways in which despite the supposed end of formal colonialism, many of colonialism’s 
exploitative structures continue under a contemporary technoscientific empire.  
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Decolonizing Science Fiction’s Monsters 
Previous scholars have started their analysis of postcolonialism in science fiction 
from different premises of “colonialism.” Scholars such as Jessica Langer emphasize the 
figure of the “other” in colonial ideology and the power of narrative in psychological 
colonization and subsequently decolonization. Langer focuses primarily on examining the 
ways sf narratives conceptualize the identity of the “Other” and perpetuate, or challenge, 
colonial discourses, assumptions, stereotypes, etc. Langer’s emphasis on the discursive 
structures of colonial narratives draws attention to the ways sf tropes such as the alien, 
the invasion narrative, and the figure of the “stranger in a strange land” functions as 
central signifiers of the colonial ideology at the heart of the genre. Langer’s discursive 
approach can therefore be seen as following the semantic/syntactic paradigm of genre 
theory offered by Rick Altman. Altman argues that the semantic elements which 
constitute a genre include “traits, attitudes, characters, shots, locations, sets, and the like,” 
while the “constitutive relationships between undesignated and variable 
placeholders…might be called the genre’s fundamental syntax” (10). In other words, 
“The semantic approach thus stresses the genre’s building blocks, while the syntactic 
view privileges the structures into which they are arranged” (10). Though Langer never 
explicitly outlines this, Postcolonialism and Science Fiction suggests that by altering the 
syntactic structure (the narrative relationship between colonizer and colonizee) of 
familiar semantic elements (aliens, stranger, etc.), postcolonial sf functions as a form of 
decolonization. While Langer’s text usefully outlines the semantic elements of 
colonialism upon which sf concerned with postcolonialism draws, her exploration of the 
particular syntactic structures of colonialism in sf narratives is limited.  
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As previously mentioned, however, John Rieder provides an insightful and telling 
analysis of the syntactic structures of science fiction as they exemplify particular colonial 
frameworks. Rieder contends that two generic frameworks in particular exemplify sf’s 
close relationship to colonialism: sf’s “colonial gaze” and sf’s ideology of progress. 
Importantly, these two frameworks are central to both the genre’s internal logic and the 
exploitative structures of empire. Sf’s colonial gaze is one of the genre’s most 
recognizable conventions, and manifests narratively as a fascination with the exotic that 
is frequently constructed through the binary division between technologically superior 
observers/scientists and “native” or alien inhabitants. Where the colonial gaze in 
Victorian adventure fiction is revealed through the gaze of the traveller upon “exotic” 
natives (as Marlowe in Heart of Darkness, for instance), the colonial gaze in sf translates 
to the binary division between human/non-human (alien or posthuman) others. This is 
most evident in early sf focused on scientific travellers such as H.G. Wells’s The Time 
Machine (1895) or Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Lost World (1912). By constructing this 
dichotomy, narrative voice and power is given to the (white, male) observer while those 
positioned as alien “others” are often denied the same voice or character complexity; as 
Rieder says, the cognitive framework of the colonial gaze in sf “distributes knowledge 
and power to the subject who looks, while denying or minimizing access to power for its 
object, the one looked at” (7). Langer’s work expands on Rieder, particularly when she 
argues that the dual poles of the colonial gaze—or what she identifies as use of the 
“Stranger” and the “Strange Land” motif—are central signifiers for sf as well as “the very 
same twin myths of colonialism” (3). This binary (between stranger and strange land or 
self and other) is thus also symptomatic of the Manichean relations that define colonial 
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contexts, where a number of other ideological divisions emerge between 
conceptualizations of civilization and savagery, modernity and its past, and biological 
determination and cultural construction.9   
Gareth Edward’s Monsters is an exemplary critique of the problematic 
assumptions and power structures that underline the division between alien “others” and 
human protagonists in sf. As a film, Monsters not only highlights the ideological 
construction of the “other,” it is also a visual representation of how the colonial gaze 
functions as spectacle through the film’s visual fascination with difference, or the 
“exotic.” The film explains that six years earlier NASA had discovered the possibility of 
life beyond Earth; as NASA’s capsule returns to Earth for examination, the capsule, 
which contained samples of the foreign organism, crashed over Mexico, which has now 
been populated by alien creatures and labelled an “infected zone.” Andrew Kaulder is a 
photographer from the US who comes to Mexico to document the aliens and further his 
career. Mid-mission, however, he is charged with escorting his boss’s daughter, 
Samantha Wynden, out of Mexico and safely back to the US. The film follows their trials 
in attempting to cross the infected border zone, which is highly militarized and 
supposedly dangerous. Kaulder and Samantha, both intimately connected to the media 
industry in the US, exemplify the colonial gaze of sf as its documents the violence and 
tragedy of creature attacks in Mexico. Like McDonald’s novels, Monsters is told from the 
perspective of its human characters, and thus “distributes knowledge and power to the 
subject who looks [US media], while denying or minimizing access to power for its 
                                                          
9 See JanMohamed’s “The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial Difference in 
Colonialist Literature.” 
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object, the one looked at [the alien and the Mexico]” (Rieder 7). Importantly, the film 
makes clear that not only are Kaulder and Samantha observing the creatures, they are also 
observing the “foreign” culture they have found themselves in. Kaulder is shown 
incessantly photographing all aspects of Mexican culture; as a journalist looking to sell 
his pictures and profit from them, we know that these pictures will become part of the 
media representation of the “disaster” in Mexico. Hinting at Kaulder’s complicity in a 
form of disaster capitalism, Samantha asks Kaulder, “Doesn’t that kind of bother you? 
That you need something bad to happen to profit from it?” (Monsters). 
However, Monsters soon begins to undermine the power dynamic established 
through the colonial gaze. As Kaulder and Samantha travel closer to the infected zone, 
they discover that more damage has been rendered by the American military in an 
attempt to supposedly “protect” Mexico than the damage that has been caused by the 
creatures themselves. Stumbling upon a memorial site lit with candles dedicated to the 
“5,000 dead” because of military bombings, Kaulder and Samantha are shocked into 
silence. The film lingers on a wall in particular that poses the question, “Que son los 
monstrous? [Who are the monsters?] No bombing” (Monsters). Up to this point, the 
images of the aliens that we have been shown on televisions in the film have depicted the 
creatures as violent aliens. This wall, however, stops the film (as well as Kaulder and 
Samantha) in its track, reorienting the colonial gaze to suggest that Mexico has not been 
“invaded” by the creatures but by a hyperviolent American military that is far more 
destructive. In fact, as Kaulder and Samantha travel deeper into the quarantined zone, 
they are told that the creatures are not naturally aggressive: “If you don’t bother them, 
they don’t bother you,” says one of their guides (Monsters). Their guides explain that it is 
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actually the “American planes” (Monsters) that make the creatures angry and violent, and 
that they are otherwise peaceful beings. By depicting contact between the creatures and 
US military as one characterized by violence and struggle over power and territory, 
Monsters questions the “discursive framework of scientific truth, moral certitude, and 
cultural hegemony” (Rieder 10) that the colonial gaze attempts to establish in sf. The film 
asks not just how the “other” is depicted but for what scientific, political, and ideological 
purpose? These questions become more evident as Kaulder and Samantha begin to 
question their own assumptions about the nature of the creatures and the hegemony of the 
US military. 
As Monsters exemplifies and as Rieder points out, the construction of the “other” 
through the colonial gaze also enables a critique of the self, or the observer. Hence, the 
“strange destinations of [foreign] voyages now also referred to a centuries-old project of 
cognitive appropriation, a reading of the exotic other that made possible, and perhaps 
even necessary, a rereading of oneself” (Rieder 6). This moment of using the “other” to 
understand oneself is made clear in Monsters when Kaulder and Samantha stand on the 
Mexican side of the border and stare at the immense wall built by the US to protect its 
borders. In a self-reflective moment, Kaulder notes, “You know, it’s different looking at 
America from the outside…in” (Monsters). Paradoxically, it is by contact with the 
“other” (both the creature and cultural other) in acts of appropriation that Kaulder is able 
to begin to critique the ideologies of American militarization and neoliberal exploitation. 
Like the dialectic between Kaulder and the creatures in Monsters, Rieder uses 
H.G. Wells’s The War of the Worlds (1927) as an example of the oscillation between a 
“fantasy of appropriation” and its critique (6). Wells’s text famously depicts a Martian 
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invasion of Earth, requiring the reader to imagine themselves in the position of the 
colonized rather than colonizer as would be typical of most adventure fiction. 
Importantly, Rieder notes that while Wells’s texts plays with a “reversal of positions” in 
which (white) humans are now the colonized and Martians the colonizers, this framework 
still “stays entirely within the framework of the colonial gaze” as “the ‘native’ human 
narrator himself occupies not only the position of the dominated, dehumanized colonial 
subject, but also that of the scientific observer” (10). The narrator is still a human 
observer, and it is his voice that tells the story of the Martian invasion, not the voice of 
the aliens. Wells’s narrative, however, also “estranges the colonial gaze by reversing the 
direction of the gaze’s anachronism,” and though it does not “demystify the colonial gaze 
by bringing it into contact with history as autoethnography would,” it does set “the 
hierarchical difference between observer and observed swinging…with each swing 
potentially questioning and recoding the discursive framework of scientific truth, moral 
certitude, and cultural hegemony” (Rieder 10). In other words, Wells’s text critiques the 
colonial gaze by reversing the positions of colonizer/colonized, revealing the ideological 
values traditionally attributed to each side of this binary.   
McDonald’s novels and Monsters function in much the same vein—though they 
perform postcolonial critiques of the colonial gaze and ideology of progress through sf, 
they ultimately fall within the framework of colonial gaze because the alien “others” of 
these narratives are never given a voice or do not take over the role of narrator/scientific 
observer. Evolution’s Shore, for instance, focuses on a white, relatively privileged 
woman from the global North and her experiences with the alien Chaga, thus the book 
stays within the framework of the colonial gaze by oscillating between a (white scientist) 
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human versus alien dialectic. The same could be said about Monsters, which focuses on 
two white main characters who have found themselves the “aliens” in a foreign land. 
Both McDonald’s Chaga saga and Monsters are therefore exemplary of the first category 
of postcolonial texts I have identified as those that use the semantic structures (the figure 
of the alien, or Chaga) as well as the syntactic structures (the colonial gaze) of the genre 
in order to examine the extent to which science fiction is complicit in reiterating the 
structures of colonialism. For this reason, I see these texts as offering a critique of the 
genre’s colonial semantics/syntactic structure while still operating within a colonial 
framework.  
Importantly, McDonald’s Chaga novels and Edwards’s Monsters ultimately do 
“demystify the colonial” by bringing their narratives into contact with specific socio-
political histories (Kenya and Central America, respectively) a move that I believe 
enables them to be considered postcolonial sf. Though they are not “autoethnographic 
expressions” from the perspective of the people whose lands have actually been invaded 
or from the perspective of the aliens themselves, both the Chaga novels and Monsters do 
begin the process of unravelling the epistemic violence supported through our cultural 
imaginations of the “other.” Self-representation, while fundamentally important in its 
own right, is not necessarily the only means of critique. As Rey Chow argues in regards 
to gender and representation, “self-representation also raises once again the most 
tenacious problems of representation itself” in that “representation, even representation of 
the self, would always need to come to terms with those elements of heterogeneity that 
render the ‘self’ opaque rather than transparent” (46). In other words, Chow argues that 
the self inevitably becomes “other” in such representations revealing that, “In spite of 
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being imagined as the ultimate source of knowledge, the self does not necessarily ‘know’ 
itself and cannot be reduced to the realm of rational cognition” (46).  
Chow suggests that representation is always complicit in and entails privilege and 
inequality (47). Thus, an individual’s experience is not always, and perhaps should not be 
seen as, representative of a group. I make this point for two purposes: first, to suggest, as 
I did in the previous paragraph, that McDonald’s Chaga novels and Edwards’s Monsters 
can still be considered part of the subgenre of postcolonial sf even though both authors 
are from Western, relatively privileged backgrounds. Secondly, I address the issue of 
representational politics as an attempt to think beyond identity politics in sf authors, as 
well as an attempt to recognize that encouraging a diversity of voices in the field—again, 
while critical, necessary, and fundamental to a postcolonial sf—is not enough. Simply 
encouraging diversity might in fact replicate the structures of the colonial gaze by 
painting non-Western authors as “exotic” voices to be exploited by the industry. 
Consideration of what constitutes a postcolonial sf needs to be more attuned to both the 
question of narrative representation and material practice. The increased call for diverse 
authors in science fiction is not only a question of representation, but a question of the 
structures of sf organizations that have proved unwelcoming or have not actively 
encouraged the participation of people of colour. 
To conclude this journey of “decolonizing” sf, we might return to an examination 
of the second framework that structures both science fiction and colonialism: the 
ideology of progress. For Rieder, this second framework is the most defining feature of 
the relationship between sf and colonialism, as “science fiction addresses itself to the 
ideological basis of colonial practice itself, by engaging various aspects of the ideology 
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of progress” (30). Following Jameson’s work, Rieder sees progress as a form of social 
memory required by capitalism and expressed through narratives about social 
development, growth and expansion (Rieder 29). In sf, when narratives focus primarily 
on technological development, such focus can often eschew political charges by 
appealing to the idea of “scientific progress” and global development. However, as 
Rieder points out, early sf reveals the ways scientific projects are also driven by a 
colonial ideology of progress, as underpinning even “the most legitimate scientific 
endeavor” is also the “common assumption that the relation of the colonizing societies 
[seen as more technologically advance] to the colonized ones is that of the developed, 
modern present to its own undeveloped, primitive past” (30). Sf’s focus on an evolved 
future exemplifies the same logic as the imperial expansionist project in its vision of 
“growth,” expansion, and the building of new worlds. As will be explored in more detail 
below, this future orientation is a means for creating imperialist relations (through the 
continued exploitation of the global South for the development of the North, for instance) 
but it can also function as a site of resistance towards imagining alternative futures. How 
sf narratives engage with the ideology of progress is thus important to considering the 
extent to which sf engages with the principles of colonialism. 
 
Nomadic Figurations: Reorienting the Colonial Gaze in Ian McDonald 
The back cover of Ian McDonald’s Evolution’s Shore (1995)—published as 
Chaga in the UK—describes the arrival of the Chaga in Kenya as “an alien infestation” 
in which “the Dark Continent becomes a frenzied backdrop of apocalyptic anticipation.” 
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The references to Henry Morton Stanley’s Through the Dark Continent (1878) and 
Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1899) are both troubling and appropriate. Charles 
Marlowe’s anxieties about, and often racist treatment of, African identity are manifest in 
his “suspicion of their not being inhuman” (100) and the double negative of Marlowe’s 
diction (not inhuman). Indeed, Marlowe’s statement reveals what Homi Bhabha describes 
as “the agonistic struggle between the epistemological, visual demand for a knowledge of 
the Other, and its representation in the act of articulation and enunciation” (72). Bhabha 
suggests it is in this space of designation and disavowal that questions of identity arise. 
As an alien invasion narrative, McDonald’s CHAGA trilogy—Evolution’s Shore, Kirinya 
(1997), and Tendeléo’s Story (2000)—examines the relationship between human and 
alien others in order to confront questions of subjectivity, identity, and alterity. 
Specifically, the CHAGA trilogy highlights how locating difference in a negative 
dialectical scheme supports the historical and material exploitation of people labeled 
racial, gendered, and sexualized others. When the Chaga lands on Earth, it colonizes the 
Kenyan landscape; yet it is the violent global response to this “disaster” of difference (led 
by the United States and the United Nations) that is the most shocking consequence of 
the alien encounter. Meanwhile, the Chaga is revealed to be a symbiotic rather than 
vampiric organism. McDonald’s novels destabilize the colonial gaze of sf in order to 
critique persisting imperial structures and the epistemological traditions that enable them. 
To briefly outline the plot of Evolution’s Shore, the novel begins as one of several 
Chaga packages headed towards Earth lands in Kenya. Its origins are unknown and all 
scientists can conclude about the alien is that it is a vegetative life-form that incorporates 
the genetic material of plants, animals, and humans into its neurological network, 
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creating new symbiotic organisms from this collected DNA. The Chaga is not harmful to 
any organism it comes into contact with, and in fact supports those living inside its forest-
like structure by creating new foods and vegetation. A reverse-terraforming of Kenya’s 
physical landscape occurs as the forest spreads, transforming the land and communities it 
touches. Humans in contact with, or living in, the Chaga may also be physically altered 
and are known as “Changed” humans. As the Chaga grows, animals and humans begin to 
take refuge inside the alien forest to escape social persecution, poverty, and political 
constraint. The UN responds to this alien “threat” by restricting access to the Chaga and 
attempting to contain and kill it. The UN’s supposedly benevolent assistance in Kenya, 
however, is soon revealed to be a means of exercising the organization’s particular brand 
of humanism. In order to control and maintain strict boundaries between the Chaga and 
Kenyan people, the UN often uses violence and force against those they claim to protect. 
Gaby McAslan is a journalist and the novel’s protagonist. Born and raised in 
Northern Ireland, she is drawn to the Chaga because “[h]ere was the way to make the 
world know her name. Her star with her name on it” (Evolution’s 26). Her obsession with 
the Chaga eventually leads to a job with SkyNet News in Kenya where her desire to 
discover the mystery of the Chaga’s origins means that Gaby often resorts to shady 
dealings to obtain further information, regardless of the consequences to the people 
around her. Eventually Gaby does uncover a mystery in the Chaga—namely, that the 
UN’s efforts in Kenya are not sincere attempts to assist the country because their research 
is partially funded by biotech companies working to harvest information from Chaga 
spores. The UN’s focus on the alien as threat means that they ignore the economic and 
social realities of Kenya as its people attempt to cope with the realities of AIDS, poverty, 
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and the information revolution. This section will focus on the first two novels of the 
series, Evolution’s Shore and Kirinya, which center on Gaby and her daughter, Serena. 
While Tendeléo’s Story is set in the same world, it is primarily an alternate history of the 
Chaga landing presented through the narrative of a young Kenyan woman. 
Kirinya takes place fifteen years after the Chaga first lands on Earth. Gaby now 
lives in exile in the Chaga because Serena is born a Changed child and both are 
prohibited from leaving Chaga regions. Meanwhile, the Chaga has grown to cover the 
entire southern hemisphere of Earth, dividing it into two halves along the equator, a 
partition that makes literal the economic, social, and political division between the global 
North and global South. The North, led primarily by the US, continues its attempts to 
contain the spread of the Chaga and Changed humans, resorting to extreme violence and 
incessant border patrol. Kirinya critiques US imperial dominance and the assumptions of 
liberal humanism exemplified by the UN. In this second novel, however, the violence of 
US military dominance is extended into space as the US attempts to secure control over a 
space object known as the Big Dumb Object (BDO), which hosts other Chaga life forms. 
While Evolution’s Shore is set primarily in Kenya, Kirinya is set in regions generally 
considered part of the “Third World” or global South. Kirinya therefore highlights 
McDonald’s broader critiques of globalization and imperialism. 
The rest of the chapter examines the ways Evolution’s Shore and Kirinya disrupt 
sf’s engagement with the ideologies of colonialism. First, I begin by examining how the 
colonial gaze of sf visualizes negative difference in the figure of the alien, and how this 
vision of alterity follows epistemological traditions that construct the subject as the 
product of the phallogocentric gaze. Influenced by Luce Irigaray’s feminist revisions of 
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Lacan, Rosi Braidotti suggests that “the phallogocentric system  functions by  
constituting  sets of  pejorative ‘others,’ negative instances of difference” and that 
“[d]evalued or pejorative otherness organizes differences in a hierarchal scale that allows 
for the management and governability of all gradations of social difference” (Nomadic 
96-97). Braidotti’s point is made evident in McDonald’s novels, which link a critique of 
the colonial gaze to the exploitative logic of advanced capitalism. Importantly, the Chaga 
also demonstrates the emergence of a third space of engagement that challenges the 
division by which the gaze rationalizes itself. In this space of hybridity the Chaga 
encourages a more ethical and positive affirmation of difference, promoting affinity with 
multiplicity over imperial domination. As a constantly transformative organism the 
Chaga presents a posthuman nomadic ethics, not only because it disrupts sf’s engagement 
with colonialism but also because it destabilizes the epistemological foundations of a 
fixed subjectivity, revealing the material conditions that continue to exploit a tradition of 
division between self and other. 
 
Alien Subjects, Phallogocentrism, and the Legacy of Humanism 
As alien invasion narratives, McDonald’s novels challenge Western 
epistemology’s tradition of using the gaze to conceptualize and treat difference as a 
dialectical opposition based on aggression and exploitation. The dominance of this 
epistemological orientation is reflected in various frameworks including Hegel’s 
master/slave dialectic, Laura Mulvey’s notion of the male gaze, and the colonial gaze 
that, as Rieder explains, distributes knowledge and power. The next two sections of this 
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analysis will focus on critiques of sf’s colonial gaze, examining first the way difference is 
conceptualized negatively before proceeding to outline the material consequences of this 
negative conception on social, economic, and political structures. Analysis of the gaze is 
central to understanding postcolonial critiques in the novels as “struggles over what will 
count as rational accounts of the world are struggles over how to see” (Haraway 194; 
emphasis in original). Furthermore, focusing on the relationship between difference and 
subjectivity as linked to sf’s colonial gaze reveals that “the epistemology of the eye and 
the training to see is central not only to the scientific enterprise but also to the process of 
the constitution of the subject as an ethical and political entity” (Braidotti, Nomadic 190). 
In Evolution’s Shore and Kirinya, sf’s colonial gaze is represented through specific 
characters (such as Gaby) as well as through UN scientists, the media, the US military, 
and biotech corporations that seek to dominate and ultimately control  the Chaga. 
In Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis, subjectivity is seen through the paradigm of 
castration in which the gaze “is presented to us only in the form of a strange contingency, 
symbolic of what we find on the horizon … namely, the lack that constitutes castration 
anxiety” (Lacan 72-73). Braidotti critiques this unconscious phallic structure, contending 
that epistemological traditions privileging phallogocentrism are complicit in equating 
difference with negative terms and can be linked to the historical dehumanization and 
exploitation of those constructed as gendered and racial others. Similarly, speaking of 
Bhabha, Griselda Pollock contends that “[w]e could argue racism, xenophobia, and 
fascism are premised on an extreme of the castration paradigm” (3). Translated to the 
alien others of sf, this phallic gaze is replicated as a colonizing gaze which, as Rieder and 
Jessica Langer have noted, oscillates between the positions of subject and object coded as 
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the relation between human observer and alien other. If the “colonial gaze distributes 
knowledge and power to the subject who looks, while denying or minimizing access to 
power for its object, the one looked at” (Rieder 7), alien others, such as the Chaga, are 
denied subjectivity and reduced to disposable bodies. 
McDonald’s novels link dominant, male-oriented theories of the gaze to the 
colonial gaze of sf and subsequently to the scopic drive of Gaby’s unwavering desire to 
discover the origins of the Chaga. As a journalist who moves to Kenya because she is 
fascinated by the exoticism of the alien, Gaby represents the scientific observer who 
wants “to get there before it was all named and numbered and known and there was no 
mystery left for her to explain” (Evolution’s 27). Gaby not only aspires to understand the 
Chaga, but she also wants to claim it for herself—it is “her alien rain forest,” a fetishized 
other for which she erects a “little shrine” (27). When Gaby is finally given the chance to 
learn more about the Chaga from Peter Werther, one of the first people to enter and leave 
its forest, she is unable to understand where the Chaga falls along the dichotomous 
borders of good/evil and human/non-human. Complicating matters, Peter describes his 
experience in the Chaga as simultaneously “wonder and horror,” “beauty and terror,” 
“monstrous [and] wonderful” (55). Struggling to understand, Gaby positions the Chaga as 
an other in relation to herself and equates the Chaga’s difference with negativity when 
she asks Peter if it represents “[t]he heart of darkness” (55). Peter responds that, on the 
contrary, the Chaga is “[t]he beginning of all light,” “so strange that it cannot be seen” 
(55; emphasis in original). Gaby’s fear of the Chaga reveals that her desire to understand 
the Chaga is premised on violent oppositions in which the split of subject/other is—like 
Lacan’s phallogocentric conception of the gaze—based on a paradigm of absence and 
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loss. Where Gaby sees difference in the legacy of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness—as 
negation, repression, or oppression of an other—Peter sees the Chaga’s difference as an 
affirmative relationship and a horizon of possibility. 
Additionally, the UN’s brand of humanism is revealed to be a lens that merely 
replicates the structures of the colonial gaze. By categorizing the Chaga as a non-human 
other, the UN follows a history of colonial violence in Africa characterized by the 
exclusion, brutality, and dehumanization of people of colour. Braidotti notes that “[t]he 
equation of difference with pejoration is built into the tradition that defines the Subject as 
coinciding with and hence being the same as consciousness, rationality, and self-
regulating ethical behaviour… [while] Otherness is defined in negative terms as the 
specular counterpart of the Subject” (Nomadic 75). The danger of this humanist tradition, 
as Braidotti contends, is that it results in the reduction of certain beings (historically non-
Western others) to disposable bodies. As an alien invasion narrative, McDonald’s texts 
are premised upon encounters with difference, and the extreme violence used by the UN 
to control the Chaga reflects the UN’s desire to enforce strict ideological boundaries 
between human and non-human others. Like Gaby, the UN and the US see the Chaga’s 
difference in primarily negative terms or, as one director puts it, the US military “can’t 
think in any other terms than enemies, invasion, containment, and counterattack” 
(Evolution’s 100). Thus, the UN’s attempts to regulate access to the Chaga are attempts 
to dehumanize and eventually eliminate the Chaga’s monstrous body. The US and UN 
even resort to using napalm (though unsuccessfully), and they ultimately take over Kenya 
in the name of protection, objectifying both Kenyans and the Chaga. 
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Furthermore, when the UN discovers Changed humans, it creates Unit 12, a 
highly confidential decontamination unit used to imprison Changed humans and subject 
them to scientific examination. By hiding Changed humans from public view and treating 
them as non-human scientific experiments, the UN maintains its power over them while 
claiming to protect Kenya and uphold universal humanist values. Similarly, Kirinya 
expands on the institutional prejudice of Unit 12 by emphasizing the development of 
terms such as “Space Monkey,” used by the US military to describe Changed humans. 
Not only is the term reminiscent of a history of racial violence and the disavowal of 
cultural difference, it also signifies the anxiety around non-anthropocentric subjectivity. 
Significantly, Changed humans inhabit the Chaga-grown southern hemisphere of Earth 
representative of the racial others of the global South. The UN’s boundary policing may 
thus exemplify Tony Davies’s claim that “[a]ll Humanisms, until now, have been 
imperial. They speak of the human in the accents and the interest of a class, a sex, a race, 
a genome” (131). 
By drawing attention to the epistemic violence enacted under the name of 
humanism and phallogocentric paradigms of subjectivity, McDonald’s novels connect 
ways of seeing with the continued exploitation of the global South. Gaby calls this 
“intellectual colonialism” (Evolution’s 174), noting during a UN directors’ meeting that 
“[t]his is what it is all about … UNECTAfrique/ Asie/Amerique.… The white boys 
telling the rest of the world what to think and how to think it. All the poor and the dirty 
and the overcrowded and the funny colored” (174). Too concerned with its own humanist 
vision and controlling the Chaga, the UN fails to address the material realities of Kenyan 
life. The UN forces millions of Kenyans to flee their homes, to live in poverty and 
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refugee camps as the organization’s own resources are directed towards research for 
biotech corporations. UN peacekeeping forces are revealed to be corrupt soldiers preying 
on disenfranchised refugees; on Gaby’s visit to a camp she sees firsthand “three blue-
helmets laugh at a desperate old man offering them the only thing he valued: an aged, 
aged black bicycle” (117). Moreover, the UN’s complete disregard of the status of AIDS 
in the country is made evident when it is revealed that the Chaga stops the development 
of HIV 4. HIV 4 sufferers discover that progression of the virus is stopped when Chaga 
spores enter their bodies; however, this also results in physical mutations that can include 
limb growth or Changed bodies. As a result, the UN hides this knowledge. Miriam 
Sondai, a Kenyan virologist who refuses to join the  UN’s  efforts, criticizes  the  
organization’s  neglect  of  HIV 4 by suggesting that AIDS is “an African problem in that 
the West does not want to get involved because it sees Slim [a nickname for AIDS] as a 
Malthusian check on African population growth” (93). Published in 1995, a year after the 
Rwandan genocide and in a decade fraught with tension over the status of AIDS in 
Africa, the novel channels contemporary criticism of the United Nations. 
Significantly, McDonald’s novels link a critique of the epistemological 
construction of difference with the exploitative logic of advanced capitalism as evidenced 
through the UN’s insistence on the monstrosity of the Chaga and their attempts to control 
access to the forest. Reinforcing ideological and physical barriers around the Chaga 
means that the UN and the US military control access to a new, lucrative resource. When 
Gaby launches an exposé of military violence inflicted against Changed humans in 
Kirinya, she tells her boss from SkyNet that more than fear of alien others motivates the 
US. Rather, the global North fears they will lose their position of economic power: 
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The political strategy is to keep the South isolated and divided until the Northern 
corporates can develop bucky technology to the level where they can survive 
contact with us.… It’s the classic alien first contact scenario: in almost any 
permutation contact with an advanced interstellar alien civilization, human society 
comes apart. Human society? Fuck. Western corporate capitalist society comes 
apart. They have a strategy for it, I’ve seen it, I had it wormed out of the 
Pentagon: quarantine, control, access restricted to government and military 
channels. (269) 
Gaby essentially describes disaster capitalism, which Naomi Klein outlines in The Shock 
Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (2007) as the process by which international 
development institutions exploit natural and human disasters in the process of neoliberal 
expansion. The US is not the only nation involved in such exploitation—at the end of 
Evolution’s Shore the UN’s benevolent assistance is discredited when Gaby discovers 
that the organization is also funded by biotech companies and armaments manufacturers 
hoping to profit from  Chaga technology. 
While Evolution’s Shore highlights the fear surrounding the Chaga’s anomalous 
body, Kirinya emphasizes the real-life violence of epistemological traditions privileging a 
fixed subjectivity. Because the UN does not recognize the agency of Changed humans, it 
also does not recognize the sovereignty of new political nations formed in the global 
South. As such, abuse against Chaga communities (such as the Harambee) is not 
considered an international human-rights issue. In addition, the UN restricts the migration 
of people wishing to escape into the Chaga, holding them in transit camps. Serena 
sarcastically notes that while the North asserts that those contained in UN camps are 
refugees, they are in fact “hostages” (204), people who are treated as disposable pawns. 
Under the colonial gaze of the UN and US, the raced bodies of refugees and Changed 
humans are subject to the same degradation. The prejudice against Changed humans 
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culminates in the horrific massacre of a refugee camp, Soroti, in northern Uganda. When 
Soroti is attacked by unknown helicopters, Oksana and Serena watch as hundreds of 
refugees are killed by “missiles [that] blew them all away in a spray of flesh and shivered 
metal” (215). The attack is later revealed to be a “field test” (269) for Northern industrials 
developing experimental weapons from Chaga biotech. With no UN personnel surviving 
the attack, the US manages to hide its involvement and it is only when Gaby collects 
stories of survivors that a different narrative emerges: “as the details of the massacre 
unfold, the magnitude of the lie the North is telling itself grows. If you have to lie, lie big. 
The story that it was a pitched battle between rival tribal factions holds. There is no 
contrary evidence” (239). The Soroti massacre exemplifies the inextricable relationship 
between epistemic and material violence. When difference is envisioned as “lack” it is 
either fetishized or feared—under this epistemological framework, Changed humans and 
refugees are constructed as inferior and disposable to “normal” humans, and the violence 
against them at Soroti is symptomatic of an epistemological framework that can only 
envision difference as negativity. 
 
Reorienting the Gaze: “Desire as Plenitude.”10 
Unlike texts that simply reverse the colonial gaze of alien-invasion narratives, 
McDonald’s novels reorient the framework of the gaze. If the Chaga reveals how 
imperial authority is maintained through the process of differentiation, it also reveals the 
                                                          
10 Critiquing theories of subjectivity premised upon negative, dialectical paradigms, Braidotti writes, “[t]he 
idea of desire as plenitude and not as lack produces a more transformative and less negative approach to 
the nomadic relational subject than previously allowed, for instance by the split subject of psychoanalysis” 
(Posthuman 189). 
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productive potential of difference. Specifically, the UN’s attempts to control the Chaga 
open up a space beyond the negative logic of the self/other dialectic. Positioned on the 
fringes of society, the Chaga is what Bhabha might call the production of a hybrid space. 
Bhabha points out that in cultural colonialism, “the reference of discrimination is always 
to a process of splitting as the condition of subjection: a discrimination between the 
mother culture and its bastards, the self and its doubles, where the trace of what is 
disavowed is not repressed but repeated as something different—a mutation, a hybrid” 
(159; emphasis in original). As a symbiotic organism that draws on human, animal, and 
plant DNA, the Chaga is repeatedly described as something “we have always known” and 
yet simultaneously something that is “changed in subtle ways” (Evolution’s 55) by its 
contact with others. Ultimately, it is the Chaga’s constant metamorphosis that opens up 
intersubjective spaces that envision difference and desire as positive, mutually productive    
processes. 
Despite the UN’s frequent mistreatment of the Chaga, certain UN directors 
recognize its symbiotic nature, suggesting that the Chaga is “one species with many 
dependent variants” or, as one director explains, “symbs are like families, communities, 
clans, tribes if you will” (Evolution’s 173). Similar to Octavia Butler’s Oankali, this 
symbiotic relationship is complex; the Chaga’s dependence on humanity can be seen as 
either exploitative or conversely as the production of a positive desire. I argue that the 
Chaga leans towards the latter as evidenced through the juxtaposition of UN refugee 
camps and Chaga communities. In opposition to the UN’s disregard for those suffering 
under its care, the Chaga supports new life forms and social formations and presents an 
alternative to the poverty of UN transit camps by  offering  free, nurturing food. After 
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eating and living in the forest herself, Gaby “did not wonder the Western industrials 
wanted it ring-fenced. The Chaga’s Grace Abounding was the denial of consumer 
capitalism,” an “insidious Eden where everything may be had by reaching out to take” 
(212). The Chaga’s strange generosity simultaneously inspires Gaby and worries her, and 
she once again sees the Chaga’s difference primarily in terms of negation and separation, 
fearing that the Chaga’s difference is “the end of everything it means to be human” (213). 
Conversely, Jake, a fellow news reporter, suggests she is a “pessimist” and that instead 
the Chaga is “a gate into new ways of being human” (Evolution’s 213). Jake recognizes 
the Chaga’s interdependence with humanity and sees its difference less as threat to 
humanity than to capitalist rule. While the Chaga collects DNA and alters Kenya’s 
ecosystems, Jake explains, “What the Chaga says to me is, now you don’t need to 
compete for resources, now all the rules of supply and demand are torn up: there is 
enough here for everyone, so now you can experiment with new ways of living, new 
ways of interacting, new societies and structures and sociologies” (213). In other words, 
the Chaga presents an alternative to consumer capitalism that does not seek to exploit 
those most acutely affected by this regime—people of the global South. 
In addition to challenging the logic of the global market, the Chaga’s constant 
symbiosis results in the emergence of Changed humans, whose hybrid existence 
confronts normative ideas of subjectivity and embodiment. While the UN and US deny 
the subjectivity of Changed humans, their disavowal of the Chaga’s difference is instead 
a 
sign of the productivity of colonial power.… [Hybridity] is the name for the 
strategic reversal of the process of domination through disavowal (that is, the 
production of discriminatory identities that secure the “pure” and original identity 
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of authority).… It unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power 
but reimplicates its identifications in strategies of subversion that turn the gaze of 
the discriminated back upon the eye of power. (Bhabha 159) 
For Bhabha, the “process of splitting” produces cultural difference through which 
colonial power is maintained; it is also symptomatic of the hybridity produced through 
disavowal, and subsequently that unsettles the notion of an essential, authentic identity. 
Changed people are reminders that fixed subjectivity and definitions of the human have 
also been used in exploitative colonial projects that define racial others as subhuman. 
Gaby discovers this when, after seeing Changed children, she links the contingent and 
historical meaning of the term “human” with the effects of colonial ideologies: 
How many centuries has it taken us to learn to see that people whose skin is a 
different colour from ours are as human as we, and now you are asking us to hug 
these winged children and hybrid obi-men and changelings to us. Things we may 
not even recognize as human we must call brother and sister. (Evolution’s 234) 
If the idea of human subjectivity is premised upon the disavowal and repetition of 
difference, Changed humans signify a hybrid identity that makes evident the process of 
cultural differentiation between the boundaries of human and non- human other. The idea 
of a universal and whole subject is eroded, and linked to the detrimental effects of 
colonial subjugation. Instead, as an alien figuration that is constantly transforming and 
simultaneously animal, plant, and human in its various materializations, the Chaga 
promotes a nonunitary subjectivity. In doing so, it rejects a philosophical tradition in 
which difference is envisioned as either negation or fetishized other, reconfiguring 
practices of belonging. 
Significantly, Kirinya expands on the notion of nonunitary subjectivity by 
focusing on the perspectives of multiple characters: namely, Serena, a Changed human, 
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and Oksana, Gaby’s friend and Serena’s surrogate mother. Bracha Ettinger’s concept of 
the matrixial gaze may help explore how Serena and Oksana reorient phallogocentric 
conceptions of difference in the novel. Ettinger explains that the matrixial gaze embraces 
transsubjective spheres that contest male-oriented conceptions of the gaze as founded on 
fear and lack, proposing instead a “model for a shareable dimension of subjectivity in 
which elements that discern one another as non-I, without knowing each other, co- 
emerge and co-inhabit a joint space, without fusion and without rejection” (65; emphasis 
in original). The matrix reconsiders difference outside the binary paradigms of 
masculine-feminine by introducing an alternative passage of subjectivization that is not 
founded on the “desire for a lost object” but rather a “metramorphic link” (124): 
Metramorphosis is an out-of-focus passageway composed of transgressive 
borderlinks that transform, simultaneously and differently, co-emerging partial- 
subjects, partial Others, partial-objects.… In its function as a passage to the 
Symbolic, metramorphosis acts from the shareable borderspace to create and 
redistribute the traces of these joint transformations of encounters, without taking 
the route of the masculine Oedipal castration. (Ettinger 65; emphasis in original) 
The matrixial gaze/space supports the nonunitary theory of subjectivity proposed in 
Braidotti’s Nomadic Subjects. Both consider “subjectivity-as- encounter” (Ettinger 86) in 
which “becoming-together precedes being-one” (72). In this way the matrix is not 
symbiosis in the sense of fusion, nor is it a rejection of the other; instead it is an 
interconnected process of becoming.  
As an isopath who “can share other people’s identities” (Kirinya 101), Serena 
personifies the matrixial gaze. She “sees, hears, smells what you smell” (101), and can 
link to humans and animals alike. Serena’s connections are matrixial encounters that 
engender the process of metramorphosis, or “transgressive borderlinks that transform, 
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simultaneously and differently, co-emerging partial-subjects, partial Others, partial-
objects” (Ettinger 65; emphasis in original). When Serena joins the Black Simbas, a rebel 
group which uses violence against the North, she embarks on a mission that requires her 
to use her isopathic skills to force a surrogate body to commit suicide. Fueled by her 
anger towards non-Changed humans, Serena agrees to inhabit the body of Mrs. 
Meenakshi Khandewal (who has unknowingly been injected with Chaga spores) and 
commit a bloody suicide that will spread the Chaga into carefully protected non-Chaga 
areas. Serena’s isopathic connections with others are not one way, however, and the 
bodies she inhabits mutually affect her. Mid-mission, Serena tries to reaffirm the purpose 
for killing her host but finds she cannot; instead she discovers “vain, trivial, kindly Mrs 
Meenakshi Khandewal.… She found the well-dressed snobbish middle-class Indian 
woman who had nothing she could call her own but her two daughters. She saw a human 
being” (263). By inhabiting another’s body Serena learns that “the knowing self is partial 
in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply  there and original; it is always constructed 
and stitched together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together 
without claiming to be another” (Haraway 193). Serena’s link with Khandewal affects 
her ability to treat another’s body as disposable, and the event is one in a series of many 
through which, despite her initial hatred of non-Changed humans, Serena discovers 
community and kinship in the space of the other. 
Though Oksana is not an isopath, her insights as a linguistic shaman are 
particularly significant for exploring the relationship between alternative forms of 
subjectivity and phallogocentrism. Oksana believes in “the power of language over 
reality” (186). Oksana’s shamanism does not believe in or perpetuate “the tyranny of the 
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logocentric gaze” (Braidotti, Nomadic 64), but instead she suggests that an alternative to 
the fixity of rational, linguistic structure exists, perhaps even as Ettinger’s feminine 
matrixial unconscious. Oksana explains that, in her version of shamanism, spirits are 
internal processes where, 
altered states of consciousness remain unconscious, preconscious, because they 
have no language structure—or whatever structure they have, it is not logical, 
language-like. It’s like, in a dream, identities are not fixed; you can have a 
different face, your best friend looks like someone else, everyday words have 
totally different, but quite consistent meanings. A different logic—I know there is 
wisdom there, and very great power, if we can tap it. Shamanic flight is the flight 
within, to these altered states of consciousness. (181) 
If, as Braidotti argues, “phallogocentric logic is embedded in language, which is the 
fundamental political structure and symbolic system or myth in our societies” (Nomadic 
97), then shamanic flight into alternate realms of consciousness is a trajectory out of rigid 
and molar ways of being. When Oksana repeatedly emphasizes the “power of word over 
matter” (183), she does not suggest that language merely dictates reality. Rather, 
Oksana’s shamanism can be seen as a sort of utopian attempt to find an embodied 
language where the linguistic signifier is not based on absence and lack but on a process 
of becoming—where there is instead “language that describes its object so completely 
and precisely that to change a sentence, a word, even a letter, changes objective reality” 
(183). The closest Oksana comes to experiencing this is when she flies a Chaga-grown 
airplane, describing her sense of merging with the Chaga as becoming “womanplane.… 
She had wings for arms, engines in her belly. This was true shamanic flying” (189). In 
the matrixial sphere of shamanic trance, Oksana searches for “a different logic,” one in 
which subjectivity is a materialist, interconnected process of becoming. 
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Enacting Nomadism 
Evolution’s Shore and Kirinya confront a central question about sf: as a genre 
deeply rooted in the myth that Langer calls “the stranger and the strange land” (3), how 
can it represent an alternative to the colonial gaze and its repetition of the human/alien 
binary? Furthermore, in representations of alterity, how does one articulate the 
construction of difference as both embodied and multidimensional? If language is the site 
at which subjectivity is enunciated, then imagining alternative representations of 
subjectivity is both a linguistic and epistemological endeavor. Influenced by Irigaray as 
well as by Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic thought, Braidotti offers the figure of the 
nomad as a discursive and political project that conceptualizes desire beyond a logic of 
division. Specifically, “[n]omadism is an invitation to disidentify ourselves from the 
sedentary phallogocentric monologism of philosophical thinking” (Nomadic 24). Like 
Donna Haraway’s cyborg, Braidotti’s nomadic ethics encourages “the transcendence of 
negativity … [meaning that] the conditions for renewed political and ethical agency 
cannot be drawn from the immediate context … [but] have to be generated affirmatively 
and creatively by efforts geared to creating possible futures” (Posthuman 191).11 
McDonald’s novels portray the Chaga, Gaby, and the Freedom Tree as nomadic 
figurations that complicate the human/alien binary and the premise of division on which 
the gaze rationalizes itself. Importantly, McDonald’s novels disrupt the categories of 
                                                          
11 2. Haraway’s work has close affinities with nomadic feminists such as Braidotti, and Braidotti often 
invokes Haraway’s cyborg figuration, arguing that “Donna Haraway’s work on vision and science offers the 
most convincing example of positive feminist-situated epistemology and an alternative take on 
visualization techniques” (Nomadic 206). 
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human and alien alike, portraying each as subjects that are nonunitary, nomadic, and 
engaged with difference in mutually productive encounters. 
Braidotti takes from Haraway the term “figuration” as a methodology and way of 
expressing different subject positions. A figuration is not a metaphor but rather an 
alternative vision of subjectivity that is politically and ethically informed (Nomadic 22). 
Nomadism is about recognizing one’s ever-shifting subject position, moving away from 
essentialist and phallocentric frames of reference. It is also about a sustained commitment 
to intersectional approaches and political figurations that are “purposeful tools for 
intervention in reality, figuration in that they make an impact on our imagination, but 
they are also forms and accounts of situated knowledge” (Nomadic 105). Nomadic 
subjectivity is in this sense a sort of posthumanism that emphasizes the different 
historical and socioeconomic situations of subjects and their diverging positions in global 
power relations. The nomadic subject, however, is not simply the cosmopolitan tourist; 
instead it is “consciousness-raising and the subversion of set conventions [that] define the 
nomadic state, not the literal act of traveling” (Nomadic 26). The nomad embraces a 
transitory nature that emphasizes affective connection, bonding, and coalitions in 
transgressive spaces. Following Haraway, Braidotti emphasizes the potency of a nomadic 
figuration as a political myth that exposes the embodied social and political practices of 
particular locations. Nomadic transgression is therefore also actively opposed to the 
vampiric hybridity of advanced capitalism, which proliferates difference for 
consumption. 
As an “alien” figure, the Chaga lends itself to nomadic thought by constructing 
interwoven spaces conducive to understanding encounters with difference outside the 
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rigid constructs of subject/object/other. In tune with the symbiotic organisms envisioned 
by authors such as Ursula K. Le Guin and Octavia E. Butler, the Chaga demonstrates that 
alien figurations may themselves provide immanent lines of flight out of the binary logic 
that characterizes sf’s colonial gaze. By engaging with difference in a symbiotic 
relationship, the Chaga rejects the double bind of self/other by reconceptualizing the 
negation of difference as a space of affinity, or a space of interconnection and affective 
relation. Peter Werther describes the Chaga as a sort of neurological network premised on 
the ideals of shared community and communication: “It’s smart. The trees talk. The roots 
connect, like the cells in your brain. They touch, they share, and they think, but it is not 
any kind of intelligence we can understand” (Evolution’s 56). Peter’s description 
emphasizes the rhizomatic mode the Chaga functions in, both literally as a complex 
network and figuratively in its ability to reconfigure the self/other dichotomy. The 
Chaga’s symbiotic relationship with all things that it touches means it is never one thing 
but is instead a liminal space, a “place of perpetual change and transformation” (232). Its 
engagement in a mutually productive symbiosis presents an alternative to the engulfing 
violence of the self/other dialectic. 
Though Gaby is not an obvious example of a nomadic subject, her experiences 
throughout Evolution’s Shore may be some of the most important, because her ability to 
take responsibility for her actions and embrace new ways of seeing and being are crucial 
nomadic orientations. Initially, Gaby’s white, colonial gaze dominates the beginning of 
Evolution’s Shore, and she is so consumed by the exoticism of the Chaga that she fails to 
see the lived realities of Kenyan people and her own position of entitlement. As Jerome 
Winter suggests, despite her criticisms of UNECTA as a neocolonial agent, Gaby is 
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“perhaps too oblivious of her own white privilege” (466).  Even though Gaby frequently 
encounters the extreme disparity between the wealthy and poor in Kenya and the violence 
used to maintain such division, she is comfortable in her material situation and unable to 
recognize her own culpability. As a result, she is frequently described as “self-
unknowing” (94), and her obsession with the Chaga initially prevents Gaby from taking 
responsibility for her actions and desires. In spite of this, through her contact with the 
Chaga she eventually learns what Braidotti argues is the importance of “cartographies of 
power that rest on a form of self-criticism, a critical, genealogical self-narrative” 
(Nomadic 16). Gaby’s encounters with the Chaga open up a space that encourages 
increased self-reflexivity and critical engagement with her embodied position. 
Eventually the metaphysical cannibalism of Gaby’s anthropocentric and humanist 
stance is shaken during two major events in Evolution’s Shore: first, through her 
encounter with a Changed child and second, through her experience of decontamination 
in Unit 12 after the UN captures her inside the Chaga.12 Significantly, Gaby’s first 
contact with the Chaga is written in the first person as diary entries, straying from the 
third-person narration in most of the novel. When Gaby finally ventures into the Chaga’s 
“heart of darkness” she begins to question the UN’s decontamination lies and constructed 
narratives of fears, and during her encounter with a Changed child she begins the process 
                                                          
12 3. I draw here on Ti-Grace Atkinson’s feminist exploration of the “metaphysical cannibalism” that 
Atkinson argues has been exercised against women. While Atkinson and Braidotti consider the notion of 
“metaphysical cannibalism” primarily in relation to the subjectivity of women under patriarchy, Deborah 
Paes De Barros in Fast Cars and Bad Girls: Nomadic Subjects and Women’s Road Stories (2004) points to 
an extension of such cannibalism in Deleuze and Guattari’s work: “Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
consider the notion of ‘metaphysical cannibalism’ in another context. In their Anti-Oedipus, the act of 
consumption becomes finally a kind of colonization, a reclamation of a territory already claimed by 
another” (48). Atkinson, Braidotti, and Deleuze and Guattari all articulate the violence and exploitation of 
those subjugated under the traditions of Western epistemology and phallogocentrism. 
74 
 
of un-learning socially coded modes of thought about difference. Initially frightened and 
disturbed by Nicole, a Changed girl who has grown wing-like appendages, Gaby listens 
to Nicole’s father explain that her wings are the result of a symbiotic relationship with the 
Chaga. Nicole’s family is careful to emphasize “she is not a monster or a freak or an 
example of evolution in action or the first generation of the new humanity” (235). Forced 
to confront a child, Gaby functions in the nomadic mode by recognizing her resistance in 
accepting Nicole and subsequently the destructiveness of ingrained social prejudices as 
well as her own responsibility in perpetuating them. When Gaby learns of the 
“institutionalized infanticide” (235) of children like Nicole she is horrified. Meanwhile, 
Nicole’s family expresses their hope for the acceptance of Changed humans and the 
possibility of seeing the Chaga as a form of “Transhumanity. Post-humanity. Pan-
humanity” (233) that is not harmful or destructive but an entrance into new ways of being 
human. This is also the point at which the Chaga is a particularly potent political 
figuration, creatively envisioning a “pan-humanity” which is grounded in a critique of 
current social and political structures rather than hierarchal difference. 
Gaby’s nomadic shift towards the embrace of alternative visions of subjectivity 
continues when she is later captured by the UN and experiences decontamination in Unit 
12. For the first time, Gaby is placed in the position of an objectified other as UN 
scientists hold her for observation, subjecting her to degrading tests. Held captive, Gaby 
is sterilized, probed, prodded, and finally sexually violated when she is forced into a  
“birthing chair” where “they did things with the dilators and the rubber gloves and the 
endoscope and the lubricating jelly” (241). When Gaby retorts, “You don’t need to do 
this.… There is no medical reason for this. You just want to humiliate me because we 
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fucked the UN up the ass” (241), the doctor responds by continuing his examination with 
greater force. As the narrator of Evolution’s Shore, Gaby is stripped of power and 
autonomy, and placed in the position of a “contaminated” Changed human. Furthermore, 
when Gaby is finally released, she is brought on a tour of the other inhabits of Unit 12 
where she discovers Changed people who have transformed in various ways—some have 
multiple hands, can access multiple consciousnesses, or have grown winged appendages. 
Once again, Gaby is forced to confront her own white gaze when she sees a group of 
Changed beings and thinks of them as “Tree people. Monkey people. A hundred 
childhood racist clichés bubbled up in Gaby’s mind” (255). Gaby knows Changed people 
represent new ways of understanding humanity, yet her ingrained prejudices and ways of 
seeing reflect the dangers of epistemological traditions premised on self/other binaries. 
Enacting nomadism requires to her to acknowledge these destructive trends and “prick 
them with reason” even if “[o]ld prejudices burst hard” (255). It is not until after Serena’s 
birth and her mission with the iMerina that Gaby is perhaps able to fully understand the 
potential of nomadic thought. 
Kirinya marks the imminent collapse of the North/South divide on Earth and the 
possibility of embracing a posthuman nomadic ethics when a rebel group, the iMerina, 
launches what they call the “Freedom Tree,” a project aimed at creating a space elevator 
between the Chaga-grown BDO and Mount Kenya. Because the US considers the BDO a 
valuable resource as a “gateway to the stars” (374), and because they do not recognize the 
subjectivity of Changed humans who inhabit the planet, the iMerina realize that 
continued US military control over the BDO will only perpetuate economic, political, and 
social inequity for both worlds. The Tree aims to connect Changed people on Earth with 
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the Changed on the BDO. A crew member of the iMerina ship, Tsirinana, names the 
project the Freedom Tree because “[i]n Sierra Leone, in the town of Freetown, there was 
a tree at the top of King Jimmy’s steps. When the slave ships were captured, the slaves 
were brought to the tree and had their chains struck off beneath its branches. It was they 
who called it the Freedom Tree” (400; emphasis in original). Tsirinana’s reference to the 
slave trade as a key source of inspiration for the space elevator associates colonial 
brutality with the treatment of Changed humans. Consequently, the Freedom Tree can be 
seen as an attempt to dispel the chains of epistemological violence produced under 
theories of subjectivity premised upon divisive, exploitative paradigms. Instead, the 
Tree’s physical and neurological connection between Earth and the BDO challenges such 
division and seeks to create spaces of nomadic affectivity and enlarged community. 
In Kirinya’s imagined future the relationship between subject/other is one of 
metramorphosis in which “the fluidity of experience places both partial- subjects in a 
reciprocity without symmetry in which they are both transformed and differently 
transform each other” (Ettinger 83). The Chaga, as a partial subject, is affected by—and 
simultaneously affects—the lives of those it touches, and it constantly reinvents itself 
based on its encounters with difference. After the Freedom Tree is successfully “planted” 
on the BDO and the mission returns to Earth, Serena describes the process of change that 
has been initiated as a sort of metaphorical rebirth where Africa, “the mother of man … 
[rises] out of the dome of ocean and the arc of night like a legendary child being born, 
that is old and wise, and at the same time forever young and curious” (402). The duality 
of the imagery Serena uses to describe the continent in this moment is symptomatic of the 
borderland that the Chaga embodies and her ability to see beyond the foreclosure of 
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binary oppositions; upon returning to Earth’s atmosphere Serena “[sees] terminum 
striding across the curved land and now she saw it not as a line of division but a place of 
joining.… She [sees] the Freedom Tree climbing out of the heart of the line of division” 
(402). The Freedom Tree opens up a space of hybridity, and becomes “a political object 
that is new, neither the one nor the other, [that] properly alienates our political 
expectations and changes, as it must, the very forms of our recognition of the moment of 
politics” (Bhabha 37). The Chaga is converted from an alien other to a transformational 
process that rejects antagonistic dualism and finds instead liminal spaces of 
interconnection. Drawing upon sf’s imperial history and reconfiguring the figure of the 
alien at the level of form and content, McDonald’s Chaga is a theoretical meditation on 
the genre’s historical engagement with the ideologies of colonialism. Braidotti might 
even call this an immanent politics in which McDonald’s alien figurations function as “an 
epistemic detox cure” (Nomadic 16). 
The Chaga, Changed humans, and the Freedom Tree present a future not only of 
bodily difference but also difference in the way we treat and understand alterity. If a 
posthuman nomadic ethics “urges us to endure the principle of non-One at the in-depth 
structures of subjectivity by acknowledging the ties that bind us to the multiple ‘others,’” 
in doing so it also produces an “ethical principle that breaks up … the master narratives 
of primordial loss, incommensurable and irreparable separation” (Braidotti, Posthuman 
100). As such, the Chaga negotiates difference without erasing it or resorting to 
hierarchal filiation. Sherryl Vint argues that “[t]he new selves SF might help us imagine 
are both the problematic selves and the unexpected others … [who] remind us of the 
fragility of our boundary-making work and that the other always is an aspect of self made 
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problematic” (21).  By imagining new relationships between self and other that work to 
destabilize essentialist narratives, the Chaga reveals the ways our boundary making can 
result in exploitative and destructive categories of difference. The “evolution” imagined 
by McDonald, then, is not only a biological one, but also a social, political, and economic 
transformation that will, like the Chaga and the Freedom Tree, change the landscape of 
our social and political world. 
 
Science Fictional Lines of Flight 
Evolution’s Shore and Kirinya use generic traditions to expose the 
epistemological assumptions behind sf’s colonial gaze and reorient the genre’s 
imperialistic tendencies. By re-working now classic sf conventions including the 
narrative of alien invasion, the discovery of Big Dumb Objects (BDOs), cosmopolitan 
envoys, and evolutionary change, McDonald’s novels align with a strain of globally 
concerned sf. The Chaga series clearly draws on the works of previous sf authors such 
Ursula K. Le Guin, Gwyneth Jones, and Arthur C. Clarke, similarly concerned with the 
genre’s imperialistic tendencies and engaged with more cosmopolitan perspectives. If 
Evolution’s Shore “plugs” into the megatext of sf (Winter 461), then McDonald’s novels 
can be seen as inhabiting a space of multiplicity that plays with the evolving status of sf 
icons and themes. Asked in an interview about his appropriation of other texts, 
McDonald argued, “Everything influences you. To deny that is to deny any attempt to 
produce art at all” (Gevers). 
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McDonald’s self-reflexivity is not postmodern play but is rather a reflection of his 
historical and social reality as a writer in Northern Ireland, a society he considers Third 
World (Gevers). In many ways, McDonald’s sentiments echo Bhabha’s discussion of 
hybridity and the enunciation of a Third Space in The Location of Culture (1994), in that 
McDonald’s novels function as a space “which constitutes the discursive conditions of 
enunciation that ensure that the meaning and symbols of culture have no primordial unity 
or fixity; that even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistoricized and read 
anew” (Bhabha 55). Committed to a revisionary engagement with the present, 
McDonald’s future visions renew past symbols and histories, constructing in the process 
an in-between space that intervenes in sf’s operations within the contemporary moment. 
This dedication to a politics of location is not simply an aesthetic endeavor: as McDonald 
points out, “I’ve never taken to all that Home Counties pining-for-Empire/ degeneration 
stuff. I’ve been living in the last days of empire for most of my life, and it gives you quite 
a different perspective. Historical necessity” (Gevers). 
While McDonald acknowledges an affinity with those under the rule of empire, 
his claims to Third World kinship are somewhat problematic. As an educated white male, 
McDonald’s experiences are considerably different from those in the various cultural 
settings he appropriates. Kenya’s history of colonization, slavery, and complex relations 
among a wide range of racial and ethnic groups results in very different experiences of 
colonization from those of Northern Ireland. McDonald’s equation of Ireland as “Third 
World” thus must also be examined critically for its ability to render invisible the very 
specific violence and exploitation experienced by racialized others in the global South. 
For example, Evolution’s Shore and Kirinya are told primarily from Gaby’s perspective 
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as a Northern Irish woman, and Kenyan characters play mostly marginal, supporting 
roles. Kenya becomes a backdrop for general “Third World” struggles, and at times 
McDonald’s novels lose sight of the specificity of historical context in postcolonial   
nations. 
Despite these concerns, McDonald’s novels do share a political affinity with 
postcolonial sf, a subgenre that has at times been criticized for its appropriation of 
various cultural settings while simultaneously praised for its utopian drive. For instance, 
writing about two other authors in the field, Lauren Beukes and Tobias Buckell, Eric D. 
Smith notes that “[d]espite their… limitations, both [writers] summon the critical 
resources at hand, however partial or compromised, however imbricated within the 
cognitive and cultural architectures of hegemony, to illuminate and engage the brute 
necessities of the present” (194). Smith’s comment is also useful for considering 
McDonald’s work in Evolution’s Shore and Kirinya—while occasionally problematic, 
both novels retain a desire to expose exclusionary and exploitative visions of difference. 
By referring to contemporary political and social institutions like the UN, the future of 
McDonald’s novels is brought into direct contact with contemporary realities. David 
Higgins argues it is sf’s very engagement with and sensitivity to imperial discourses and 
practices that allow for critical alternatives, and McDonald’s novels are examples of such 
political engagement.13 
Evolution’s Shore and Kirinya use the genre’s engagement with colonialism to 
critique current imperial structures and ultimately to challenge the “hegemonic [and] 
                                                          
13 4. See Higgins’s “Toward a Cosmopolitan Science Fiction” in American Literature 83.2 (2011): 331-354. 
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exclusionary power at the very heart of the identity structures of the dominant subject” 
(Braidotti, Nomadic 9). In this way, the Chaga functions as the nomadic figuration 
Braidotti advocates: its simultaneous posthuman imaginings and critique of Western 
imperialism create an alternative space that destabilizes the structure of a humanistic 
subjectivity and the social relations that support it. If subjectivity is understood as a 
socially mediated process and negotiation with external power relations (Braidotti, 
Nomadic 18), then McDonald’s critique of imperialism is also a critique of how we come 
to understand self and difference. This relocation of difference is not an attempt to 
imagine a radical alterity but to recognize the tradition of naturalized difference that has 
proliferated with advanced capitalism. If nomadic subjects follow a politics of location in 
order to deterritorialize and defamiliarize us from our static locations and subject 
positions, then McDonald’s texts not only defamiliarize us in the tradition of sf, they also 
defamiliarize our conceptualization of difference as a dialectical opposition based on 
consumption and exploitation. 
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CHAPTER THREE: “Race and/as Technology,” or Techno-Orientalism and Science 
Fiction(s) 
This chapter will examine how postcolonial sf draws attention to the relationship 
between race, science fiction and scientific discourse, particularly through the lens of 
techno-Orientalism. In other words, postcolonial sf as I see it draws attention not just to 
the discursive processes of racialization but also to the supposedly “value-neutral” 
scientific practices that construct pejorative difference. Sandra Harding argues that, 
“value-neutrality is not value neutral” (61), and that postcolonial science studies have 
pointed to the ways modern science retains a distinctly European/colonial core by 
suggesting that it does. This is also part of the ideology of progress identified by 
Rieder—scientific development is often heralded as a positive endeavour for all, 
especially for the global South where technological development is seen as providing the 
means to transcend poverty, disprove racism (through genomics), and contribute to more 
equitable futures. However, postcolonial sf questions this techno-optimism, highlighting 
the ways colonial frameworks underlie many scientific claims that, if unacknowledged, 
could continue to have adverse effects on the lives of people of colour. If the “claims for 
modern science’s (value-neutral, internally achieved) universality and objectivity” are left 
unchallenged, Harding argues that one consequence is the “disvaluing [of] local concerns 
and knowledge” which in turn gives legitimacy and power to outside experts (61). 
Technological and scientific development can therefore be used as a tool of subjugation 
when less “developed” nations must continue to depend on expertise from the global 
North.  
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As a part of popular culture, sf’s imagined futures have always engaged questions 
of race, though in early sf this was frequently through the absence of people of colour 
rather than through direct engagement with racial politics. Isiah Lavender III in Race in 
American Science Fiction (2011) succinctly notes, “Science fiction often talks about race 
by not talking about race, [and] makes real aliens, has hidden race dialogues”; 
furthermore, even though sf is a “literature that talks a lot about underclasses or 
oppressed classes, it does so from a privileged if somewhat generic white space” (7). As 
Lavender’s quote suggests, several sf tropes—such as aliens, cyborgs, and technological 
others—are linked to the construction of “otherness,” even if race is not foregrounded as 
this explicit difference. Species differentiation, for instance, functions as a form of racial 
differentiation in sf, and often reflects evolutionary judgements regarding which species 
is the more evolved life form. Rieder addresses this in relation to Wells’s The War of the 
Worlds, for example, when Wells compares the Martian invasion of Earth to the genocide 
of Tasmanians. On the surface Wells’s comparison astutely notes the cruel 
dehumanization and colonization of Tasmanians by asking (white) readers to imagine 
themselves as colonized people, but Rieder points out that Wells’s “analogy [also] rests 
on the logic prevalent in contemporary anthropology that the indigenous, primitive 
other’s present is the colonizer’s own past” (5). The construction of racial difference via 
species difference in science fiction therefore points to a central feature that links the 
genre to colonialism: the construction of exotic others through which evaluative 
judgements are made regarding race and historical development. Such features are also 
indicative of Rieder’s notion of the colonial gaze, revealing the ways science fiction’s 
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vocabulary and narrative structure is invested in the ideological construction of racial 
difference. 
If the ideological basis of colonial practice is central to much early sf, then it is 
also inevitable that “some of the racism endemic to colonialist discourse is woven into 
the texture of science fiction” (Rieder 97). Thus, when sf presumes an evolutionary white 
or colour-blind future, it contributes to the marginalization of people of colour by 
depicting race as a matter of little importance. As Mark Bould contends, sf’s colour-blind 
futures actually erase histories of racial struggle and thereby fail to engage the material 
conditions that perpetuate racist ideologies (“Ships” 180). When early sf did engage with 
race, it frequently reinforced racist assumptions and fears. This is particularly evident in 
early pulp science fiction, where yellow-peril narratives such as Philip Nowlan’s 
“Armageddon 2419 A.D.” and David H. Keller’s “The Bloodless War” depict Asian 
“hordes” at war with the United States. Betsy Huang points out how “American science 
fiction’s long Orientalist history” exemplifies “the West’s enduring ambivalence towards 
Asians as friend or foe in its conceptions of the future” (95). Indeed, though many of 
these yellow-peril stories were influenced by immigration policy at the time, such as the 
Chinese exclusion act, these narratives also reveal how the colonial gaze is ingrained in 
the genre’s very structure as evidenced through its tendency to reiterate binary divisions 
(between human and nonhuman characters, for instance) central to racist paradigms. Just 
as the colonial gaze is premised upon the binary between the one who looks and the one 
who is looked at, “the apologetic function of the concept of race does not depend on 
precise categorization, however, but simply on division itself” (Rieder 110). This division 
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is clearly evident in early sf which constructed racial division through alien others, as 
well as through explicitly racist/ethnocentric narratives such as yellow-peril tales. 
Contemporary science fiction continues to replicate the structures of the colonial 
gaze and ideology of progress even if current genre texts appear less imperialistic and 
include more diverse characters. Where early sf presents clearly demarcated boundaries 
between its (white) scientists and (non-white) aliens, late twentieth century sf depicts a 
different array of alien “others” in the form of posthuman or technological others. In 
contemporary sf the changing semantic structures, or tropes, of sf do not necessarily 
signify the end of colonial regimes; rather, the binary logic of the colonial gaze is 
translated to new divisions between, for instance, the have and have-nots of informational 
capitalism, or between virtual and physical spaces in cyberpunk fictions. If early sf erases 
the complex history of race relations by depicting solely white societies and colour-blind 
futures, the inclusion of Japanese and East Asian characters in 1970s and 80s cyberpunk 
does not necessarily signify a departure from the genre’s colonial gaze. For example, 
Lavender highlights a moment in Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) when replicants— 
who are considered nonhuman characters and referred to through the derogatory phrase 
“skin-jobs”—are explicitly compared to black men through a racial slur; in the film 
Deckard states, “Skin-jobs. That’s what Bryant called Replicants. In history books he’s 
the kind of cop who used to call black men niggers” (qtd. in Lavender 9). “Skin-jobs” and 
black men are both marked by their phenotypal difference, which is ultimately used as a 
way to identify, racialize, and project hatred onto a certain group of people. 
Furthermore, the frequent association of “Asian” identity and settings with high 
technology (in Gibson’s Neuromancer or Scott’s Blade Runner, for instance) points to a 
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form of techno-Orientalism in contemporary sf and technoscientific discourse. In their 
explanation of techno-Orientalism, David Morley and Kevin Robins argue that racist 
assumptions have not disappeared with advancements in technoscience but rather are 
integrated into the technology itself. Depictions of Japanese technological dominance in 
cyberpunk, for example, often reiterate Orientalist fears where  
[w]ithin the political and cultural unconscious of the West, Japan has come to 
exist as the figure of empty and dehumanised technological power. It represents 
the alienated and dystopian image of capitalist progress. This provokes both 
resentment and envy. The Japanese are unfeeling aliens; they are cyborgs and 
replicants. (170)  
Even though cyberpunk might depict racially diverse futures, “the desire to conceptualize 
the East through a technocratic framework within cultural production leads to a re-
articulation and re-emergence of the yellow peril” (Sohn 10), or a form of techno-
Orientalism, as Asian characters are often represented through racial frames that present 
them as cold, calculated and emotionless robots. Asian characters and settings in 
contemporary sf therefore continue to reflect anxieties about the potential dominance of 
the East. 
Two major themes define this chapter: first, through three different novels I 
consider the ways postcolonial sf challenges the assumption that advancements in 
technology are utopian solutions that will help transcend racism. Postcolonial sf 
challenges this assumption by exploring how technological developments can function to 
further propagate racist assumptions and colonial practices. Secondly, I suggest that these 
novels reveal how the bodies of people of colour are doubly racialized in science fiction 
by drawing attention to processes of racialization that continue to mark Asian bodies, 
reducing them to instruments of both science and narrative exoticism. To put it simply, 
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the bodies of people of colour have long been the “instruments” of science and used as 
tools for the development of modern science. However, by explicitly prescribing 
technological qualities to the bodies of people of colour, techno-Orientalism also disrupts 
the oversimplified binary of biological determinism versus cultural relativism through 
which race is often discussed. As Wendy Chun suggests, seeing race as technology 
“displaces claims of race as either purely biological or purely cultural” (38) thereby 
enabling us to “frame the discussion around ethics rather than ontology, on modes of 
recognition and relation, rather than being” (39). I expand on Chun’s claim to consider 
how postcolonial sf and techno-Orientalism can “frame the discussion [of race] around 
ethics” by seeing processes of racialization as technologies of colonialism. The colonial 
gaze of sf is therefore symptomatic of the very real, historical practices of domination 
and subjugation that can occur through the supposedly neutral field of scientific 
development. My critique does not seek to posit a blanket condemnation of modern 
science, but rather draws attention to the need to re-consider certain scientific practices 
through the lens of postcolonial and critical race studies.  
Focusing specifically on techno-Orientalism allows me to address how Asian 
identity in particular is constructed, but my use of techno-Orientalism here also differs 
slightly from most contemporary definitions which tend to focus on the ways high-tech 
Asian future articulates anxieties about the West’s dominance into the future. In the latest 
collection on the subject, for instance, editors David Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta Niu 
define techno-Orientalism as “the phenomenon of imagining Asia and Asians in hypo- or 
hypertechnological terms in cultural productions and political discourse” (2). This 
definition, while usefully broad, is not much different than the articulation of yellow-peril 
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fears in early sf where technologically advanced Asian hordes descended upon the U.S. 
Earlier definitions of techno-Orientalism also focus on the West’s fear of losing their 
dominance as a consequence of the economic expansion of East Asian countries 
emerging out the 1990s economic boom and increased technological innovation. 
Cyberpunk has therefore been a central genre for the interrogation of what Toshiya Ueno 
calls the “Techno-Orient” that was “invented by the world of information capitalism” 
(228). Interestingly, attempts to define techno-Orientalism seldom foreground the ways 
specific technological developments can affect how Asian identity is constructed in 
narratives and what racial stereotypes are propagated. Differing slightly from these 
definitions, then, my examination of techno-Orientalism traces the relationship between 
contemporary scientific discourses, sf’s engagement with these discourse, and the 
implicit processes of racialization that continue to define both fields. Postcolonial sf uses 
the genre’s potential for cognitive estrangement to defamiliarize advancements in 
genomics and biotechnology, drawing attention to the potential dangers of colonial 
frameworks that underpin these advancements should they continue unexamined into the 
future. 
 
Race, Technoscience, and The Windup Girl 
Paolo Bacigalupi’s The Windup Girl (2009) presents a compelling departure from 
sf’s traditionally white future, portraying a futuristic Bangkok where—despite 
advancements in technoscience—racial tensions and prejudices persist, affecting the daily 
lives of people of colour. The Windup Girl depicts a dystopian world in which a global 
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energy collapse, known as the Contraction, has led to the rise of biotech companies and 
their increased control over world-wide food production and distribution. Calories are the 
new currency and nations with their own seed banks are rich and not yet tied to the yoke 
of Western agricultural corporations. Thailand holds its own seed bank and is one of the 
few remaining countries whose markets are closed off from these multinational 
corporations. One such American biotech company, AgriGen, attempts to penetrate 
Thailand’s market in order to integrate the country into the global economy, and thus 
subject Thailand to potentially detrimental economic and social effects as a result of 
AgriGen’s superior technology. Bacigalupi’s critique of the imperial practices and 
environmental consequences of multinational biotech companies permeates his work 
from Pump Six and Other Stories (2008) through to the to The Windup Girl and Ship 
Breaker (2010).   
Importantly, The Windup Girl also highlights the complex effects of 
technoscience on discourses of race. Bacigalupi’s use of Thailand as an “exotic” setting 
in which different ethnicities/races interact depicts a world in which latent ethnocentrism 
and Orientalism continue to persist, and people of colour in the novel struggle for their 
daily survival in a racist global political economy. Hock Seng, for instance, is a “yellow 
card,” a derogatory term for Malaysian refugees of Chinese descent who have fled to 
Thailand to escape persecution in an increasingly fundamentalist Malaysia. The racial 
denomination “yellow card” is derived from the literal yellow identification card 
Chinese-Malays must carry in Thailand. Emiko, the “windup girl,” is also a racialized 
character who, as part of a biologically engineered race of “New People,” positions 
discourses of race in relation to developing technoscience. New People—called 
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“windups” for their characteristic “stutter-stop” motions (37)—are created by the 
Japanese to work as labourers and companions (read: slaves), replacing Japan’s dying 
population. Windups are illegal in Thailand, and only the Japanese are exempt from this 
regulation in exchange for their technological assistance to the Thai Kingdom. The 
Windup Girl positions race and racial politics as a central concern in this imagined future, 
exploring the historical impact of globalization, migration, and technoscience on the 
global South.  
This section will begin by examining the complex construction of “Asian” 
identity in Bacigalupi’s novel; specifically, it will explore the ways The Windup Girl 
avoids constructing monolithic racial representations, taking into consideration the 
historical, political, social, and technological structures that influence how race is “read” 
and represented. I will start my analysis by focusing on the novel’s setting and use of 
ethnically diverse characters, arguing that the novel engages with the historical 
complexity of race relations in South East Asia. The second half of this section will focus 
on the intersections of technoscience and the cultural construction of Asian identity in 
what Peter Chow-White calls the “informationalization of race” (1168), or the reduction 
of racial politics to a matter of informational code and data. Significantly, advancements 
in biotechnology in the novel do not erase but rather perpetuate old racial ideologies, 
hierarchies, and practices. Orientalism is translated to a form of techno-orientalism in 
which prejudices and fears continue with the expansion of global information 
communication technologies. As such, Bacigalupi’s novel does not envision a colour-
blind future; instead it portrays race as a matter of life or death, and Emiko’s constant 
fear of being discovered and mulched is but one example of the struggle for daily 
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survival raced characters face. The Windup Girl suggests that in an increasingly global 
political economy, advancements in biotechnology are not utopian possibilities that 
transcend racism but rather tools that mask racist and imperial ideologies.  
 
South East Asia and Variations of Techno-Orientalism 
The Windup Girl is set in Thailand, and while it draws on the discourse of 
Orientalism as outlined by Edward Said, it also reveals the dangers of a different 
variation David Morley and Kevin Robins define as “techno-orientalism.” Morley and 
Robins argue that racist assumptions have not disappeared with advancements in 
technoscience but rather are integrated into the technology itself, thus “[a]s the dynamism 
of technological innovation has appeared to move eastwards, so have these postmodern 
technologies become structured into the discourse of Orientalism” (169). Though Morley 
and Robins refer primarily to Japan their observations may be extended to Thailand, a 
growing “tiger” economy in South East Asia. In more general terms then, techno-
orientalism may be understood as “the desire to conceptualize the East through a 
technocratic framework within cultural production [which] leads to a re-articulation and 
re-emergence of the yellow peril” (Sohn 10). Importantly, Bacigalupi’s novel highlights 
the discourse of techno-orientalism while critiquing its assumptions and re-orienting its 
homogenizing framework. The novel achieves this by critically engaging with its setting 
and diverse characters in order to expose the effects of what Csicsery-Ronay Jr. calls the 
“technoscientific Empire” (8) that is our current socio-political condition. 
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Some readers have criticized The Windup Girl for using Thailand as an “exotic” 
setting and accuse the novel of Orientalism,14 but I argue that by shifting sf’s traditionally 
“Western” focus to a geographic region seldom explored in sf, Bacigalupi’s novel 
actually opens up the narrative’s potential to function as an “ethnoscape.” Lavender 
defines an ethnoscape as a space that uses sf conventions to question the intersection of 
race and technology:  
While sf’s conventional estrangements populate the fictional environment 
with, or structure it around, the presence of science, technology, 
mythology, aliens, androids, humanity, natural and artificial phenomena, 
politics, culture, language, religion, and so on, the ethnoscape reformulates 
that construction so as to create an alternative image that enables us to 
rethink the intersections of technology and race as well as their political, 
social, and cultural implications. (163) 
As an ethnoscape The Windup Girl avoids exoticizing Thailand by confronting the 
relationship between race and developing biotechnologies in a country struggling to keep 
up with multinational agricultural corporations. By doing so, the novel highlights the 
racist and colonial practices of the First World and the effects of uneven technological 
development in an increasingly global economy. Historically, Thailand has never been 
colonized but like many countries in the global South it has opened up its borders to the 
information revolution and foreign investment. Bacigalupi’s novel, however, depicts 
Thailand as sealed off from international markets; thus, attempts to integrate the country 
into the global economy reflect fears that the country’s “irreducible difference will 
                                                          
14 See, for example, Jaymee Goh’s critique of The Windup Girl at Beyond Victoriana, a steampunk blog. In 
her review, Goh accuses Bacigalupi’s novel of being “Yet another novel in which a foreigner re-writes the 
history of a culture that doesn’t belong to him, blending fact and fiction in a blend which is 
unrecognizable.” At the SF Signal blog, Karen Burnham also critiques Bacigalupi’s use of “an exotic third 
world country,” arguing that Bacigalupi’s novel exploits Thailand’s image as an economically and 
politically unstable country. 
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remain aloof from, and impenetrable to, Western reason and universalism” (Morley and 
Robins 162). 
Fear of Thailand’s alien culture and its potentially powerful difference is most 
evident in AgriGen’s attempts to penetrate the country’s carefully protected seed banks. 
However, Akkarat, chief of Thailand’s Trade Ministry, recognizes AgriGen’s offers as an 
attempt to maintain its technological supremacy and economic power. When Anderson 
argues that opening up Thailand’s borders to AgriGen and its science will be beneficial 
for the kingdom, Akkarat challenges Anderson’s claim of “mutual interests” reminding 
Anderson that the historical record of imperial contact has been one of exploitation and 
inequality: 
This is not a question of perspective.  Ever since your first missionaries 
landed on our shores, you have always sought to destroy us. During the 
old Expansion your kind tried to take every part of us. Chopping off the 
arms and legs of our country…With the Contraction, your worshipped 
global economy left us starving and over-specialized…And then your 
calorie plagues came. (150) 
From Akkarat’s perspective technological innovation and Western notions of “progress” 
have only led to increased starvation, global plague, and continued dependence on the 
First World. Akkarat recognizes the social cleavages that have been rendered by an 
information/global economy, and that the consequences of uneven technological 
development translate to a form of neo-colonial rule. As global inequality and suffering 
increases, The Windup Girl challenges the logic of progress and development, revealing 
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the dangers of a global economy constructed on the basic principles of what Manuel 
Castells identifies as patriarchalism and productivism.15   
 An analysis of The Windup Girl must address the novel’s cultural and social 
references to Thailand as a place infamous for its sex tourism. Emiko’s status as an illegal 
windup caught in the sex trade embodies techno-orientalist attitudes in which her 
genetically manipulated body is associated with assumptions regarding the supposed 
passivity of Asian women. Significantly, the novel suggests Emiko’s subservience is less 
a consequence of her genetic variation than of her social, political, and economic 
situation. As Andrew Hageman states, “Emiko’s exploitation in the Thai sex trade 
demonstrates that she has been programmed with directives to please, and it is this 
automation to meet market demands that in fact makes her an object that humans can 
treat with repugnance or with utilitarian apathy” (295). Reduced to the level of 
technological commodity, Emiko is little better than a slave in every sense of the word.  
Because prostitution has in fact been illegal in Thailand since 1960, Emiko’s involvement 
in an illegal occupation positions her as outside legal protection. Furthermore, abandoned 
by her Japanese master in Bangkok, Emiko is also an illegal alien with no political status.  
As an illegal immigrant, sex worker, and a being considered sub-human, Emiko has no 
civic rights and is triply excluded from any position of political autonomy or power. 
Emiko’s narrative, then, reflects the situation of many refugee women from surrounding 
countries (including Burma, Laos, and Cambodia) who migrate to Thailand in search of 
work, often participating in sex work or manual labor. Already denied political autonomy 
                                                          
15 See in particular Manuel Castells’ End of Millennium (1998) Volume III of The Information Age: 
Economy, Society, and Culture. 
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as illegal refugees, migrant workers are further excluded from any position of power as 
sex workers.16 Though the text’s fictional representations cannot be seen as 
representative of prostitution in Thailand, as an ethnoscape the novel’s setting highlights 
the economic, social, and political histories of Thailand, defamiliarizing readers from 
traditionally “Western” focuses. 
While a simplistic binary division between the “West” and the “East” may be 
drawn in Bacigalupi’s novel, racial antagonism is not unilateral and Thailand harbors 
many of its own prejudices. This is not a simple reversal of Orientalism into 
“Occidentalism” (Robertson 192), but a somewhat accurate reflection, in fact, of the 
complex history of racial, ethnic, and religious tensions within Thailand as a whole. For 
instance, in contemporary Thailand and much of South East Asia it is white skin that is 
foremost representative of beauty and social status. Walter H. Persaud argues that the 
privileging of whiteness is an effect of globalization and the history of cultural/political 
exchange in Thailand. Furthermore, ethnic tensions in the novel also reflect the historical 
record of conflict along the border of Thailand and Malaysia. Hock Seng, a Buddhist and 
Chinese-Malay, flees North to Bangkok when “the brown people turned on the yellow 
people in Malaya” (202). “The brown people” Hock Seng refers to are “the Green 
Headbands” of Malaya (67), whose persecution of Chinese-Malays forces Hock Seng to 
live as a refugee in Thailand. Hock Seng’s escape to Bangkok from Malaysia mirrors the 
recent migration of Buddhist citizens in southern Thailand to central or northern Thai 
provinces in order to escape the increasing violence between southern separatists (who 
                                                          
16 For an excellent study on the complexities of migration and the sex trade in Thailand see Leslie Ann 
Jeffrey’s Sex and Borders: Gender, National Identity, and Prostitution Policy in Thailand (2002). 
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are primarily Muslim). Ethnic tensions on the Thai/Malay border can be traced back to 
1902 when Thailand’s southernmost provinces were annexed, a region whose population 
is predominantly Malay Muslims. Though violence between separatists and the Thai 
government has occurred for more than half a century, it has escalated in the last ten 
years due to poor government relations, lack of representation for local minorities, abuses 
in human rights by Thailand’s military, and poor socio-economic conditions in the 
South.17 
The Windup Girl draws on Thailand’s complex race relations. For instance, the 
Environment Ministry attempts to impede the negative consequences of globalization by 
resorting to a fierce nationalism that encourages antagonism against yellow cards and 
non-Thais in order to protect the “purity” of Thailand. Consequently, when Hock Seng 
flees to Bangkok in order to escape the Green Headbands he finds Thailand is not a haven 
free from racism either. The flight North for many yellow cards means they are able to 
escape persecution and death; however, “native” Thais also harbor their own prejudices 
against yellow cards. For example, Jaidee, a captain in the Environment Ministry and a 
native Thai, expresses his dislike for Chinese-Malays like Hock Seng: 
Jaidee has a certain respect for the Chaozhou Chinese….They are utterly 
unlike the pathetic Chinese refugees who have flooded in from Malaya, 
fleeing to his country in hopes of succour after they alienated the natives 
of their own.  If the Malayan Chinese had been half as clever as the 
Chaozhou, they would have converted to Islam generations ago, and 
woven themselves fully into the tapestry of that society....The Chaozhou 
are smart, where the Malayan Chinese are stupid. (117) 
                                                          
17 For more on the conflict in Southern Thailand see Zachary Abuza’s A Conspiracy of Silence: The 
Insurgency in Southern Thailand (2009) or Duncan McCargo’s Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and 
Legitimacy in Southern Thailand (2008). 
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Jaidee’s extreme sense of nationalism, xenophobia, and fierce loyalty to the Thai 
kingdom is reflected in his moniker as the “Tiger of Bangkok” (146). Like the 
Environment Ministry’s attitude towards AgriGen, Jaidee treats immigrants and non-
Thais as invasive threats to the security of Thai government, economy, and culture, or as 
Hock Seng says, “The Environment Ministry sees yellow cards the same way it sees the 
other invasive species and plagues it manages” (224). As a result, when the city breaks 
into war between the Environment Ministry and the Trade Ministry, yellow cards and 
foreigners suffer the most physical abuse at the hands of the Thai military. Thailand’s 
attempts to retaliate against imperialism by inverting power structures only perpetuates a 
vicious cycle that feeds into the “us” versus “them” paradigm upon which colonial rule is 
premised.  
Tellingly, Hock Seng’s distrust of Thai workers reflects the internalized 
prejudices and ongoing effects of colonial encounter across South East Asia. As manager 
of Anderson Lake’s factory in Bangkok, Hock Seng works primarily with native Thais 
though he constantly “curses that he works with Thais. They simply lack the spirit of 
entrepreneurship that a Chinese would throw into the work” (132). Hock Seng believes 
that, “they are Thai. They are all incompetent” (14). The stereotype of the “lazy native” is 
a prejudice often rendered against native Thais, and Hock Seng’s statement reflects 
discourses surrounding work/labor in Thailand where ethnic “natives” in South East Asia 
are seen as less capable and ambitious than foreigners. Syed Hussein Alatas’s influential 
critique of imperialism in The Myth of the Lazy Native (1977) analyzes the image of 
Malays, Filipinos and Javanese as “dependent” (8) and lazy—an effect, Alatas argues, of 
persisting colonial ideologies and stereotypes in the region. Alatas contends that this 
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myth “has led to certain discriminatory practices…[and] a number of employers have 
avoided Malays because they believe them to be lazy…[or] not endowed with the 
capacity to do business. All these ideas derive their origin from the colonial image of the 
Malays” (17). Alatas claims the colonial myth of the lazy native permeates even current 
day constructions of Malaysians as dependent and requiring assistance. Though Alatas 
refers predominantly to the Malay Archipelago, his critique may be extended to Thailand, 
where the myth of the lazy native is also enacted against native Thais. Hock Seng, then, 
exhibits this colonial mentality, criticizing Thais for their lack of “the spirit of 
entrepreneurship” and incompetency (132).   
Bacigalupi’s novel emphasizes the manner in which ideological constructions of 
race are reinforced by a history of economic, social, and political relations. Not 
surprisingly, the list of racial slurs and epithets in the novel is much longer than what has 
been explored here. For instance, Anderson, as an outsider, is frequently called a 
“farang” [white foreigner] (31), “yang guizi” [foreign devil] (29), and “devil cat” (28).  
Bacigalupi’s frequent use of racially loaded language is not, however, in the tradition of 
ethnocentric colonial fiction. Rather, the emphasis placed on racial distrust and animosity 
highlights the growing division between peoples forced to survive under the conditions of 
a brutal capitalist economy. Subject to racial discrimination and under a state of constant 
uncertainty and competition, Emiko and Hock Seng’s narratives are closely linked in 
their political exclusion as illegal aliens and their reduction to replaceable labor. This fact 
is made evident when Raleigh, a nefarious bar owner and pimp, threateningly tells 
Emiko, “I own every part of you” (159). Emiko’s cultural demarcation is not far removed 
from Hock Seng’s status as a yellow card. When Bangkok is locked down after the death 
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of Somdet Chaopraya—protector of Thailand’s Child Queen and the most powerful 
figure in Thai government—“only a few people are allowed in and out, ones who show 
residence cards. Locals” (224). Because Hock Seng carries, “only a yellow card for 
identification, it took [him] half the evening to traverse the city, avoiding checkpoints” 
(224). Hock Seng is thus positioned as migrant labor and, like Emiko, a refugee who 
must live in transit while denied social and political agency. By exploring diverse 
characters as they are affected by different political, social, and economic positions, The 
Windup Girl’s use of racial representations recognizes the complex history of race 
relations in Thailand, fracturing an Orientalist construction of “Asia” as a homogenous 
region. 
 
Genetic Code and the “Informationalization of Race” 
In addition to portraying the continued imperial and racist structures of a future 
Bangkok, The Windup Girl also explores the effects of techno-orientalism on scientific 
discourses, namely on the field of genomics. If “new technologies become subsumed into 
the discourse of racism” (Morley and Robins 172), Bacigalupi’s novel examines the 
tensions between scientific objectivity and persisting racial prejudice, revealing, as 
Rieder puts it, that “the crux of racist ideology is not the opposition between civilization 
and savagery. It is rather the way scientific racism confuses cultural and natural 
phenomena” (109). This scientific racism is most evident in Gibbons, a genius scientist 
who has deserted AgriGen and is now harboured by Thailand to help the nation battle the 
mutating plagues of agricultural corporations and their genetically modified foods. The 
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relationship between science, biology, and culture is explored through the development 
of genetic technologies in The Windup Girl, revealing that old race models persist in this 
future world where changes in communication technologies have ushered in a new 
colour-blind age. Race in the novel is positioned through the paradigm of genetics, an 
equation that reiterates colonial mentalities and represents a disturbing manifestation of 
techno-orientalism. 
As a “generipper” (357), Gibbons is one of the few people in the novel to embrace 
New People; however, his scientific interest in New People as products of evolution also 
reduces the complexity of their lived experience to scientific fact. While New People are 
“raced” bodies marked by their supposed difference, Gibbons refers to Emiko as a 
genetic “design” with which he is familiar (357). Gibbons’s claims to knowing and 
understanding Emiko are based on assumptions regarding her genetics, and his treatment 
of her as a programmed design reflects a shift in what Chow-White calls the 
“informationalization of race,” or the process by which globalization, changes in the 
global economy, and developments in information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) have resulted in a new mode of racialization. Chow-White explains racial 
knowledge is now constructed in terms of genetic “information,” reducing the politics of 
race to a matter of code (1181). Chow-White contends,  
Where conventional conceptions of race have been articulated in terms of 
culture or phenotype, in the digital age, information is the material by 
which we work on racial meaning... However, race as information does 
not replace the dependency of racialization on ethnicity or skin colour.  
Rather, as the paradigm of race as culture emerged from the paradigm of 
race as biology, I would argue that the paradigm of race as information has 
emerged from both to create a new racial formation—the 
informationalization of race. (1171) 
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Because genetic technologies that focus on programming DNA are ICTs, such 
technologies are not merely tools but global systems which act as sites negotiating racial 
meaning through data that is collected, stored, and analyzed. This results in new racial 
classification systems that mirror old hierarchal systems with seemingly neutral terms.  
As Chow-White argues, “Racial classification systems that used terms such as Negroid, 
Mongoloid and Caucasian have become African, Asian, and European, which, on the 
surface, may appear more informational and descriptive than ideological” (1182). In 
addition to this, Chow-White argues the informationalization of race may continue to use 
the same markers of racialization (physical characteristics, ethnicity, etc.) but does not 
always rely on them, as the very structures of developing ICTs form new sites of creating 
and re-working racial meaning. The Windup Girl explores the dangers of this suppressed 
scientific racism through Gibbons’s treatment of Emiko.   
Needless to say, Donna Haraway’s earlier reflections on technoscience in her 
landmark essay “A Cyborg Manifesto” (1985) also examine the implications of 
developing communication technologies and biotechnology on discourses of race, 
gender, and class. Haraway outlines the transition from “old hierarchical dominations” to 
“scary new networks,” a development she calls the “informatics of domination” (161). 
Both Haraway and Chow-White consider the development of communication sciences 
and biology integral in the move from an industrial society to an information system, 
emphasizing the changes biotechnologies and genetics play on our understanding of 
DNA as the ultimate “code” of human life (Haraway 162, Chow-White 1168). Gibbons 
embodies this mentality in the technical and often reductive language he uses to describe 
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windups; to Gibbons, New People are subjects who are “easier to build” (243) and whose 
“mechanics” he “know[s] the secrets of” (358). Though Gibbons appears to be helping 
Emiko when he agrees to help reverse her sterility, he in fact reduces her to the status of 
“genetic material” to be disassembled and reassembled (358). To Gibbons, Emiko’s 
perceived difference is a result of her mechanics or biology. Despite Haraway’s appeal 
for a move away from essentialism and naturalized difference in the face of changing 
technoscience, Bacigalupi’s novel suggests, like Chow-White’s study, a renewed (and 
troublesome) relationship between race and biology as a result of developing ICTs.  
Chow-White asserts that advancements in human genomics require us to reconsider the 
ways technoscience may result in a reification of race, or a return to the “alter of 
biological determinism” (1185). As new scientific technologies and research develop, 
what becomes increasingly evident is the need to examine the effects of technoscience on 
the discourse and politics of race.  
Gibbons’s acceptance of New People seems to encourage a move away from 
identity politics and racist ideology; however, Gibbons’s lack of any ethical approach in 
his scientific endeavours reveals he is primarily motivated by ego and power. His claims 
of authority over Emiko’s genetic design show a paternalism and a desire for domination 
—a desire made all the more troubling by his wish to be the scientist, or “god,” to lead 
the future of mankind into “the Eden that beckons us” (243). Gibbons fails to see the 
dangers of a future where, as a white male scientist, he continues to rule over racial and 
ethnic others. Though Gibbons appears to only jokingly call himself a “god” on 
numerous occasions (244), his sense of superiority permeates all his work. He views 
genetic manipulation as a technological tool divorced from ideology: “Our every 
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tinkering in nature, our every biological striving. We are what we are, and the world is 
ours. We are its gods. Your only difficulty is in your unwillingness to unleash your 
potential fully upon it” (243). This genetic “tinkering,” however, has resulted in a 
growing divide between the wealthy and poor, increased racial tensions, heightened 
nationalism, and global starvation. Such events are clearly not the “potential” Gibbons 
refers to.   
Even as a supposedly objective scientist, Gibbons is unable to see how his own 
work is implicated in social and political structures. As a white scientist, protected and 
provided for by Thailand in exchange for his knowledge, Gibbons is further removed 
from the streets of Bangkok where poverty and racism are an everyday reality. Distanced 
from the realities of Thailand’s struggling people, Kanya realizes Gibbons sees his work 
as an intellectual game: 
We are in the hands of a gamesman. In a flash of insight, Kanya 
understands the doctor entirely…A man who found his competition too 
lacking, and so switched sides and joined the Thai Kingdom for the 
stimulation it might provide…We rest in the hands of a fickle god. He 
plays on our behalf only for entertainment, and he will close his eyes and 
sleep if we fail to engage his intellect…The man exists only for 
competition, the chess match of evolution, fought on a global scale. (248)  
Gibbons’s interest in Thailand and genetics is not out of compassion or empathy for the 
condition of others. While Gibbons appears to assist Emiko at the end of the novel, one 
cannot help but wonder if he is fulfilling his dream of having “a few more worshippers” 
(244). Hageman also points out Gibbons’s “discourse of diety,” asserting, “despite the 
hospitality he shows to Emiko and the cheshires, Gibbons still frames his vision of the 
future in terms of ‘gods’ with dominion from a position atop a hierarchy” (297). 
Gibbons’s supposed scientific rationalism reveals an imperial streak for power and 
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domination. He is not altruistically motivated. As he explains to Kanya, Gibbons worked 
with AgriGen for so long because, “They paid me in the coin I wanted most” (246).  
If Gibbons highlights the scientific racism of future technoscience, as a 
genetically altered human Emiko highlights the effects of this scientific racism on people 
of colour. New People are engineered, and thus considered “unnatural” (302) and “not 
human” (35). Emiko’s genetic structure determines her value and worth, and her 
“difference” and innate passivity is supposedly a result of manipulated genetic code. 
Physically, Emiko’s difference is barely visible except in a specific movement marked by 
its “heechy-keechy” stutter-stop motion (37). However, like Chow-White’s assertion that 
physical traits work alongside the informationalization of race, what marks Emiko’s 
“raced” body is not only her physical difference but her difference as manifested on an 
informational and genetic level. Her physical and genetic variation is considered 
indicative of innate difference, and Emiko often wishes her clients would “look at her, to 
see her instead of simply evaluating her as a piece of genetic trash” (37). Emiko is treated 
as “genetic trash” as a result of her race, and New People are considered a group 
containing immutable and predetermined differences from “natural” people. Because 
New People are treated as programmed “platform[s]” (357), Emiko is considered 
inherently subservient and incapable of autonomous thought and feeling, allowing others 
to continue to abuse her.  Bacigalupi’s vision of developing technoscience is bleak—this 
future is not colour-blind, but rather one where biotechnology reduces the complexities of 
human life to “code.”  
As a windup whose genetic difference renders her subhuman, Emiko’s narrative 
reveals the ways genetic technologies may rearticulate racist and colonial ideologies.  
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Emiko’s biology is seen as predetermining her identity as racial other. Furthermore, her 
alterity is seen as indicative of psychological and social difference, and Emiko must be 
trained to control her “animal” urges. Emiko’s teacher, Mizumi-sensei, reinforces this 
when teaching New People “there are two parts to a New Person’s nature. The evil half, 
ruled by the animal hungers of their genes…And balanced against this, the civilized self, 
the side that knows the difference between niche and animal urge. That comprehends its 
place in the hierarchies of their country and people” (154). Mizumi-sensei’s instruction 
that New People must “own their souls” (154) and “civilize” their animal urges is 
reminiscent of colonial endeavours to “civilize” different cultures. Racism has not 
disappeared, and as Emiko often laments, “Even if she is New People, there is nothing 
new under the sun” (38). The genetic variation of New People is treated as a condition 
designating one’s inferiority, subservience, and obedience. However, as N. Katherine 
Hayles argues in her discussion of the posthuman, principles of reflexivity may reveal 
that, “an attribute previously considered to have emerged from a set of pre-existing 
conditions is in fact used to generate the conditions” (9). In other words, Emiko’s 
supposed inferiority is constructed through the stories, teachings, and prejudices that 
represent her need to serve as an already naturalized quality. Taught all her life that she is 
subservient and genetically built to follow orders, Emiko begins to question these 
narratives: “Does her eagerness to serve come from some portion of canine DNA that 
makes her always assume that natural people outrank her for pack loyalty?  Or is it 
simply the training that she has spoken of?” (184).18 Emiko’s question reveals the 
                                                          
18 Though not explored in detail here, Emiko’s comparison to animals not only evokes slave comparisons 
to animals, it also emphasizes the anthropocentrism of this future world. 
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reflexivity and dangers of naturalized difference—she is unable to determine whether 
engineered genes have led to her servitude, or whether, as Hayles suggests, her servitude 
and submissiveness is an attribute which produces the very difference it presupposes. 
Emiko’s eventual defiance of her training and her ability to finally break free of her cycle 
of dependence on Raleigh and Anderson suggests that contrary to her genetic “code,” 
Gibbons may be correct in assuring Emiko, “Nothing about you is inevitable” (358). 
Emiko’s resistance to her training results in a double consciousness in which she 
is frequently torn by her conflicting feelings to serve or rebel. To draw on W. E. B. Du 
Bois’ discussion of race in his study, The Souls of Black Folk (1903), Emiko’s internal 
struggle is a form of self-discipline in which she is constantly subject to a sense of 
looking at herself “through the eyes of others” (38). Whenever Emiko begins to question 
her role and hope for an alternative future, “She squashes the thought.  It is the other 
Emiko who thinks this...Two sides of a coin, two sides of the soul,” a DuBoisian double 
consciousness (154).19 Emiko frequently suppresses her desire to rebel, reminding herself 
that such desires are not part of her niche. This form of self-discipline divides Emiko’s 
thoughts between what others expect of her and her own desires—“two warring ideals” in 
one body (Du Bois 38). As a result of this double consciousness, Emiko constantly 
struggles with her identity. However, like Haraway’s cyborg figure, it is not until Emiko 
embraces her partial and contradictory perspective that she begins to question the 
knowledge of her origins. While initially Emiko believes her genes dictate her 
                                                          
19 Du Bois describes this double consciousness as “a peculiar sensation…this sense of always looking at 
one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in 
amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, 
two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body” (38). 
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oppression, Emiko complicates this when she, “wonders if she has it backwards, if the 
part that struggles to maintain her illusions of self-respect is the part intent upon her 
destruction. If her body, this collection of cells and manipulated DNA—with its own 
stronger, more practical needs—is actually the survivor: the one with will” (34). This 
does not mean that Emiko’s body, “with its own stronger…needs” (34), defines or 
destines her to a predetermined future (even her inability to be fertile is not inevitable). 
Rather, to think of the body as “entrapped” by programmed social and genetic code is to 
deny the possibilities that reside in her multiple contradictions. Her “illusions of self-
respect” are social and political structures that have demanded her to fulfill her role as a 
passive and subservient New Person, and it is not her supposed genetic difference that 
reinforces her subjugation. If “bodies are maps of power and identity” (Haraway 180), 
then Emiko’s constant struggle with her identity is one which recognizes that different 
bodies have been shaped by and participate in different historical, political and social 
structures. Not until the latter half of the novel does Emiko begin to understand the 
effects of institutional regulation and imperial relations between New People and “natural 
people” as they affect her identity and life (184).  
Emiko’s politically and socially marginalized status suggests that the “colour-
blind language in human genomics” masks a return to biological determinism (Chow-
White 1182). This colour-blind language also hides the formation of new regimes of 
racial signification and discrimination in every day practices and institutions. Because 
Emiko is a windup, she is an illegal alien in Thailand and therefore denied political and 
social rights. Put another way, she “is a deeply maligned technoscientific posthuman” 
(Hageman 294). The Environment Ministry’s strict regulations against New People 
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means that if Emiko is discovered she will be immediately killed and mulched.20 Emiko 
is not only legally marginalized; the physical abuse Emiko must endure at the hands of 
Kannika, one of Raleigh’s “natural” girls, in order to survive reminds us of the continued 
effects of institutional racism in her everyday life. Kannika’s violence is accompanied by 
verbal abuse as she calls Emiko a “Japanese plaything,” telling her she “will always be 
nothing, and for once the dirty Japanese get what is coming to them” (38-9). Emiko’s 
association with Japanese high technology, simultaneously revered and despised, subjects 
her to a form of techno-orientalism—because she is a female figure and Japanese 
technological commodity, Emiko’s threatening difference reveals techno-orientalist fears 
that the West’s “loss of its technological hegemony may be associated with its cultural 
‘emasculation’” (Morley and Robins 167).   
As a “raced” character, Emiko’s “heechy keechy” movements also mark her body 
as the body of a woman of colour—“I am marked. Always, we are marked” (358)—and 
her continued abuse signifies the domination and exploitation of her body in the global 
political economy. Judged by her physical movements and genetic difference, Emiko 
mourns, “All they see are stutter-stop motions. A joke. An alien toy. A windup” (36). 
Though Judith Butler focuses on the sexed body when she suggests the body is “shaped 
by political forces with strategic interests in keeping that body bounded and constituted 
by the markers of sex” (103), Butler’s argument may be extended to race. If the body is 
shaped by political and cultural forces, race and sex mark Emiko’s as that of commodity, 
slave, and dangerous other. Markers like Emiko’s stutter-stop motion are designed to 
                                                          
20 Andrew Hageman also reflects on this, stating that Emiko is, “an illegal non-human alien who would be 
shredded and recycled if discovered” (294). 
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enforce Emiko’s physical and ultimately social difference. As Gibbons explains to 
Emiko, “The windup movement is not a required trait…. The safeties are there because of 
lessons learned, but they are not required” (358). In other words, Emiko’s body has quite 
literally been constructed to reinforce her subjugation. While identities cannot be 
disembodied, they are also always intimately bound by political and social relations.  
Emiko eventually realizes that her biology does not predetermine her value or 
subject her to a life of servitude, but rather the practices and social structures of a world 
which “trained [her] to the eternal service of a master” do (252). In a world where “New 
People” are considered under the rule of those who are “natural,” Emiko realizes she will 
always be viewed as simultaneously other than human and as less than human. As a 
result, Emiko dreams of escaping to the villages of the North where New People 
supposedly live away from the laws of the Environment Ministry. During a moment 
which mirrors Victor Frankenstein’s creature and his own self-conscious awakening as he 
gazes into a pool of water, Emiko stares into the khlong (moat) waters and “sees herself 
in the canal’s reflection with the green glow of the lamps all around…She feels perhaps 
she could become one with the water...Does she not deserve to float and slowly sink?  
She stifles the thought. That is the old Emiko. The one who could never teach her to fly” 
(253).21 If Emiko once felt torn by a sort of double consciousness, it is at this moment 
                                                          
21 In Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein: or, The Modern Prometheus (1831), Victor Frankenstein’s creature gazes 
into a pool, comparing himself to the cottage dwellers he so admires:  
I had admired the perfect forms of my cottagers—their grace, beauty, and delicate complexions: 
but how was I terrified when I view myself in a transparent pool! At first I started back, unable to 
believe that it was indeed I who was reflected in the mirror; and when I became fully convinced 
that I was in reality the monster that I am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of 
despondence and mortification. (116) 
Like Frankenstein’s creature, Emiko is trapped by her “marked” body and her own ambitions of freedom. 
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that her “jesses” are cut free (252). A few pages later, Emiko will fight against her 
allegedly ingrained passivity, retaliating against Raleigh, the Somdet Chaoparaya, and the 
men in Raleigh’s bar in a moment of violent rage. Despite recognizing her ability to 
break free of her supposedly innate dependence and urge to follow orders, Emiko knows 
she must eventually reach the northern villages to survive as Bangkok is still a city 
structured on racist principals which privilege “natural” people. As a result, Emiko 
continues to struggle against her submission until the end, as she is still living in a world 
that requires her to be submissive despite the urge to rebel she often feels. These 
boundaries are so ingrained in Emiko and have become so naturalized that even Emiko 
admits “she has been enslaved to think against New People, even when she herself is one 
of them” (155). Though Emiko is told she will always serve, when she hears of the 
villages up North where New People have no masters, “she makes herself stare at the 
mess and recognize that she is no longer a slave…. She is something else” (252). Emiko 
never reaches these villages, but as Bangkok floods and its inhabitants flee, Emiko is 
given the space and freedom to begin the process of reversing her cultural training. 
 
Racial Futures 
The Windup Girl invokes a number of contemporary racial concerns, and its 
culturally diverse characters provide a point of departure for examining the importance of 
race in developing technoscience. Bacigalupi’s reference to the social, economic, and 
political histories of Thailand situates discourses of race in the novel on a local context, 
avoiding simplistic binaries between “East” and “West.” Edward Said argues, “When one 
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uses categories like Oriental and Western as both the starting and the end points of 
analysis...the result is usually to polarize the distinction…and limit the human encounter 
between different cultures, traditions, and societies” (45-6). Bacigalupi’s novel avoids 
replicating the binary division between “East” and “West,” instead emphasizing what 
Haraway calls the “historical systems of domination” that link bodies and power (161).  
In this future, technological advancement does not result in a colour-blind world, but 
instead perpetuates the racist structures of a vampiric global economy. Instead of 
examining the developments of technoscience and race in an information society from a 
Western-centric perspective, Bacigalupi’s novel is attendant to the complex history of 
race relations in South East Asia. In doing so, The Windup Girl departs from traditions of 
colonial adventure fiction by refusing to exoticize Thailand and producing an 
environment that foregrounds the intersections of race, technology, and imperial 
encounter. Bacigalupi’s novel does not suggest a post-racial alternative, but emphasizes 
the potential for continuing ethnocentric/racist ideologies and practices in developing 
technoscience. In this estranged world, familiar patterns continue as bodies are “raced” 
by the changing discourses of genomics, information technologies, and globalization.  
 
“Race and/as Technology” in The Bohr Maker and Salt Fish Girl  
The final half of this chapter continues to examine the relationship between race 
and technology, particularly biotechnologies and genomics, in Linda Nagata’s The Bohr 
Maker (1995) and Larissa Lai’s Salt Fish Girl (2002). I argue that the representation of 
Asian bodies and their modification through genetic engineering in The Bohr Maker and 
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Salt Fish Girl constructs “race as technology” (Coleman 177), a move that enables each 
novel to explore the promises and perils of understanding race through genomics. Asian 
characters in both novels are differentiated by their genetics rather than visible physical 
traits, and the novels question how genomic research might lead to the re-emergence of 
racist assumptions about biological “destiny.” In this respect, The Bohr Maker and Salt 
Fish Girl explore how the genetics of certain bodies continue to be seen as more valuable 
while others are deemed expendable and easily exploited, even if processes of 
racialization may no longer be premised upon visible physical traits. The identification of 
this difference in value on a molecular, genetic level is symptomatic of new biopolitical 
regimes that organize and divide bodies through a variety of processes, including scrutiny 
over one’s conception (natural versus unnatural birth), the ability to access technological 
resources to attend to one’s body, and the ability to make decisions over one’s body or 
not. Tellingly, Asian bodies in these narratives are “owned” and acted upon by other 
characters in the scientific community. By specifically using techno-Orientalist tropes,22 
both novels reveal the ways in which the bodies of people of colour are doubly racialized 
in science fiction, reduced to instruments of both science and narrative exoticism. 
                                                          
22 I reiterate here again that my definition of techno-Orientalism differs slightly from conventional uses of 
the term. Niu, for instance, defines techno-Orientalism as “a practice of ascribing, erasing, and/or 
disavowing relationships between technology and Asian peoples and subjects,” and clarifies that her 
“version of techno-Orientalism points to the way it ignores the history and constructions of relationships 
between Asian people and technology, particularly those deemed emerging or revolutionary” (74). 
Though Niu sees techno-Orientalism as a mechanism that disavows the participation of Asian people in 
technological development (89), I understand techno-Orientalism to mean the opposite; rather, I see 
techno-Orientalism as the attempt to “naturalize” the relationship between Asian characters and 
technology. By linking Asian identity to technology (regardless of whether this is through a process of 
ascribing or disavowing this relationship), techno-Orientalist narratives function as processes of 
racialization that represent certain bodies as instruments and “tools” to be exploited. My understanding 
of techno-Orientalism also serves to highlight how race has always functioned a technology of 
colonialism. 
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Despite their somewhat different subgenres—Greta A. Niu calls The Bohr 
Maker nanopunk and Salt Fish Girl is often examined in relation to postcolonial science 
fiction—both novels share many thematic concerns. To briefly summarize the plot of 
each, Nagata’s novel follows the separate (but soon to be intertwined lives) of Nikko, a 
genetically engineered man, and Phousita, a genetically altered woman. An illegal 
nanotechnology known as the “Bohr Maker” (described as a kind of molecular genetic 
technology) brings them together when Phousita is unintentionally injected with it and 
the Maker begins to alter her physiology, giving her access to technological resources 
previously unavailable to her in the poverty stricken community of Sunda. Nikko and 
Phousita have ambiguous “origins,” in the sense that while described and characterized 
according to their Asian features, they are not explicitly linked to a specific 
ethnicity/nation. This ambiguity is characteristic of both novels and their interrogation of 
the shifting relationship between race, anxieties about the body, contemporary genomics, 
and processes of racialization premised upon new divisions.  
Like The Bohr Maker, Lai’s novel depicts a future where the human genome 
sequence can be altered and cloned. Salt Fish Girl is set in the near-future along the 
Western coast of Canada, and one of its primary narrative arches is about the relationship 
between Miranda and Evie, both characters of Asian descent. During a critical moment in 
the novel Miranda discovers that Evie’s genes have been spliced with those of freshwater 
carp in order to render her “nonhuman.”23 Though it is considered illegal, multinational 
                                                          
23  Two primary narrative arcs occur in Salt Fish Girl: the first narrative, set in nineteenth century China, 
focuses on Nu Wa and the salt fish girl, while the second, set in the near-future, features Miranda and 
Evie. For the purposes of this essay, I only discuss the second narrative as it most clearly exemplifies the 
intersection between science fiction, techno-Orientalism, and biotechnologies. 
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corporations are revealed to be creating genetically altered humans like Evie for work in 
their factories, a future rendition of contemporary sweatshops.  
My purposes in this section are twofold: first, I examine how both novels 
critique the ways Asian bodies are constructed as genetic “others.” By foregrounding 
difference at the micro-level of genetics, both texts interrogate the biopolitical reassertion 
of racial “markers” through genomics and critique how this difference continues to 
position certain bodies as more expendable and exploitable than others. Second, I 
examine how science fiction may provide the conceptual tools for imagining an 
engagement with race beyond its negative history as lack and abjection. That is, rather 
than offering critique only, I suggest The Bohr Maker and Salt Fish Girl also construct 
alternative frameworks for seeing race as a tool of ethical deliberation. Using Beth 
Coleman’s influential work on race as technology, I argue that the use of techno-
Orientalist tropes in these narratives might also be seen as opening up a space, or gap, 
that can “be exploited to liberate race from an inherited position of abjection toward a 
greater expression of agency” (177). Because techno-Orientalism positions the Asian 
body itself as technological, it becomes a particularly potent medium through which 
processes of racialization can be interrogated, critiqued, and reimagined.  
By doing so, Asian characters in the novels move towards greater expressions of 
agency, as they utilize “[r]ace as levered mechanism” against the systems that attempt to 
contain them by “mov[ing] discourses of race from the field of science into that of ethics” 
(Coleman 182). Rather than framing discussion of race and what qualifies as “Asian” 
through the dichotomy of science versus ideology, The Bohr Maker and Salt Fish Girl 
shift the discussion towards questions of process asking instead why certain modes of 
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representation are generated and who they benefit. Both novels are therefore more 
interested in interrogating the social and ethical implications of genomics rather than its 
accuracy or “truth”; as Jenny Reardon argues, “We may never resolve questions about the 
biological meaning of race, but we can make more reflective choices about whether and 
how we engage the debate” (59). Shifting arguments away from the biology/culture 
divide that often defines Asian Americanist critique, positioning race as technology 
means that The Bohr Maker and Salt Fish Girl embrace the technoscientific discourse of 
science fiction to highlight the fragmented and relational terms (epistemological, 
material, and economic) upon which Asian/Asian American identity has historically been 
constructed.  
 
Critique: Techno-Orientalism and the Asian Body 
A central concern that unites The Bohr Maker and Salt Fish Girl is their 
interrogation of the biopolitical reassertion of racial “markers” through genetic 
technologies. By focusing on genetically altered posthuman characters of Asian descent, 
or who are represented as “Asian” in appearance, both novels inevitably draw on techno-
Orientalist tropes. In one of the earliest theorizations of the term, David Morley and 
Kevin Robins define techno-Orientalism as the integration of racist assumptions into 
representations of technology itself; thus, Morley and Robins contend that “the alienated 
and dystopian image of capitalist progress” (170) is represented through dehumanized, 
emotionless Asian robots who also signify Western fear over loss of technological 
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hegemony. While scholars such as Morley, Robins, and Toshiya Ueno24 focus primarily 
on the ways techno-Orientalism articulates anxieties about the West’s economic status in 
the future, in this section I would like to focus on the ways representations of Asian 
characters in The Bohr Maker and Salt Fish Girl express anxiety over how race is 
technology precisely because racial difference is established through genomics and new 
scientific practices.25 Techno-Orientalism in these narratives is therefore not 
representative of fear over technological hegemony, but fear of increasingly unstable 
definitions and understandings of race in a supposedly “postracial” scientific age. 
Specifically, developments in mapping the human genome have led to increasing tension 
between genetic racialists and racial constructionists over the value of using genomics as 
a basis for understanding and discussing race.26 
The Bohr Maker and Salt Fish Girl reveal the dangers of searching for “truths” 
about race through genomics, even when such scientific discourse appears to affirm the 
meaninglessness of race. In this way, they make evident Jenny Reardon’s claim that in 
the early twenty-first century, “subtle differences among statements about the biological 
meaninglessness of race acted to shore up the power of biological experts and political 
actors to differentiate humans racially for the purposes of knowing and governing them” 
                                                          
24   See Ueno’s essay “Techno-orientalism and media-tribalism: on Japanese animation and rave culture” 
(1999). 
25 There are several other working definitions of techno-Orientalism. In the latest collection on Techno-
Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media (2015), for instance, editors David 
Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta Niu define techno-Orientalism fairly broadly as “the phenomenon of 
imagining Asia and Asians in hypo- or hypertechnological terms in cultural productions and political 
discourse” (2). 
26 Jenny Reardon’s work on “Decoding Race and Human Difference in a Genomic Age” is critical to my 
explication of techno-Orientalism in these narratives. Reardon’s article outlines in much greater detail the 
various scientific, political, and ideological forces at play leading up to the Human Genome Project. 
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(40). In the novels examined here, the manipulation of human genetic material means that 
people can change their physical appearances (The Bohr Maker), or science has 
confirmed the equality of all people and “[s]tuff like that is not supposed to happen 
anymore” (Lai 160). However, even in these supposedly postracial scientific futures, 
racializing techniques continue to segregate and construct as abject certain bodies. This 
racialization occurs through the ways in which certain bodies are genetically modified 
without consent (positioning them as instruments of science), or through the ways in 
which access to biotechnology and scientific resources limits the ability of certain people 
to live according to the same standards of life granted to those in the global North. The 
Bohr Maker and Salt Fish Girl therefore articulate contemporary anxieties around the 
meaning of “difference” in an age when bodies can be examined, probed, and modified at 
the very micro-scale of genetics.  
In The Bohr Maker, for instance, it is significant that Nikko is the only character 
specifically racialized as Asian while other characters are described primarily through 
phenotypal characteristics (through skin or hair colour). Nikko’s face is “half-masked, his 
flat Asian nose and petite ears barely visible,” and the platelets that characterize his skin 
are frequently called “china-blue” (16). Furthermore, Nikko’s genetic alterations mean 
his face is defined by a “cold stare” and “lack of expressions” (16). These physical 
characteristics, however, indicate a greater biological difference. To Kirstin, Nikko’s 
secret lover and “Chief of the Commonwealth Police, charged with enforcing the laws 
that limited the use of nanotechnology” (20), Nikko is an “animal” (17) and “freak” (28) 
because he is genetically engineered. Though she fetishizes his difference as a “china 
statue” (20), Kirstin, considers it “one of her duties to ensure that society remained 
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human” (20), and she sees Nikko as decidedly animalistic, “feral” (17), and an inhuman 
statue; thus, Nikko’s physical “Asian” qualities come to be associated with the 
subhuman. In a future where people with money can change their physical appearances, 
identifying the novel’s only subhuman character with a specific racial category is an 
instance of techno-Orientalism in which Nikko’s “half-masked” face and “flat Asian 
nose” symbolize the fear of “dehumanised technological power” (Morley and Robins 
170).27  
However, Nagata’s novel does not simply reiterate techno-Orientalist tropes; 
instead, it critiques them specifically, and paradoxically, by constantly describing 
Nikko’s body through racialized terms, a move that makes legible the ways Nikko’s 
genetic difference is established with recourse to traditional racial taxonomies. It is 
Nikko’s genetic alterations that make him subhuman in the novel, not his epidermal 
characteristics; by making this invisible difference visible through the characteristic 
markers of techno-Orientalist discourse, Nagata’s novel highlights the dangers of reading 
biological “meaning” through genomics. For instance, despite Nikko’s claim that, “I am 
not an animal!” (18), he is considered to be first and foremost a scientific experiment, not 
a person with rights and agency. Though mixing human genetic material is allowed, the 
global government body known as the Commonwealth bans the combination of “human 
inheritance with nonhuman or artificial instructions” (22). Because Nikko’s genomic 
                                                          
27 In other words, Nikko represents western anxieties around unfettered technological/capitalist 
expansion in Asia. In Spaces of Identity (1993), Morley and Robins argue that “image[s] of the Japanese as 
inhuman” cyborgs reveals the “political and cultural unconscious of the West, [in which] Japan has come 
to exist as the figure of empty and dehumanised technological power” (170). Japanese/Asian cyborgs 
therefore “provok[e] both resentment and envy” as they represent technological progress as well as fear 
of the dehumanising effects of such development (170). 
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structure results from artificial instructions that create additional body parts and an 
“enameled hide” (16) which allow him to exist in space, he is not considered human. 
Instead, he is “an experimental model, a singular prototype of an artificial human variant 
that had since been banned” (16; my emphasis). Just as the bodies of people of colour 
have always been used as instruments of science,28 Nikko’s body is a tool, valued for its 
utility as a scientific experiment. Accordingly, his right to live is premised upon the will 
of others, in this case the “authority of a research permit” granted by the Congressional 
science advisory committee that also includes an “expiration date” (19) for when he must 
be shut down. In order to make Nikko’s difference matter and to enforce his position as 
object rather than human subject, Nikko’s physical characteristics (as Asian) therefore 
“signify” the invisible processes at the micro-level of genetics. 
Additional means through which certain bodies are marked as subhuman include 
access to genetic technologies and the agency to use them (something Nikko also does 
not have). Put another way, genetic differences are not the only determining factors to 
qualify as “human” in the novel. Because Phousita cannot afford body modifications that 
would enable her to have “ghosts” and additional cloned bodies, Niu argues that she, 
“lacks the modifications that make one recognizably human to the Commonwealth” (86). 
Phousita is not specifically described as Asian like Nikko, but her lack of agency 
represents Orientalist terms. Not only is she from the “primitive political entity” of Sunda 
(84)—referencing islands in the territory of Indonesia—Phousita is described through 
stereotypes typically associated with Asian women as petite and passive. She is 
                                                          
28 Thanks to Isiah Lavender III who reminded me of the particular case of The Tuskegee Experiment where 
the U.S. government infamously conducted a syphilis experiment on African American men in Alabama 
between 1932 and 1972.   
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“unnaturally small” and “stood no taller than a petite child of seven or eight” (8). Her 
physicality, like many racialized stereotypes, serves to initially indicate a passivity, as we 
are told that she “belong[s] to Arif” (40) and depends upon his direction. Furthermore, 
Nagata’s novel implies that Phousita’s modified body is part of what subjects her to the 
sex trade, positioning her as part of what Kirstin calls the “scourge of human rats” who 
live in poverty outside the Commonwealth (85). Despite their different backgrounds, 
Nikko and Phousita both exemplify how genetics becomes a determining factor in this 
future. One’s genomic structure not only defines who has the “right” to live but also who 
has access to technologies that would enable this kind of subjectivity. Agency in the 
novel indicates the right to live, thrive, and move as a free being, abilities denied to both 
Nikko and Phousita. 
Like Nikko, in Larissa Lai’s Salt Fish Girl Evie is represented as Asian, though 
the use of racial taxonomy in Lai’s novel serves primarily to indicate a greater, genetic 
difference. Evie and her sisters (the other women in the factories known as Sonias) all 
have “[b]rown eyes and black hair” (160), and there are rumors that they descend from “a 
woman called Ai, a Chinese woman who married a Japanese man” (160). Importantly, 
these physical characteristics do not matter until Evie reveals that she is “not human” 
because her “genes are point zero three per cent Cyprinus carpio—freshwater carp,” 
designating Evie as a “new fucking life form” (158). Upon learning Evie is a clone, 
Miranda notes, “She creeped me out…there was something sordid about her origins” 
(158). Indeed, prior to this, Miranda does not notice anything different about Evie. 
Miranda’s shift in perspective underscores the immateriality of race—Evie’s body is not 
raced until the scientific “truth” of her origins as being composed of non-human genetic 
121 
 
material emerges. This genetic indicator marks Evie as a biological other and provides 
the reason Nextcorp can exploit the labor of women of colour—where early colonialism 
used phenotypal characteristics to indicate the inherent inferiority of people of colour,29 
Nextcorp uses genetic difference to assert that Sonias are subhuman. In Salt Fish Girl, 
race is technology, not only because it is purposely and culturally engineered, but also 
because the supposedly neutral scientific field of genomics establishes race. 
What racializes the “brown eyed, black haired” bodies in Salt Fish Girl, then, is 
not their phenotypal difference but the ways in which their bodies become instruments of 
science,  reduced to biomaterial that can be manipulated, commodified, and controlled. 
While the origin story about Ai is a rumor only, Evie suggests the greater likelihood that 
the genetic material for the Sonias was acquired from the Diverse Genome Project which 
“focused on the peoples of the so-called Third World, Aboriginal peoples, and peoples in 
danger of extinction,” a project that was purchased by Nextcorp (160). Regardless of the 
origin story, in both cases colored peoples’ genetic material gets treated as a commodity 
to be bought and sold for scientific practice. This process not only replicates but 
constructs racist assumptions about biological difference and inferiority—by selling the 
biomaterial of only certain populations, specific bodies are targeted for their 
“bioavailability.” Rachel Lee argues that, “At the turn of the twenty-first century, an 
epidermal notion of race rubs against and in tension with other modes of aggregating 
populations” (210). One primary mode of segregating populations emerges from what 
                                                          
29 See for instance, John Agnew’s discussion of the way “‘race’ shifted in meaning from the looser sense of 
groups differing as much civilizationally as physically to a much stronger sense of complexion and physical 
stature as determining civilizational differences” in colonial geopolitics (45). Throughout The Exquisite 
Corpse of Asian America (2014) Rachel Lee also points out the ways, “comparative anatomy and the 
equation of colored bodies with primitive sexuality and infectious disease were used to justify…colonial 
policies” such as those “in the Philippines and Asian exclusion legislation in the United States” (260). 
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Lee calls “a biomodification regime of primary class or economic stratification in which 
wealthier sectors of society supplement and extend their optimized bodily 
transformations, while poor and perpetually debt-ridden sectors of society become 
bioavailable to service this sector’s amplified transformations” (210). Lee offers the 
example of organ donors from the global South as an example of such bioavailability, 
alongside other examples such as the biopsied tissue of Henrietta Lacks and ensuing 
racialization of the cell line HeLa.30 In a supposedly post-racial world where “[s]tuff like 
that is not supposed to happen any more” (160), the segregation of populations in Salt 
Fish Girl according to biological difference reveals that understanding race through 
genetics is a difference in degree and not kind from the overtly racist ideologies of 
colonialism. 
Accordingly, while Evie and Miranda look exactly alike—indeed, when Evie 
suggests she is not human Miranda “looked at her blankly” (156)—what comes to matter 
is “the neoracializing mode of cloned or ontogenetic marking” (Lee 61). By focusing on 
processes of racialization, Lai’s novel avoids framing race as purely scientific fact or 
social ideology. Instead, Salt Fish Girl is more interested in examining what the ethical, 
social, and political stakes are of biological definitions of race. For Evie, part of the 
danger of identifying race at the micro-level of genetics lies in the hand of a corporation, 
Nextcorp, which defines human/non-human, or who can live and how through labor. Evie 
and the Sonias are therefore intentionally racialized for their labor and enslaved because 
they are, after all, not human according to the ideological divisions propagated by 
Nextcorp’s genomic research. Lai’s novel also highlights the ways in which ideological 
                                                          
30 For more information see Rebecca Skloot’s The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks (2010). 
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divisions between civilization/savagery or human/nonhuman are central structures of 
racialized capitalism where the exploitation of people of colour continues to be a reality. 
Just as the colonial gaze is premised upon the binary between the one who looks and the 
one who is looked at, Rieder points out that “the apologetic function of the concept of 
race does not depend on precise categorization, however, but simply on division itself” 
(110). By defining “human” and “nonhuman” difference through genetic variation, 
Nextcorp can continue to use cheap labor and exploit their workers with little regard for 
their well-being.  
In different ways, then, both The Bohr Maker and Salt Fish Girl present the 
racialized Asian body as a biological resource, distinguished by their supposed biological 
“inferiority,” and useful only for the purposes of scientific advance (Nikko) or fulfilling 
the desires of a biologically superior race (Phousita and Evie). Racism has not 
disappeared in these novels, and genomics justifies not only the difference and 
“subhuman” qualities of these characters, but also the wholesale killing of their 
communities. For instance, Phousita’s community is destroyed with little ethical 
consideration when Kirstin decides to burn it down to draw out Phousita and the Bohr 
Maker. The extermination of Sonias in Salt Fish Girl is equally brutal, as the safe house 
Evie formed with the Sonias gets destroyed when their nascent, self-governed community 
is discovered. Sonia 14 finds her murdered sisters in a field, where “[s]he recognized 
Sonia 148 by her hand, still wearing a ring cut from a bit of copper pipe” and “Sonia 116 
by a mole on her heel” (250). The brutality of these murders reveals that racialized bodies 
are not only exploited but expendable. As Lee claims, “[r]ace operates as a mode of 
class-labor exploitation…but racism as it engenders moral repugnance refers to genocidal 
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obliteration (necropolitics), including the keeping of half-alive dehumanized others as 
bioemporiums and as scientific/clinical resources for the biopolitical elect” (217). The 
Sonias are kept “half-alive” as exploitable labor for the benefit of a biologically superior 
race, but once they challenge their limited agency are killed with little regard as they have 
no political rights and are not legally considered human. By foregrounding the emergence 
of new modes of racialization in these technological futures, both The Bohr Maker and 
Salt Fish Girl clearly see dangers in the ways changing biopolitical regimes will 
understand and regulate difference.  
 
Constructivism: “Race as Technology” 
The Bohr Maker and Salt Fish Girl draw on techno-Orientalist tropes, but they 
do so in order to critique the ways processes of racialization continue to function at the 
subdermal level even if in a supposedly post-racial age visible physical difference is no 
longer seen as meaningful. Instead, genomics posits difference at the micro-level, 
presenting a whole new set of dangers for people who are already in situations of 
economic and social precarity. By using techno-Orientalist tropes to exemplify the ways 
certain bodies are constructed as Asian, however, both novels also open up the space for 
understanding race itself as a technology. While this observation may seem obvious, as 
race is often discussed as a tool of subjugation, Beth Coleman contends that seeing race 
as technology can also function productively rather than “continu[ing] to naturalize racial 
difference as lack” (182). Coleman declares, “the adjustment suggested by the concept of 
race as technology is one away from race as information (i.e., race considered only in 
terms of quantifiable — and thus reessentialized —  data) and one toward race conceived 
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as tool (as the possibility for production and creativity)” (193; my emphasis). Seeing race 
as “tool” or technology recognizes, as Wendy Chun notes, that “race has never been 
simply biological or cultural, but rather a means by which both are established and 
negotiated” (44). Race thus becomes a tool of ethical deliberation, in which thinking 
about, using, and negotiating the terrain of racial representation develops into a form of 
agency rather than a predetermined position of “lack.” In The Bohr Maker and Salt Fish 
Girl, it is precisely by using their position as Asian “others” that characters challenge the 
structures that confine them and form new understandings of community. 
In Nagata’s novel, Phousita’s embrace of the Bohr Maker challenges the 
dichotomy of biology/culture in understanding the genomic “truth” of race. Though the 
Bohr Maker is a nanotechnology in the novel, its representation as a microscopic tool that 
can alter biological material means the Bohr Maker also symbolizes a broader discourse 
about the genetic realities of human difference. In the novel, the anxiety of understanding 
the “truth” of this difference manifests as anxiety over what is “natural” biology or not. 
This anxiety is particularly evident in a conversation between Phousita and Leander 
Bohr, the inventor of the Maker. Leander warns Phousita that if she allows everyone 
access to the Maker people will only continue to utilize it for harm as “[t]hey want to be 
more than human. They want to remake the world. They will murder the spirit of our 
Mother” and thus destroy the “biological continuum” (221). By “Mother” Leander means 
the “natural” realm of creation and genetic evolution, “[t]he billions of years of change, 
the billions of deaths of human and nonhuman entities, the constant unconscious 
improvisation of a trillion genetic lines” (222). As someone from Sunda whose life was 
spent trading sex for food, Phousita questions the “unconscious” nature of this 
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evolutionary process. She asks, “The continuum. What was that but pain passed from one 
generation to the next?” (222). Where Leander appeals to the supposedly rational 
scientific knowledge of genetic inheritance as natural evolution and fears the erosion of 
this process because of the Bohr Maker, Phousita identifies not the tool itself as 
problematic but the logic that underlies it as ethically questionable. Thus, when Leander 
asks for Phousita to destroy the Maker, she retorts, “I’ve heard that gods are stingy with 
their gifts, that they enjoy the suffering of the people…it makes their own lives more 
sweet” (221), recognizing that not only has nanotechnology been kept out of reach for the 
people in the Spill, but that doing so has enabled the life of plenitude for citizens of the 
Commonwealth. For Phousita, the Bohr Maker and its technology does not represent the 
struggle between biology and culture—rather, it represents an ethical struggle between 
who has the right to prosper and who must suffer for this. 
Where Leander believes that the Bohr Maker would disrupt the natural process of 
evolution, or the “continuum of life” (222), Phousita recognizes that “nature is always 
already culturally altered; culture is always already composed of material nature” (Lee 
11). That is, science’s claim to knowledge divested of ideological interest is problematic, 
particularly when an exclusive group of “experts” produce this knowledge and benefit 
from it most. As a molecular designer, Leander believes his objective scientific approach 
can be distinguished from social ideologies, but Phousita challenges this belief, asking 
Leander, “who are you to command the world?” (223). Indeed, Phousita’s challenge 
highlights a history of scientific knowledge that has produced racialized claims. As 
Reardon argues about the supposedly “colour-blind” claims made by geneticists in the 
late twentieth century, by positioning geneticists as the only people with the “molecular 
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tools that could pierce the ideological veil of the skin to view the truth that lay beneath it 
in the DNA” (52), biological definitions of race continue to “invest one group with the 
expertise to define race…circumscrib[ing] vital public debate about what we want to 
know about our differences and how those differences should matter” (58). Phousita, 
however, recognizes that the value and utility of the Bohr Maker must be a communal 
and public conversation, and she decides to share the Bohr Maker with the people of the 
Spill. Ultimately, Phousita cares less about whether the Bohr Maker will alter the nature 
of genetic development and more about how it will affect her people.  
Similarly, Salt Fish Girl is less concerned with the reality of human difference 
and its genetic constitution, and more concerned with ethical questions, asking, “[W]hat 
relations does race set up?” (Chun 57). This concern first arises when Evie reveals to 
Miranda that she is a genetically modified human. Indeed, this encounter foregrounds 
race for the first time race in Salt Fish Girl, but the novel shifts race from a tool of 
subjugation (in which Miranda was “creeped out” by Evie) to a tool which challenges 
Evie’s supposedly non-human status, making Miranda question her previous assumptions 
about the relationship between ideology and truth. Evie uses the signification of her 
body—her “brown eyes and black hair” (Lai 160)—as prosthesis which “adds 
functionality to the subject, helps form location, and provides information” (Coleman 
194). In other words, Evie’s raced body serves as a prosthesis that asks what the ethical 
consequences of certain modes of signification are, or why certain bodies are “raced” in 
certain ways. Her story helps Miranda realize her ignorance and complicity in failing to 
question the surface appearance of what she has been taught to believe. When Evie asks 
if “everyone in this town [is] as out of it as you” (161), Miranda is offended by the 
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implication, but she soon realizes Evie is right. As Miranda ponders the implications of 
her new found knowledge that certain people continue to be dehumanized for the profit of 
others, she notes how Evie has changed her: “My world had suddenly become something 
quite different from what it had been mere moments ago” (161).  
 Despite the novel’s emphasis on the “dark forces of biotechnology” (as the back 
cover states), Salt Fish Girl does not condemn Evie or necessarily care about the 
implications of Evie’s genetic difference for understanding “human” genetics. Instead, 
the novel elides ontological questions of race to foreground the ways “[r]ace as 
technology recognizes the proper place of race not as a trait but as a tool—for good or for 
ill—to reconceptualise how race fits into a larger pattern of meaning and power ” 
(Coleman 184-5; my emphasis). Miranda’s shift in perspective from viewing Evie as 
something unnatural to viewing Evie’s difference as revelation represents a moment at 
which the question of ethics is at work, tracing “larger pattern[s] of meaning and power.” 
For instance, Miranda sees beyond Evie’s supposed difference to question the 
epistemological frameworks that she has unquestionably accepted. These frameworks 
have led her to believe what “the newspapers say,” to “respect private property,” that 
“[t]here must be laws governing human biomaterial,” and as previously mentioned, that 
“stuff like that is not supposed to happen any more” (161). Furthermore, the novel’s final 
section ends with the birth of a child and the development of a new form of family for 
Evie and Miranda. Tellingly, this section is titled “zero point three per cent” (252), 
suggesting that while Evie is still part “carp” and thus legally considered non-human, her 
future promises to be much different than the one of racialized labour she was subjected 
to. Accordingly, Evie might represent Chun’s claim that, “although the idea and the 
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experience of race have been used for racist ends, the best way to fight racism might not 
be to deny the existence of race, but to make race do different things” (57). Evie may be 
different, not because of her genetics, but because she constructd an alternative future in 
which race ‘does different things.’ Though Lai’s novel takes a firmly historical approach 
to understanding the shifting material and epistemological frameworks that define the 
realities of human difference, it ends on an ambiguous note about what will be done in 
the future and what will happen the “next time” (269) determinist readings of race 
emerge.  
 
Racialized Labor(s)  
Wendy Chun notes that rethinking race as technology asks the question: “can the 
abject, the Orientalized, the robot-like data-like Asian/Asian American other be a place 
from which something like insubordination or creativity can arise?” (51). Nagata’s and 
Lai’s novels suggest yes, as The Bohr Maker and Salt Fish Girl use techno-Orientalist 
tropes, but they do so in order to critique a history of racialized labor and its new 
biopolitical articulations in fields such as genomics, which problematically divest science 
from ideological values. This critique makes all the more clear why Lai and Nagata 
represent their characters as Asian, bodies that have stereotypically been associated with 
mechanical, dehumanized labor. Furthermore, Phousita and Evie, through being 
characterized in specifically techno-Orientalist terms, reorient the idea of race as 
prescriptive and determinist, engaging instead with race as a point of departure for 
critically examining the implications of reinscribing human difference at the level of 
130 
 
genetics. Both novels thus use the idea of mechanical/mechanized Asian bodies in a 
manner that highlights the ways race can be used as a tool towards more productive 
endeavors, enabling, as Coleman puts it, the “critique of racial instrumentalization, but in 
a fashion that exploits the nature of technology toward the human and the affective as 
opposed to toward dehumanization” (199). Paradoxically, then, through techno-
Orientalist tropes that dehumanize Asian characters, Phousita and Evie bring to light 
questions about the way in which we continue to classify, use, and appropriate the 
meaning of human difference. 
By addressing the history of racialized violence against Asians/Asian Americans 
while using the conceptual tools of science fiction to disrupt these occurrences, The Bohr 
Maker and Salt Fish Girl exemplify Beth Coleman’s call for a renewed engagement with 
race beyond determinist attempts to define human difference. That is, The Bohr Maker 
and Salt Fish Girl displace the question of biology versus culture all together, asking 
instead if race might be used as “an aesthetics and ethics” in which “an agent can judge 
the strategic value of one mode of representation over another” (Coleman 199). 
Importantly, Coleman notes that seeing race as a tool in this regard does not mean erasing 
the very real, material experiences faced by people of colour—instead, Coleman argues 
that seeing race as technology supplements critique by arguing for a dislocation of race 
from the biological that can function through the work of ethics, in which “how we 
engage race as an extension of ourselves constitutes a key question” (199; my emphasis). 
Thus, race changes from something that predetermines the agency of racialized bodies 
into a tool that raced bodies such as Phousita and Evie can use towards challenging the 
repressive systems that attempt to define them.  
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Both Phousita and Evie share central roles in changing the communities they are a 
part of, and they do so not despite their difference but because of it. For The Bohr Maker 
and Salt Fish Girl, engaging with race is not a matter of overcoming stereotypes about 
Asians as “model minorities” or presenting more “emotionally” complex Asian 
characters—it is instead about asking how our understanding of Asian/Asian American 
identity can illuminate the entangled networks of power that are continually inscribed on 
the bodies of people of colour. Mediating the boundaries of past and present, science 
fiction provides the ultimate space for this project of critiquing the historical processes of 
racializing while imagining a future in which race functions differently. Miranda says it 
best, perhaps, noting at the end of Salt Fish Girl, that her growing family with Evie 
represents, “the new children of the earth… out of DNA both new and old, an imprint of 
what has gone before, but also a variation. By our difference we mark how ancient the 
alphabet of our bodies. By our strangeness we write our bodies into the future” (259). 
These bodies of the future may be marked by histories of racialization, but their 
“strangeness” will also function differently than the assumptions of racial essentialism 
that preceded them. Like the engineered bodies of their posthumans, The Bohr Maker and 
Salt Fish Girl ask how conceptions of race might be engineered differently in the future, 
such that processes of racialization change from tools of subjugation to tools of 
communication and ethical deliberation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Globalization as Techno-optimism: Examining Information and 
Communication Technologies through Postcolonial Perspectives 
Contemporary science fiction does not express the explicitly colonial frameworks 
Rieder identifies in early sf’s lost-race tales (such as those of Haggard’s She), but sf still 
participates in a process of world-building that, upon critical analysis, reveals troubling 
assumptions about how we understand global “development.” By considering how 
technology, the environment, and socio-political life will develop into the future, sf 
engages in a process of speculation and world-building that reflects current ideological 
assumptions about what social structures and technologies can lead us towards these 
futures. In this chapter, I argue that postcolonial science fiction questions the genre’s 
focus on future speculation and the genre’s frequent emphasis on technological 
development as a means towards social development (expressed through an implicit 
techno-optimism). Though these generic frameworks and assumptions—about focus on 
the future and techno-optimism—seem central to the genre, postcolonial sf suggests we 
must approach such ideas with caution and consider how they reproduce neocolonial 
ideologies. Importantly, postcolonial sf is not wary of discourses about the future in sf 
because of debates over the genre’s predictive or allegorical qualities—indeed, 
postcolonial sf recognizes that sf does not seek to actually imagine the future, but 
“[r]ather its multiple mock futures serve the quite different function of transforming our 
own present into the determinate past of something yet to come” (Jameson, 
Archaeologies 288). It is precisely because sf is a critical tool that defamiliarizes the 
present that postcolonial sf is attuned to what focus on the future—in both sf and 
technoculture—reveals about contemporary fascinations with techno-utopian possibility. 
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Namely, postcolonial sf is wary of how focus on the future risks erasing the historical 
context of the past and recurring cycles of violence that are perpetuated against specific 
groups of people. In this chapter, I explore the idea that Lauren Beukes’s Moxyland 
(2010) and Alex Rivera’s Sleep Dealer (2008), reveal an ambivalent, and somewhat 
suspicious, attitude towards focus on the “future” and imagining future worlds. 
Specifically, this chapter argues that postcolonial sf, extending from its critique of 
the ideology of progress, offers a unique critical framework through which to analyze the 
assumption that technological development will lead to an increasingly egalitarian future. 
For instance, postcolonial sf such as Moxyland and Sleep Dealer examines the 
consequences of information and communication technologies (ICTs) on how we 
understand the idea of global development and progress. I must be careful to note here 
that postcolonial sf does not reject technological development in a return to “nature” or 
“primitivism” foregrounded in texts such as James Cameron’s Avatar (2008). Rather, if, 
as Bacigalupi suggests, “Science fiction hunts for the techno-fix, not the social-fix” 
(Liptak), postcolonial sf reveals that “social” fixes must precede or accompany 
technological development or science will continue to function as a tool of subjugation. 
Csicsery-Ronay defines the obsession with techno-fixes as indicative of “[a]n invisible 
imaginary imperial regime [that is] tak[ing] shape” (244). This techno-scientific regime is 
“an Enlightened empire of shared commitments to instrumentality, justified by its 
promise of ever-greater rationality and material abundance in the future, a 
future…managed by technoscientific means” (Csicsery-Ronay, Seven 244). For Csicsery-
Ronay, sf becomes a “central mediating literary institution” for examining the 
development of this techno-scientific empire (244). 
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Through Moxyland and Sleep Dealer, I analyze how postcolonial sf questions, 
from the perspective of the global South (and thus in an autoethnographic framework), 
the assumption that technological development will positively affect the lives of people 
of colour. Such techno-optimism, or faith in the ability of technological development to 
save us from catastrophe (ecological or otherwise), is, as Imre Szeman argues, central to 
principles of modern science (814). Szeman argues that “techno-utopianism” is the 
political dream “that mankind produces only such disasters as technology can solve; the 
disaster arises only when the conditions in which to repair it are already in the process of 
formation” (814). Sf appeals to such techno-optimism by foregrounding the idea that 
scientific progress will lead the way to global development via technology; by doing so 
the genre risks eschewing any question of politics by constructing the idea that 
technological development is a universal need. However, as Rieder points out, early sf 
actually reveals how scientific projects are simultaneously driven by a colonial ideology 
of progress because underpinning even “the most legitimate scientific endeavor” is the 
“common assumption that the relation of the colonizing societies [seen as more 
technologically advanced] to the colonized ones is that of the developed, modern present 
to its own undeveloped, primitive past” (30; my emphasis). Sf’s focus on an evolved 
future exemplifies the same logic as the imperial expansionist project in its vision of a 
specific kind of economic growth, technological expansion, and construction of new 
worlds that signify its development and break from a “primitive past.” When techno-
utopianism pervades visions of the future (both in sf and the “real-world” technoscientific 
discourses it draws on) pause should therefore be given to consider whether neocolonial 
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relations are being created with geo-political regions that have little access to 
technological resources. 
Perhaps more than any other popular genre, postcolonial sf like Moxyland and 
Sleep Dealer challenges the ideology of progress that lies behind techno-optimism. Part 
of the danger of focusing on the techno-fix, is as Szeman makes clear, that the “fantasy of 
past coincidence” only “reinforces the bad utopianism of hope;”  in other words, “modern 
imaginings of science” depict technological development in the past as emerging just in 
time to help avoid potential disasters or to push economic and social development ahead 
(814). This “fantasy” that technology appears just in time to save us, “reinforces the bad 
utopianism of hope” as it assumes that science will eventually find technological 
solutions to all our problems—ecological, social, or otherwise. Such hope, however, is 
premised upon the image of a future where technology functions as deliverance (the 
similarities between religious rhetoric and techno-optimism are telling); when 
communities adopt this “bad utopianism of hope” they do not see the need for any 
immediate or radical change, as future technology will surely find a solution to current 
social and ecological problems. Thus, techno-optimism in sf and technoscientific 
discourses often serves to defer the need for radical social action into the future, and 
functions as part of the normalization of discourses of the apocalypse, where, as 
Frederick Buell argues, living in a state of crisis is no longer shocking news. The genre 
assures readers that ecological disaster or social collapse may be near, but technological 
development will always evolve in time to save us. This cultural belief is represented in 
science fiction itself: post-war science fiction often depicted technology in a pessimistic 
light due to fears of nuclear apocalypse, but much contemporary science fiction evokes 
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the genre’s early sense of wonder over technological development. Films such as 
Blomkamp’s Elysium (2013), Christopher Nolan’s Interstellar (2014), and Tarsem Sing’s 
Self/Less (2015) represent contemporary wonder over the possibilities of future 
technologies in fields such as health care, space travel, and urban development.  
Moxyland and Sleep Dealer exemplify a postcolonial science fiction that does not 
appeal to such techno-utopianism, in part because these texts emerge from social contexts 
where technology has frequently been used as a tool of subjugation. Rob Nixon points 
out that, “the affectless language of technospeak” can function as a mechanism of “the 
insidious, traumatic violence inflicted on the most vulnerable,” and a form of “slow 
violence,” which is characteristic of environmental and social problems in the global 
South (169).The Kenyan short Pumzi (2010) by Wanuri Kahiu, is another example of a 
text in the subgenre that is wary of technological solutions. Pumzi depicts a 
postapocalyptic world in which lack of water has led to the extinction of nature as we 
know it. Organic life seems to have disappeared, and humanity now exists in 
subterranean communities where holographic technology and medicinal “dream 
suppressants” are everyday features. Though this future is defined by high technology, as 
Asha, the film’s protagonist discovers, it is also defined by a repressive regime in which 
people’s bodies become the only available resources for sustaining life. Accordingly, 
human energy powers machines in this contained biosphere, and water is re-circulated 
from people’s sweat and urine in order to be made consumable. Pumzi shifts the focus of 
ecological disaster from the cities and economic centres—such as New York, Los 
Angeles, or Tokyo—that dominate much of science fiction, focusing instead on what 
ecological change will mean for African contexts and people of colour. Technology in 
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Pumzi does not lead to a form of “liberation,” as resource scarcity means people’s bodies 
are subject to increased control in order to meet the demands of a fragile technological 
ecosystem. As I will explore below, Moxyland and Sleep Dealer also suggest that at a 
moment when information communication technologies seems ubiquitous and our virtual 
future decidedly near, careful attention must be given to the social, ethical and material 
stakes of an emerging technoscientific Empire.  
 
Cosmopolitan Visions and Networked Communities  
Despite being from different geographical regions, both Moxyland and Sleep 
Dealer share a number of similar approaches towards understanding the development of 
global communication technologies. Their similarities stem partly from the ways both 
texts challenge the techno-utopian fantasy that technological development can provide 
social and environmental justice for all. Indeed, they both disrupt fantasies of a 
“networked” cosmopolitan community. By examining the impact of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) outside of current global economic centers and 
focusing instead on South Africa and Mexico, Moxyland and Sleep Dealer explore how 
technology affects the lives of people of colour, reversing the process by which 
“information loses its body” (Hayles 2).31 I will begin by examining how both texts 
                                                          
31 I refer specifically to Hayles’s discussion of how “information lost its body, that is, how it came to be 
conceptualized as an entity separate from the material forms in which it is thought to be embedded” (2). 
As Hayles’s nuanced analysis suggests, “[w]hen information loses its body, equating humans and 
computers is especially easy,” a move that enables a critique of the liberal, humanist subject traditionally 
premised on the idea of fixed subjectivity; however, “[b]ecause information had lost its body, this 
construction [also] implie[s] that embodiment is not essential to human being. Embodiment has been 
systematically downplayed or erased in the cybernetic construction of the posthuman in ways that have 
not occurred in other critiques of the liberal humanist subject” (4). I see Moxyland and Sleep Dealer as 
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emphasize the embodied effects of ICTs on individual people, before briefly examining 
how this emphasis on materiality also creates spaces of resistance in which ICTs can be 
used towards more ethical global encounters. Reading Moxyland and Sleep Dealer side-
by-side creates a map of how both novels use the discourse of science fiction as the basis 
for developing a shared ethical stance, particularly through their adaptation of cyberpunk 
themes. Hence, while Moxyland and Sleep Dealer resist the tendency to generalize 
regarding the effects of technological development, by doing so they actually share a 
common ethical stance: that is, they are both committed to understanding technology as 
embodied, and thus see attempts to universalize and disembody information as a 
continuation of neocolonial regimes of power.  
Before proceeding to explore the novels’ thematic concerns, a brief summary of 
each text is necessary. Set in a near-future Cape Town, Moxyland is a post-cyberpunk 
text32 that follows four characters (Kendra, Lerato, Tendeka, Toby) from different socio-
economic backgrounds. All four characters challenge the claim that social relations will 
be improved by access to technoscientific resources, portraying instead how such 
technological developments “facilitate unfettered capitalism’s inherently destructive and 
mutagenic dynamism, which turns every sphere of experience, from fashion to labour, 
into commodities” (Csicsery-Ronay, Seven 245). Kendra, for instance, demonstrates the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
pointing to the dangers of ‘downplaying’ the importance of the body and embodiment when discussing 
the effects of technological development.  
32 Thomas Foster argues that “second-generation or ‘post-cyberpunk’” shifts away from “romanticizing” 
cyberspace, and includes feminist, queer, and racial appropriations of cyberpunk conventions (Foster, xv). 
Foster argues that though many have claimed the death of cyberpunk since Gibson’s Neuromancer, 
“cyberpunk didn’t so much die as experience a sea change into a more generalized cultural formation” 
(Foster, xiv). Post-cyberpunk therefore reflects changes that occurred not only within the genre’s textual 
practices but also within, “a variety of other cultural, social, economic, historical and political practices” 
(Foster, xvi).   
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biopolitical power of this near-future—as a “sponsor baby” (7), she is a brand 
ambassador for a drink called “Ghost.” Part of her job entails being injected with 
nanotechnology that brands her skin, marking her body with the corporation’s logo and 
effectively rendering her a “product” of Ghost. A side effect of the nanotechnology is the 
development of her addiction to the drink, establishing her as both the perfect consumer 
and marketer. By depicting the ways Kendra is marked and controlled by Ghost, 
Moxyland uses the vocabulary of science fiction to make literal the ways corporate 
power, as Hardt and Negri argue, “not only regulates human interactions but also seeks 
directly to rule over human nature” (Empire xv). Hence, Ghost sees Kendra as a 
commodity they own and whose life they are entitled to control over—when Kendra tells 
her employers she would like to end her contract with Ghost, the company no longer 
views her as useful and subsequently sees it within their right to “terminate” Kendra’s 
contract by killing her.  
Moxyland therefore examines the transition from colonialism to the consolidation 
of new technological empires and the continued exploitation of the global South. 
Beukes’s novel reveals how the exploitative logic of South African apartheid is translated 
to new binary divisions between the technological “have” and “have nots” of a 
competitive, neoliberal world. Kendra and Lerato’s adoption of principles of 
instrumentality in a technoscientific regime exemplifies how the adoption of neoliberal 
principles regards human bodies and relationships as resources available for exploitation. 
Kendra’s body and identity as an innovative artist is used by Ghost to promote their 
“fashionable” brand, while Lerato shapes her personal identity according to the needs of 
Communique’s corporate goals. In order to escape poverty and the conditions of the 
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Rural, both characters deem this commitment to corporations as necessary to their 
survival. Arguably, the exploitation of human bodies in this manner is an extension of 
colonial logic itself—apartheid’s racial policies were deeply rooted in the struggle over 
South Africa’s resources; thus, by the time of deracialization in the 1990s, the country 
was already deeply divided by class structure. Adoption of neoliberal policies post-
apartheid therefore only exacerbated existing class structures. Moxyland suggests that 
despite technological developments, socio-economic differences and the exploitation of 
people of colour will only continue if contemporary neoliberal ideologies are carried into 
the future. 
Alex Rivera’s film Sleep Dealer (2008) takes place on a different continent at the 
US/Mexico border. Set in San Diego and Tijuana, Sleep Dealer depicts a near-future 
where “info-maquilas” host Mexican workers who remotely control robots working in 
the US. The film primarily follows Memo Cruz, a young man who is forced from his 
rural community to work in Tijuana after his father is killed by a US drone operator 
named Rudy Ramirez. In Tijuana, Memo meets Luz Martinez, who helps Memo get his 
cybernetic “nodes,” implants which are placed on his body and allow him to “jack in” (to 
use images from cyberpunk) to other machines, computers, or robots. Nodes are required 
for becoming a cyber-worker, and when Memo receives his and begins work in the info-
maquilas, he is able to not only work but become part of a greater cybernetic/virtual 
network that has much in common with the Internet or World Wide Web. To Memo, this 
is initially exciting as nodes give him mobility and the chance to access a “global 
economy” (Sleep Dealer) which seems far removed from his rural home in Santa Ana del 
Rio. Through their nodes and the info-maquilas, workers are connected to robots in cities 
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such as New York and Los Angeles where they control the movements and actions of 
robots without ever needing to be physically present. Thus, labour is “imported” into the 
US without any actual physical immigration required.  
Like Moxyland, Sleep Dealer examines the persistence of colonial frameworks in 
contemporary multinational capitalism. Lysa Rivera argues that Sleep Dealer is a 
borderland sf text which “not only offer[s] critical visions of globalization both today and 
in the future but also insist[s] on reading late capitalism as a troubling and enduring 
extension of colonial relations of power between the United States and Mexico” (416). 
The film, while clearly a critique of migrant labour and the exploitative conditions of late 
capitalism, also permits a counter-narrative in which Memo and Rudy are able to connect 
through the very resources (information communication technologies) that divide and 
constrain them. Unbeknownst to Memo, throughout the film Luz uploads memories and 
stories about Memo’s life to a platform called “Tru-Node” where people buy and share 
memories constructed by others. Eventually Rudy discovers Memo’s memories online, 
leading Rudy to personally seek out Memo in order to atone for the pain he has caused 
Memo’s family.  
 
The White Noise of Cyberpunk and Fantasies of Disembodiment 
Moxyland and Sleep Dealer specifically draw on the tropes of cyberpunk in order 
to demonstrate that information and communication technologies are not neutral “tools.” 
By exploring what virtuality, or cyberspace, means for people of colour, Moxyland and 
Sleep Dealer challenge the genre’s fantasies of disembodiment, and thus also the idea 
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that the virtual space of technologies, like the Internet, can provide a “utopian space 
where everything—even transcending racism—is possible” (Nakamura xi). Rather than 
presenting connection to the Internet, or global network, as a tool that “levels” inequality, 
Moxyland and Sleep Dealer reveal the often violent physical consequences of being 
connected for people of colour. As Lisa Nakamura argues in regards to cyberspace, “[t]he 
socially marginalized have a different relation to postmodernity than do members of 
majority cultures or races. Hence, they have a different relation to cyberspace, or to put it 
another way they ‘do’ virtuality differently” (xv). By adapting the conventions of 
cyberpunk, Moxyland and Sleep Dealer not only challenge the genre’s traditionally 
white, male narrative, both novels also reveal that virtual spaces affect the bodies of 
people of colour differently. Characters in each text do not transcend their material bodies 
and socio-economic positions, and in fact often find that access to virtual networks 
further marginalizes them from access to greater agency and social power.  
A brief examination of cyberpunk’s generic assumptions will help situate 
Moxyland and Sleep Dealer’s postcolonial critiques in the rest of the chapter. One of the 
most defining features of cyberpunk is the subgenre’s “theme of body invasion: 
prosthetic limbs, implanted circuitry... [and the] theme of mind invasion: brain-computer 
interfaces, artificial intelligence, neurochemistry” (Sterling xi). Bruce Sterling, a central 
cyberpunk author, notes that, “for the cyberpunks...technology is visceral. It is not the 
bottled genie of remote Big Science boffins; it is pervasive, utterly intimate. Not outside 
us, but next to us. Under our skin; often, inside our minds” (xi). By “visceral” Sterling 
means that technology physically “invades” the body, and cyberpunk often foregrounds 
how technology penetrates the human body. William Gibson’s Neuromancer, for 
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instance, focuses on protagonist Henry Dorsett Case, a “cyberspace cowboy” who “lived 
for the bodiless exultation of cyberspace” (5-6). In Gibson’s novel, cyberspace is 
depicted as a disembodied experience in which the mind separates from the body to 
explore the virtual world in a type of “consensual hallucination” (51). For cyberpunk, 
“the body [is] meat” (Gibson 6), and cyberspace’s disembodied experience is presented 
as thrilling, affective, and highly desired. Ultimately, as Sherryl Vint points out, 
cyberpunk is the “genre best known for its rejection of embodiment and embrace of an 
existence in cyberspace” (102). Augmentation of the body is therefore welcomed for both 
aesthetic reasons (such as Molly’s mirrorshades in Neuromancer) and in order to enable 
characters to enter the supposedly free realm of cyberspace. Importantly, technology is 
seen only as a tool, and much early cyberpunk fantasized about cyberspace’s techno-
utopian possibilities as a disembodied space free from the physical, social, and economic 
constraints that define the “real” world. 
While the characters in Moxyland and Sleep Dealer are technologically wired 
through the use of cellphones and cyberspace, their virtual worlds are very different from 
Neuromancer’s vision of a utopian “consensual hallucination” (Gibson 51). In Moxyland, 
Tendeka’s use of the virtual world called “Pluslife” reveals the dangers of disembodying 
the material world from the virtual. To begin, Moxyland posits that “invisible” spaces of 
the internet are intimately bound by the socio-economic situation of the user; in other 
words, socially marginalized users “‘do’ virtuality differently” (Nakamura xv) because 
they are confined by specific economic and social structures. Tendeka, for instance, uses 
Pluslife, “one of the worlds’ favourite virtual escapes,” to meet with his political mentor, 
a revolutionary he knows only through the avatar name of skyward*. Unknown to 
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Tendeka, skyward* is a corporate agent who, in true Orwellian form, adopts faux 
revolutionary personas in order to seek out and contain potential uprisings in the country. 
Although Tendeka wants to “[take a] stand against the bullshit of artificially imposed 
borders and bureaucracies” (122) by producing protest art, skyward* convinces him that 
the only way to engage apathetic citizens is to create large scale spectacle: “we have to 
jolt them, surprise them, it has to be spectacular. we’re [sic] competing with media and 
advertising and promotions and pluslives, all helping people to avoid confronting reality” 
(126). When Tendeka follows skyward*’s advice and launches a protest that involves 
destroying public property and extensive media coverage, he is infected with a virus 
released by state police. He refuses to receive medical attention, claiming his death is 
“the only way to show … I’ve been infected with the M7N1 virus as an act of 
government-corporate censorship. Repression. This is human rights violation taken to its 
worst. They are wilfully killing their citizens” (289 ellipsis in original). 
Tendeka believes that Pluslife is a space where “you can actually have an 
influence on the world” (49), and in a horribly ironic twist, by the end of the novel 
Pluslife does indeed influence Tendeka’s physical world. Socially disenfranchised, 
Tendeka has no choice but to place his trust in skyward*’s advice. Skyward’s ability to 
affect Tendeka’s political and social beliefs ultimately results in Tendeka’s death, whose 
final act of rebellion reinforces the interconnection of the physical and virtual in two 
ways: first, not only does it emphasize Tendeka’s faith in skyward*until his very death, it 
also reveals the ways in which Tendeka’s very violent and visceral death is the only way 
to show how power manifests through an immaterial network. As Steven Shaviro argues, 
through the network, “control is less visual than tactile” (Connected 32), and surveillance 
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states, exemplified through skyward’s relationship to Tendeka, are “performative instead 
of constative; it is not what they say that matters, but what they do” (Shaviro, Connected, 
34). In Tendeka’s case, his self-immolation is the most radical example of the ways in 
which societies of control turn information into tactile mechanisms of control and self-
surveillance—when Tendeka becomes too invested in protest art, his death is exactly 
what Communique wants. 
Secondly, Tendeka’s death also exemplifies the dangers, for people of colour in 
particular, of disembodying virtual from material spaces. Tendeka dies assuming Toby 
will broadcast his gruesome death as proof of state repression (both Tendeka and Toby 
were at the protest, though Toby was participating in a video game at the time). However, 
Toby, the most privileged character in the novel, does not believe Tendeka’s physical 
pain as Toby is unable to distinguish between the simulated game he is playing, real life, 
and the protest. It is not until Tendeka’s violent and gruesome death that Toby begins to 
suspect Tendeka is dying: “No, kids, the indicator for yours truly that this is some serious 
fucking shit is when he starts bleeding from every exit point … it’s so overboard 
gruesome” (301). Even at this point, however, Toby disturbingly equates Tendeka’s death 
with a scene from a “total B-grade horror” (301) movie, and he views Tendeka’s death 
not as important for the exposing the violence of corporate/state force but for the money 
that he will make off of reducing Tendeka’s death to spectacle. While Tendeka dies 
assuming Toby will broadcast his gruesome death as proof of state repression, we are left 
uncertain as to how this footage will be construed, since ultimately, Toby admits it 
“depends on who’s paying” for this “exclusive” (303). Tendeka’s death thus exemplifies 
that “the ability to construct the body as passé is a position available only to those 
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privileged to think of their (white, male, straight, non-working-class) bodies as the norm” 
(Vint 8). As a socially marginalized character, Tendeka’s body matters—not just because 
he must be alive to protest, but also because his body and gruesome death bears witness 
to the depths of social and political injustice inflicted on people of colour. Thus, exposing 
the physical violence of the state is important to Tendeka, even if it means his death.  
Beukes’s adaptation of cyberpunk themes reframes the genre’s inclination 
towards disembodiment by considering what virtual spaces mean to people of different 
racial, social, and economic backgrounds. Furthermore, by setting Moxyland specifically 
in the context of South Africa, Beukes’s novel considers the ways Africa has perhaps 
always been an othered, virtual identity for the West. Through processes of colonization 
and the representation of Africa as the “dark continent” of Western modernity, Gerald 
Gaylard argues “Africa has tended to have a virtual status for the West” (159). As a 
postmodern genre that emphasizes the idea of virtuality and fragmentation, cyberpunk 
may therefore be a particularly useful genre through which to explore processes of 
racialization. Both cyberpunk and people of colour share in conditions of “virtuality”—
cyberpunk emphasizes disembodied, symbolic spaces, just as Gaylard points out how 
constructions of “Africa” and racial difference can be seen as virtual and symbolic 
identities. Nakamura extends the comparison between cyberspace and people of colour 
by pointing out that, “people of colour have always been postmodern (and by extension 
‘virtual’)” because “[w]hile everyone in cyberspace is disoriented, people of colour in 
cyberspace come to the medium already in this state, already marginalized, fragmented, 
and imbricated within systems of signification that frame them in multiple and often 
contradictory ways” (xvi; my emphasis). Indeed, as Nakamura argues, people of colour 
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have always had virtual identities in that processes of racialization have always 
constructed “fluid, marginalized selves” (Nakamura xvi) in order to establish, and 
exploit, racial difference. 
Moxyland thus situates the “postmodern” situation of people of colour in a 
specifically historical context by alluding to, and drawing out the continued implications 
of, apartheid in South Africa. In Moxyland’s afterword, Beukes elaborates on the 
significance of context to her sf novel, writing,  
Of course, it [Moxyland] also grew out of the legacy of apartheid: the arbitrary 
and artificially applied divides between people, the pass system and the insidious 
Special Branch … Don’t let anyone tell you that apartheid has nothing to do with 
South Africa now. Those roots run deep and tangled and we’ll be tripping over 
them for many generations to come. (311-12) 
The “fluid” identities of race in South Africa have real, material consequences that 
continue to affect the country’s social relations. In this sense, Moxyland grounds 
cyberpunk’s fantasies of disembodiment by insisting on a politics of location. 
Postcolonial science fiction like Moxyland critiques cyberpunk’s emphasis on 
disembodiment for how it erases the physical and material impact of processes of 
racialization on the lives of people of colour. Specifically, Moxyland challenges fantasies 
of disembodiment specifically because in a context such as South Africa, reiterating 
mind/body splits denies the ways apartheid has shaped the very real, material life of a 
nation and its people. Gaylard points out that consequently  
rather than Gibsonesque warnings of the extinction of individuality in corporate 
hyperspace, for instance, current African writers tentatively advance versions of 
virtual identity that centre around relative location in motion. … [I]t is precisely 
within the visceral geopolitical that contemporary African writers tend to locate 
their virtualities. (161) 
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Much contemporary African fiction contests the divide between bodily “meat” and mind, 
presenting instead a version of “trickster flexibility” that recognizes and highlights the 
fluctuating relationship between virtual identity and material geopolitical relations, 
fantastic and mundane worlds, and mind and body (Gaylard 161).33 For Gaylard, this 
“trickster flexibility” refers to how one’s identity shifts in different geopolitical contexts, 
but it can also refer to the ways postcolonial sf plays with the conventions of cyberpunk 
to emphasize a politics of location instead of disembodiment. Trickster flexibility for 
postcolonial sf can therefore mean that the idea of virtual identities can be used, not only 
to reiterate mind/body separations, but also to reveal epistemological assumptions about 
how identity and race is understood in different geopolitical contexts. 
Like Moxyland, Sleep Dealer rewrites fantasies of disembodiment. Specifically, 
the mind/body split typical of cyberpunk is critiqued in two ways in Sleep Dealer: first, 
Rivera’s film suggests that virtual labour and access to information and communication 
technologies will not lead to greater socio-economic equality.34 Secondly, Sleep Dealer 
suggests that, in fact, ICTs and virtual labour continue to depend on the racialization, or 
“cybertyping” (Nakamura 3), of specific bodies. Nakamura coins the term cybertyping to 
explain “the process by which computer/human interfaces, the dynamics and economics 
of access, and the means by which users are able to express themselves online interacts 
                                                          
33 Importantly, when Gaylard speaks of African fiction, he speaks of trends and tendencies, not 
homogenous categories.  
34 Sleep Dealer has been examined by many scholars as a critique of immaterial labour, virtual labour, or 
cognitive labour and contemporary neocolonial relations. See, for instance, Luis Martín Cabrera’s analysis 
of Sleep Dealer where he argues “Rivera’s futuristic musings… sho[w] how technology and cognitive labor 
may actually reproduce forms of colonial exploitation and oppression rather than leading to automatic 
liberation from the shackles of physical labor” (590). 
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with the ‘cultural layer’ or ideologies regarding race that they bring with them into 
cyberspace” (3). How users “express themselves online” is not free from the constraints 
of socio-cultural contexts; cybertypes reveal that race and processes of racialization 
therefore do not disappear in cyberspace, but rather race is articulated in new ways 
through digital mediums. Sleep Dealer illustrates the supposed “erasure” of race online 
through cyber-workers, all people of colour, who are visually hidden from view by the 
factories they work in. In the following analysis, I examine how Sleep Dealer reveals 
that, despite the attempts to hide people of colour and cyberworkers from view in 
infomaquiladoras, race continues to “mark” the body of the other in cyberspace, albeit in 
new ways. Sleep Dealer therefore reinforces that “identity online is still typed, still mired 
in oppressive roles even if the body has been left behind or bracketed” (Nakamura 4). 
Importantly, cybertyping not only reflects new racial paradigms, it also reflects “anxieties 
about the ways that computer-enabled communication can challenge these old logics” (5), 
revealing the unstable premises upon which processes of racialization function. 
Identifying cybertyping allows readers to identify new racial stereotypes as well as 
question the epistemological and material frameworks that benefit from continuing to 
perpetuate these racialized identities. Sleep Dealer reflects this very dynamic between 
critique and constructivism by exploring the dialectic between the reiteration of colonial 
frameworks through technology and the potential for postcolonial connection and more 
equitable relations through the same technology.  
Initially, Memo sees his nodes as a liberation from the constraints of everyday life 
on his family’s farm, but he soon discovers that nodes present a different form of physical 
constraint and oppression. As we see from the film’s beginning, Memo longs to 
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experience the world outside of his village. Nodes are connections that link the body to 
“the machine,” or larger global cybernetic networks, and though Memo does not have 
them implanted in his body at the beginning of the film, he tunes into remote radio 
broadcasts in order to connect to the rest of the world. When a woman named Luz finally 
helps implant his nodes, Memo notes hopefully, “Finally, I could connect my nervous 
system to the other system. The global economy” (Sleep Dealer). Luz warns him, 
however, that, “When you connect to the other side your body hooks into a machine. It’s 
a two-way connection. Sometimes you control the machine. And sometimes the machine 
controls you” (Sleep Dealer). Luz’s warning foreshadows Memo’s increasing physical 
and psychological deterioration because of his work in the info-maquilas, revealing that 
“cognitive labor may actually reproduce forms of colonial exploitation and oppression 
rather than leading to automatic liberation from the shackles of physical labor” (Martín 
Cabrera 590). Though Memo escapes the physical toil of working on his family’s milpa, 
he soon finds that having nodes takes a different kind of toll on his body, as Memo 
becomes noticeably hunched over from fatigue in the film and begins to lose his eye-
sight. Memo now has access to high-technology and the global economy through his 
nodes, but in order to be paid Memo must work long, laborious hours in a factory where 
loss of eye-sight is common and workers often experience short-circuits that blind them.  
Like Tendeka in Moxyland, Memo eventually discovers that connection to this 
“other system” (cyberspace and the global economy) does not mean he is able to escape 
the socio-economic and material limitations of his physical body. Reminiscent of 
contemporary maquiladoras and sweatshops, the factory Memo works in known as a 
“sleep dealer” because “if you work long enough, you collapse” (Sleep Dealer). Memo 
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begins to recognize that the separation of mind from body is impossible when he 
discovers the immense fatigue he feels as his “energy was being drained, sent far away. 
What happened to the river was happening to me” (Sleep Dealer). Memo equates his 
mental exhaustion with the extraction of natural resources in Santa Ana del Rio, Memo’s 
hometown where rivers are dammed by private US companies. In one particular montage, 
the film alternates between images of neurological passageways and images of pipelines 
carrying water to the United States in order to portray how both virtual labour and water 
are resources that flow out of Mexico into the global North. By equating virtual labour 
with the extraction of physical resources, Sleep Dealer points to the very real histories of 
colonial exploitation and the continuation of neocolonial forms of capitalist 
accumulation. Martín Cabrera argues that the term neocolonial is particularly important 
to the context of Sleep Dealer, as the film examines not only the manner in which living 
labor is transformed into objectified labor, it emphasizes the particular function of 
processes of racialization: 
In order to transform living labor into dead objectified labor, capitalism—from its 
original entanglement with slavery and colonialism onward—has continually 
mobilized class, race, gender, sexuality, (dis)ability, national and regional 
identities, and any other form of oppression at its disposal in order to smooth the 
process of accumulation via the extraction of labor and its cyclical reproduction. 
(594) 
Indeed, the info-maquilas depend on Memo’s racialized body, as it his poverty and 
limited social options that draw Memo to work long hours in the factories. It is Memo’s 
physical positioning on the “other” side of the US/Mexico border that enables this 
exploitation, where outsourcing labour to the global South (and “brown” bodies) also 
functions as a process of racialization that identifies certain bodies as exploitable labor.  
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Paradoxically, then, it is precisely because of the fact that virtual networks can 
make the body of the worker invisible that Memo’s body continues to be racialized and 
positioned as exploitable and expendable labor. For Cybertek, the company which owns 
the info-maquilas, keeping the body of the worker out of sight is exactly what permits the 
ongoing exploitation of people of colour—because workers operate robots remotely, US 
citizens who interact with the robots do not see the fatigue on Memo’s face, though the 
film constantly cuts back to Memo’s tired eyes to remind film viewers of his exhaustion. 
Node workers are therefore doubly dehumanized; not only are they presented as “robots” 
in the US, thereby erasing individual subjectivity, node workers are also dehumanized 
through the physical and mental exploitation they encounter in the factories. Indeed, 
because all foreign labour from infomaquilas is mediated through the figure of a robot, 
Cybertek constructs the illusion that virtual labor is colour-blind. It does not matter 
whose body is controlling the robot, or what pain this body suffers, so long as the 
required work is completed. Such processes of dehumanization that simultaneously deny 
the subjectivity of the worker while constructing a universal image of node workers 
through “robots,” enables the United States to justify their continued use of racialized 
labour guilt free. Martín Cabrera notes that this is evident from  
the first exterior shot of the infomaquilas [which] emphasizes…the colonial 
fantasy that attempts to separate the visibility and materiality of the brown bodies 
of the south from their transformation into dead labor for the predominantly white 
bourgeoisie of the north, thus constructing a cyber-apartheid of sorts that 
segregates white owners from brown workers. (594)  
 
Virtual labour is alienated from the body of the labourer, and the work performed through 
robots is therefore seen as inhuman and easily available to ‘white bourgeoisie’ of the 
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global North. As I explored in chapter three, just as techno-Orientalism depicts the Asian 
body as a machine, revealing the ways a “U.S. techno-Orientalist imagination is thus 
rooted in this view of the Asian body as a form of expendable technology” (Roh, Huang, 
Niu 11), the depiction of Mexican bodies as machines is rooted in the view of foreign 
labour as inhuman, efficient, and robotic. 
Sleep Dealer therefore resists participating in cyberpunk’s celebration of 
human/machine interfaces. Instead, as Lysa Rivera argues, the film “draw[s] from 
science-fictional metaphors and images of cyborgs and cyberspace, to comment on the 
ways in which ‘real’ labor practices in the US/Mexico borderlands region are quite 
literally exercises in dehumanization and exploitation” (424). Moxyland and Sleep Dealer 
force readers to confront the reality that technological expansion depends on the bodies 
of people of colour. Techno-utopian fantasies that uncritically embrace technological 
expansion as a means of promoting greater social equality ignore and erase historical 
colonial relations that positioned people of the global South as “resources” to be used for 
the development of the global North. Furthermore, such erasure actually works to allow 
the continued exploitation of people of colour, since virtual networks are not recognized 
for the material and physical exploitation they perpetuate. Addressing social inequality is 
therefore not simply a matter of eliminating the digital divide, or giving more people 
access to information and communication technologies, because how these technologies 
are used significantly depends upon the user’s geopolitical location. Director Alex Rivera 
reiterates exactly this point in an interview about Sleep Dealer, stating “We are being 
sold a false bill of goods, that the more connected we become the more equal we will 
be... Statistically speaking, that’s not what’s happening. The more connected we become, 
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the more we are divided” (Silverman). What Moxyland and Sleep Dealer therefore point 
out so well, is that technology functions differently according to the situated bodies it 
interacts with. For Memo, nodes are life-lines that enable him to support his family. For 
Rudy, who is also a node-worker, nodes are tools of military dominance used to protect 
privatized resources. 
 
History and Futurity: ‘Fighting For a Future with a Past’ 
As I have already suggested through other examples of postcolonial sf in this 
dissertation, Moxyland and Sleep Dealer draw on real histories of colonial exploitation in 
order to point to the ways science fiction’s emphasis on the “future” can erase the 
historical violence rendered against people of colour and the global South. In this section 
I examine how each text requires readers (or viewers) to interrogate sf’s focus on the 
future by remaining attuned to the violence of the past, or as Memo puts it at the end of 
Sleep Dealer, each text requires readers to “fight for a future with a past” (Sleep Dealer). 
Moxyland and Sleep Dealer are therefore concerned with historical context and how the 
particular conditions of a place (South Africa and Mexico respectively) might inform its 
development into the future. Their caution towards representing the future is not due to 
concern over sf’s predictive or allegorical function, nor is it quite the same as Fredric 
Jameson’s critique of the ideological closure that limits cultural imaginings of the future. 
Rather, Moxyland and Sleep Dealer are wary of discourses about the future in both sf and 
technoculture for two reasons that I view as closely related: first, both texts are wary of 
discourses that render the future a postpolitical concept and secondly, both texts re-
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politicize cultural imaginations of the future by resisting representations of a 
cosmopolitan “we” and rejecting the idea that escape from the escalating violence and 
poverty that defines contemporary global relations is possible at the moment.  
The future risks becoming a postpolitical concept when the need to imagine 
better, alternative futures generates consent rather than interrogation into what kind of 
radical restructuring might actually be required to achieve a more equitable future. 
Theorists such as Slavoj Žižek and Erik Swyngedouw argue that “the postpolitical 
condition is one in which a consensus has been built around the inevitability of neoliberal 
capitalism as an economic system, parliamentary democracy as the political ideal, and 
humanitarianism and inclusive cosmopolitanism as a moral foundation” (Swyngedouw 
24). Under a postpolitical condition, consensus is generated through negotiating group 
interests (such as the idea that the continuation of neoliberalism is inevitable though 
frameworks can be put in place for creating more equal job opportunities), a move which 
serves to curtail dissent by appearing to address a social concern—poverty—but 
ultimately also forecloses debate about the need for a larger restructuring of global 
economic and social relations. Žižek notes that a postpolitics “mobilizes the vast 
apparatus of experts, social workers, and so on, to reduce the overall demand (complaint) 
of a particular group to just this demand, with its particular content” (204; my emphasis). 
Postpolitics thus promotes a consensual politics that elides the need to address larger, 
often global, structures that are often at the root of social protests or movements.  
The danger of a postpolitical condition for sf is that discourses around imagining 
the future (both in the genre and through the technoculture that informs/is informed it) 
can generate the sense of a global consensus around the need for better or alternate 
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futures. Though on the surface this appears to foster solidarity amongst a diverse groups 
of people, focus on the future also risks erasing current material and social differences 
between those in the global North and global South. Specifically, discourses around 
imagining the future are frequently premised upon the ideology of progress, which posits 
the idea of “development” or imagining “better” futures. As Rieder argues, however, the 
ideology of progress in science fiction is symptomatic of the genre’s close relationship to 
colonialism in which the “narrative logic of growth or development” (29) is used to 
define the relationship between technologically advanced civilizations and 
“undeveloped,” or primitive, civilizations. Rieder raises the example of War of the 
Worlds (1923) where the narrator compares the relationship between technologically 
advanced Martians and humans, to the relationship between British colonists and the 
“inferior races” of Tasmania. Wells’s novel, in fact, exemplifies the same logic of 
development evidenced today in which “underdeveloped” nations are seen as those 
falling behind in economic growth. The ideology of progress functions under the guise of 
development and growth but ultimately reveals its colonial roots. 
Furthermore, by generating the sense of a global consensus around the need for 
better futures, then, focus on the future in sf can contribute to erasing the socio-historical 
differences between peoples in the global North and South. Scholars in the field of 
sustainable development, for instance, have compelling argued that discourses about the 
future foster the idea of a cosmopolitan “we” that frequently ignores the fundamental 
differences in access to resources or socio-economic disparity between nations. In their 
work on the subject, Philip Catney and Timothy Doyle suggest that, in fact, “‘the future’ 
and issues of intergenerational justice have become central parts of the construction of an 
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environmental (postpolitical) consensus in which the claims of the ‘future citizen’ of the 
North take precedence over the current citizen of the global South” (Catney and Doyle 
180). Accordingly, “concepts such as liberal cosmopolitanism … can be used to promote 
a sense of solidarity through the development of a ‘global we’ which is dominated by the 
rationalities, and serves the interests, of the minority global North” (Catney and Doyle 
179). This “post-politics of the future,” as they call it, constructs the notion of a universal 
we in the future that, rather than challenging “the very framework that determines how 
things work” (Žižek 199), only serves to perpetuate unequal socio-economic relations 
Through its very form and themes postcolonial science fiction questions the 
construction of a cosmopolitan citizenship that is often generated through discourses 
around “our” collective planetary future. This is because by focusing on the lives of 
people of colour in different historical circumstances, postcolonial sf critiques a colour-
blind approach that ignores the vast differences between, say, the impact of colonization 
in South Africa versus the impact of dependent colonialism in a place such as Thailand. 
As Mark Bould points out, “by presenting racism as an insanity that burned itself out, or 
as the obvious folly of the ignorant and impoverished who would be left behind by the 
genre’s brave new futures, sf avoids confronting the structures of racism and its own 
complicity in them” (180). Indeed, by critiquing the erasure of histories of racial 
violence, postcolonial sf simultaneously challenges the genre’s participation in similar 
ideological frameworks. Furthermore, postcolonial sf challenges the idea of a 
cosmopolitan “we” by highlighting the need for continued attention to the lasting impacts 
of colonialism on both the genre and current global politics. In other words, the subgenre 
is suspicious of focus on the “future” and future citizens because it is attuned to the 
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differences that define radically different welfare needs for people in the global South 
whose everyday concerns are very different from people in the global North. As Catney 
and Doyle succinctly put it, “Just because one looks to the future, and the rights of future 
citizens, does not mean that the people of the present are uniformly better off” (181). By 
setting their texts in specific geo-political contexts, Moxyland and Sleep Dealer remind 
us of the fact that not only are there fundamental differences between different 
communities, but also that these differences can be used to continue to exploit and 
dehumanize others. 
By gesturing towards South Africa’s complex history of socio-economic 
development, racial legislation, and implementation of neoliberal policies, Moxyland’s 
futures are deeply invested in remembering and recognizing the impact of the past on 
how we imagine the future. For instance, as previously noted, Moxyland is clearly 
influenced by the history of apartheid in South Africa as Beukes herself makes clear. 
However, while race is an implicit factor in determining the differences between the 
novel’s characters, Moxyland focuses primarily on socio-economic stratification. This is 
not to say racist policies and economic status are unrelated; indeed, it can be argued that 
apartheid’s racial policies were rooted in the struggle over the division of South Africa’s 
resources. Adrian Guelke points out that early twentieth century legislation—such as the 
1913 Land Act, which limited the land that could be owned by black South Africans —
regulated the labor and land rights of African workers, and that systemic segregation was 
“deeply entrenched in the laws of South Africa well before 1948” (24). Additionally, 
Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass argue that “under apartheid,” which became the 
official racial policy in 1945, “the basis of disadvantage shifted from race to class” (4). 
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Thus, by the time deracialization occurred in the 1990s, the country was already deeply 
divided by class structure. Patrick Bond contends that this social stratification continued 
after 1994 and perhaps intensified as South Africa “witnessed the replacement of racial 
apartheid for what can be accurately described as class apartheid” (“South Africa 
Tackles” 819). Like many critics in the wake of South Africa’s democratization, Bond 
argues that the African National Congress’s (ANC) adoption of neoliberal policies, 
supported by such organizations as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, has 
exacerbated inequality in the country. Failing environmental sustainability, poor access to 
resources, and uneven distribution of wealth continue under a system many critics refer to 
as “global apartheid” (Bond).   
Hence, while the official policy of apartheid was abolished over two decades ago, 
Moxyland suggests that racialized capitalism and the embrace of neoliberal ideologies are 
forms of invisible apartheid that continue to exploit people of colour and the global 
South. The company Ghost, for instance, uses people such as Kendra to promote their 
product, but when Kendra is no longer useful she is easily killed and disposed of. The 
corporate power of Ghost is thus symptomatic of larger, more complex systems of 
oppression; as Gordon argues, the figure of the ghost “cannot be simply tracked back to 
an individual loss or trauma” because “the ghost has its own desires, so to speak, which 
figure the whole complicated sociality of a determining formation that seems inoperative 
(like slavery) or invisible (like racially gendered capitalism) but that is nonetheless alive 
and enforced” (183; my emphasis). If defamiliarization is the key strategy of African 
postcolonial and postmodern literature (Gaylard 176), then Moxyland defamiliarizes the 
historical context of South Africa in order to highlight the continued struggles of race, 
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class, and gender in a post-apartheid era. By presenting futuristic narratives, Beukes’s 
novels “extrapolate the effects of apartheid beyond the present to an imaginative realm 
which disorients and confronts the reader’s conceptions of self and other, law-abiding 
citizen and criminal, sameness and difference, equality and freedom” (Stobie 379). 
Power, specifically the pervasive force of neoliberal capitalism, is made visible through 
the relationships between people, places, and corporations. In each relationship, the 
reduction of human beings to disposable commodities is prefaced by the figure of a 
ghost, reminding us that an unsettled past has returned once again. 
In Moxyland, each character’s resigned acceptance of neoliberal beliefs 
(particularly around socio-economic competition) reflects an unsettled past where 
racialized capitalism continues to haunt Cape Town. For example, Lerato—one of the 
novel’s central characters and a corporate programmer—most obviously represents how 
neoliberal ideologies pervade Moxyland’s future, as she turns personal relationships into 
business partnerships and people into resources to be easily used and disposed of when 
they no longer support her economic pursuits. Indeed, Lerato actively works to turn 
herself into a commodity, or a resource, that will be valued by corporations—thus, while 
Kendra is physically “branded” by Ghost, Lerato works to construct her own personal 
brand in the corporate world. Driven by the need to “distinguish yourself if you’re going 
to make any progress” (110), she hacks into Communique’s billboards in order to 
establish backdoor monitoring sites and strengthen her market value to future employers. 
She is not interested in Tendeka’s protest art, nor is she motivated by solidarity with 
revolutionary causes. Rather, her sideline work with Toby and Tendeka is an investment 
in future promotions: “Call it market research,” she says (111). Internalizing the principle 
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of survival of the fittest, Lerato is ruthless in her attempts to maintain the material 
privileges she has acquired. Despite being born into the less privileged areas of Cape 
Town, she immerses herself in work with the sole objective of moving up the corporate 
ladder while avoiding any personal involvement that might obstruct her endeavors. She 
refuses a romantic relationship as she “can’t afford to be coupled with someone who 
might hold me back” (144), and her relationship with her sisters, to whom she only talks 
on the phone in order to acquire sound bites as a cover-up for Communique’s spyware, is 
strained.  
Lerato’s rise through corporate ranks may therefore be indicative of what 
Seekings and Nattrass describe as South Africa’s “distributional regime,” a regime 
influenced not by race only but by a complex network of class relations, public policies, 
and global economic environments that affect one’s socio-economic position. They argue 
that alongside persistent racial inequality, intra-racial inequality has risen in the country 
as a result of “not only the direct and readily visible ways in which states affect income 
inequality, such as taxation and cash transfers in the form of old-age pensions and other 
grants, but also the indirect or more opaque ways, including policies affecting education 
and the labor market” (4-5). Under such a distributional system, public policies ensured 
that educated white South Africans were skilled laborers protected from competition, 
while mechanisms were implemented to manage growing unskilled black labor. Seekings 
and Nattrass argue that such policies resulted in labour forces increasingly divided along 
urban-rural lines as the state forced black labor back into the bantustans and rural areas.  
The divide between urban-rural lines that Seekings and Nattrass point out as 
symptomatic of labour divisions in South Africa is carried into the future by Moxyland 
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where Cape Town is split between an urban population—such as Lerato who works in the 
field of information communication technologies—and those such as Tendeka who live 
in the “Rural,” a space outside the corporate haven of Cape Town associated throughout 
the novel with refugees and impoverished communities of the disenfranchised. Lerato is 
able to “escape” the Rural (as she sees it), because she is given the chance to work in 
computer programming, and she develops her programming skills and competes for 
material wealth in order to avoid the threat of living returning to the Rural. Characters 
such as Tendeka, however, are denied the same material privileges as Lerato. The novel 
suggests Tendeka is a refugee originally from Harare (35), though he now lives in the 
Rural, part of Cape Town’s growing urban sprawl. Through Tendeka’s eyes, readers see 
Cape Town as a façade projected for tourists who want to see the “rainbow” future of 
South Africa post-apartheid. However, Tendeka challenges the claim that, “the sense of 
community and how transformation has been real and important. Like it’s not a total 
wank, where people are just as economically fucked as they were before” (43). Beukes’s 
novel does not depict a future free from poverty, but instead imagines a future Cape 
Town that continues to be affected by apartheid’s racial and economic policies. Against 
the tendencies of a postpolitical condition, Beukes’s novel re-politicizes the space of the 
future by reminding us that the violence that defines today will continue into the future if 
we fail to actively engage with understanding past inequalities and their contemporary 
manifestations.  
Like Moxyland, Sleep Dealer questions whether a truly cosmopolitan future can 
emerge if the ideological and material frameworks that enable racialized capitalism 
continue into the future. In Sleep Dealer, Luz’s use of the program “Tru-Node” is one 
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example of how the idea of cosmopolitanism in fact functions to commodify and exploit 
difference under neoliberalism. Memories appear in Tru-Node as short films, or 
montages, comprised of mental images and photographic snapshots from a user’s 
memory. As Luz’s own memories on Tru-Node exemplify, the videos that are for sale 
cannot help but be influenced by the real-world location of its users—for Luz, this 
becomes problematic as her memories are complicit in a form of identity tourism as they 
enable users from other parts of the world to buy her memories for their cultural 
exoticism. Indeed, the very first glimpse we have of Luz’s Tru-Node account is when the 
camera lingers on her computer screen—the memories Luz has uploaded for sale in Tru-
Node are variously labeled “The Struggle Over a Well,” “A Witch Doctor,” and “The 
Rebels.” The title of these memories, as well as the brief glimpses we get of them, depict 
a rural “past” against the images of techno-scientific development in Tijuana, a place the 
film calls the “city of the future” (Sleep Dealer). This juxtaposition between rural/urban 
spaces in the film might function to point to the similarities between a colonial past and 
neocolonial future, but Luz takes this one step further by presenting rural life as idyllic 
and authentic against the gritty, neon-lit alleys of Tijuana. For instance, when Luz tells 
Memo about her Tru-Node project, she describes going to her friend’s village as a step 
back in time.  
Indeed, Tru-Node exemplifies Nakamura’s claim that images of race on the 
internet function to redress anxieties about a loss of (white) identity in the digital age: 
“As machine-induced speed enters our lives…all of these symptoms of modernity create 
a sense of unease that is remedied by comforting and familiar images of a ‘history’ and a 
‘native’ that seems frozen in ‘a different time and place.’ (7). Nakamura’s argument is 
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that images of the “authentic native,” or racialized images on the internet, represents “the 
need for the native in modern times” (7); hence the emergence of racial cybertypes that 
“assuage [the] desire” for a return to the idea of original, “authentic” identities, especially 
in “a virtual environment like the Internet where everything is a copy…and nothing has 
an aura since all cyberimages exist as pure pixelated information” (Nakamura 6). By 
marketing her memories towards those in the global North who can afford to purchase 
these videos on Tru-Node, Luz, whether intentionally or not, contributes to constructing 
cybertypes and the image of an authentic “other.” Luz’s memory of Memo in particular, 
titled “A Migrant from Santa Ana del Rio,” represents Memo as a native struggling to 
immigrate into the future offered through Tijuana.  
Furthermore, Luz’s acceptance of commissioned work to obtain further 
information and videos of Memo is a troubling indication of the ways affective labour 
exploits people of colour (particularly women), and often without their consent. Tru-
Node is a virtual space where users from around the world can buy and share memories, 
because “your memories are too precious to waste” (Sleep Dealer). Though Tru-Node 
markets itself as a way to save memories, in Tru-Node even one’s private thoughts are 
commodified and exploited, as the program will not allow you to construct false 
memories and consistently warns Luz that she must “tell the truth” about her feelings for 
Memo. Arguably, Luz’s relationship with Memo is not innocent from the beginning—she 
purposely seeks out Memo after their first encounter on the bus. Rudy Ramirez had just 
purchased her memory “A Migrant from Santa Ana del Rio” and pre-pays her to seek out 
and find additional information on Memo. Luz’s relationship with Memo thus begins as a 
market transaction as she purposely uses her relationship to further her writing and Tru-
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Node work. However, Luz’s growing attachment to Memo is also exploited by the 
structure of Tru-Node itself—the program often forces Luz to “tell the truth” about her 
feelings for Memo, extracting personal feelings and emotions Luz does not want to share 
or sell. This type of affective labour represents the ways, “many jobs in the tertiary 
sectors demand not only the production of commodities, but also the production of 
affects,” a type of labour frequently required of women in particular who under 
capitalism are often “naturally” attributed care/nurture work (Martín Cabrera 587). 
Ironically, then, the “two-way” connection Luz warns Memo about also ends up 
exploiting Luz for her affective work, a fact Luz finally recognizes when she apologizes 
to Memo for ‘losing her way’ and selling memories of him without his knowledge (Sleep 
Dealer). Despite the film’s criticism of how Tru-Node continues to exploit people of 
colour, Sleep Dealer also suggests that it is through Tru-Node’s virtual platform that 
people can connect across their socio-economic differences. Sleep Dealer thus represents 
Tru-Node through an ambiguous and self-aware lens that I explore in more detail in this 
chapter’s next section. 
Sleep Dealer resists simply condemning Tru-Node for its exploitative qualities 
because the film offers a more nuanced critique of how aesthetics and the market are 
intimately linked. Through Luz, Tru-Node is depicted as an emerging cultural practice, 
and an artistic medium that represents the possibilities of using nodes for more than 
work. However, suggesting that Tru-Node is a virtual space free from the arena of 
politics and disembodied from the material world is problematic not only because of the 
identity tourism it hides but also because it separates culture/aesthetics from the market in 
a manner that seems nearly impossible to do today. Tru-Node is an aesthetic platform 
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where people can share their videos and stories, but it is also reveals the ways in which 
the global market affects even how and what art/culture is produced. Rudy, for examples, 
specifically requests Luz to compose more video footage of Memo that Rudy will pre-
pay for. Thus, even the memories Luz sells of Memo are not “purely aesthetic” in the 
sense that they are shaped by the information Rudy wants, and produced from economic 
necessity—Luz must continue to sell her memories to Rudy in order to earn a living. As 
Frederic Jameson points out in a recent essay on “The Aesthetics of Singularity,” in our 
current historical moment “the very word culture presents a danger, insofar as it 
presupposes some separate and semi-autonomous space in the social totality which can be 
examined by itself and then somehow reconnected with other spaces, such as the 
economic” (“Aesthetics” 102). Tru-Node thus exemplifies Jameson’s argument that 
cultural analysis cannot be separated from phenomenological, ideological, and historical 
critique. Indeed, part of why Sleep Dealer might simultaneously condemn and celebrate 
Tru-Node is because the film has much in common with the online platform—both are 
subject to economic constraints and yet both imagine that artistic mediums can also offer 
counter-narratives to the simple appropriation and commodification of race or difference. 
Tru-Node therefore represents an ideal site through which to explore the ways 
culture, economics, and politics are intimately bound. Specifically, Luz’s stories are 
borderland narratives that reveal how cultural and historical practices are shaped by the 
expansion of neoliberal economic hegemony and specific policies such as the 
establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Lysa Rivera 
argues that, “[s]ince the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
borderlands writers and visual artists have increasingly turned to the metaphors and 
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motifs of science fiction to articulate concerns over the problems of the so-called ‘Fourth 
World,’” (416) a term Rivera borrows from Manuel Castells who identifies the Fourth 
World as those excluded from access/participation in the global informational economy. 
Rivera argues that the emergence of these sf narratives is therefore symptomatic of a very 
specific socio-economic history:  
The emergence of borderlands narratives are, then, the formal result of very 
specific political and historical conditions: the annexation of northern Mexico, the 
subsequent and steady industrialization of the borderlands, and within that, the 
creation of a vast working class, now the “long-suffering ‘disposables’ of 
neoliberalism” (Hayden 271)….Post-NAFTA borderlands science fiction, in other 
words, is the formal articulation of a specific historical narrative: namely the 
history of US/Mexico capitalist labor relations in the region and militant fights for 
an alternative frameworks. (417) 
By using cyberpunk conventions, such as the direct connection of cyberspace to human 
consciousness, Tru-Node expands the film’s critique of “free trade” to include a critique 
of how even virtual spaces are not borderless. Instead, divisions persist between the 
“haves” and “have-nots” of an informational economy. Tru-Node thus also represents a 
metafictional, or metacinematic reflection on borderland narratives and how they reflect 
contemporary geopolitical division. Such cultural products are, as Rivera and Jameson 
point out, formal articulations of greater historical conditions. 
 Part of the historical condition that shapes how Sleep Dealer uses sf tropes is the 
ongoing ideological struggle to reconcile immigration fears with the need for foreign 
labour and resources in the United States. This struggle is made clear in Alex Rivera’s 
earlier short Why Cybraceros? (1997), which makes explicit reference to mid-century 
migrant labor practices under the Bracero Program. The Bracero program, lasting from 
1942 to 1964, was a series of agreements between Mexico and the US that brought 
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temporary workers from Mexico to work in railway and agricultural positions across the 
US. Like the “guest worker” programs that continue in many countries today, the Bracero 
program is only one example of countless other programs implemented by the US to 
facilitate and control access to cheap manual labour. A significant effect of the 
implementation of the 1942 Bracero program is that it enabled massive migration and 
increased “illegal” immigration as employers in the US discovered hiring illegal 
immigrants was less expensive than hiring braceros (Nevins 27). Indeed, Joseph Nevins 
argues that “through its actions… the INS [Immigration and Nationalization Service] 
actually encouraged unauthorized immigration” (27), and that this encouragement was 
facilitated in part by “powerful agricultural interests [that] played a significant role in 
producing and maintain a yawning gap between state rhetoric championing strong 
boundary policing, and actual state practice (29). Such massive migration, while 
economically profitable for US agricultural growers, also became the target of growing 
concern over national security, decreasing wages, and social “ills” (Nevins 28). These 
concerns alongside the Cold War and mid-century fears over foreign migration (from 
Asia as well as Central America), contributed to the ideological struggle to reconcile 
desire for foreign labour with the need to maintain the image of a homogenous, white 
national identity. As Nevins argues, however, the development of terms such as “illegal 
alien” reveal how immigration fears are closely linked to the continued exploitation of 
people of colour:  
…we cannot divorce growing emphasis on illegal aliens from the long history in 
the United States of largely race-based anti-immigrant sentiment rooted in fear 
and/or rejection of those deemed as outsiders, a history that is inextricably tied to 
a context of exploitation and political and economic marginalization of certain 
immigrant populations. (79) 
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Constructing immigrants as “alien others” dehumanizes people of colour and permits the 
continued exploitation of their labour for the benefit of the global North.  
Sleep Dealer draws from these continuing ideological struggles in the US over 
“illegal” immigration, and the film unapologetically points out how even if walled states 
are erected and physical migration is policed, people of colour will continue to be 
exploited by the global North as their labour is necessary to maintain the standards of 
middle-class America. “Virtual” labour, in fact, may be the ideal means of achieving this. 
As Alex Rivera points out in an interview about Sleep Dealer, the disembodied foreign 
worker on the ‘other side of the border’ reconciles the need for labour with a desire to 
continue to construct the other as abject: “the worker comes with a body…That body 
needs health care, and gives birth to children that need to go to school. So keep the body 
outside of the United States. Suck its energy and leave the cadaver or the problematic 
shell out of the picture” (Silverman). Sleep Dealer refers to this virtual labour as the 
“American dream,” making clear, as Lysa Rivera argues, the horrible irony of “the 
invisible (because disembodied) labor that makes consumerism affordable in the 
American middle class: physical and embodied, but all the while invisible, indigenous 
labor” (426).  
In addition to drawing on the historical context of NAFTA and bracero programs, 
Sleep Dealer inserts reminders of the historical violence of forced migration from rural 
communities to urban spaces into its vision of the future. Specifically, this migration is 
seen as a consequence of the privatization of communal resources. Part of the reason 
Memo moves to Tijuana is not just to fulfill his dream of access to greater global 
networks, it is also to support his family. His family’s milpa is struggling because of the 
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increased privatization of water Memo’s family must purchase from a US corporation. 
Not only does this point to what David Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession” and 
the link between neoliberalism and continuing colonial structures, the privatization of 
resources in Sleep Dealer is also reminiscent of the privatization of ejido lands. Ejido and 
communidad agrarian lands are considered collective, social property, and elected 
leaders manage decisions about land use and resource management (Smith et al. 177). 
Such land was formerly legally owned by the federal government, though rights to farm 
and access the land were given in parcels to individuals (Smith et al. 176). However, as 
Smith et al. point out, “in 1992-1993, amendments were made to the Mexican 
constitution as part of a broader neoliberal economic strategy…Suddenly, the communal 
lands of ejidos and communidades agrarias were no longer inalienable social property, 
but could be partitioned and sold” (177). The privatization of the ejidos forced rural 
communities into urban cities in search of work, much like Memo’s journey towards 
Tijuana. Sleep Dealer critiques this rural/urban migration primarily because it disrupts 
the possibility of alternative ways of living outside of the exploitative structures of 
multinational corporations—for Memo, working for Cybertek is the only means of 
supporting his family. Without access to communal resources, Memo’s family cannot 
afford the exorbitant fees for water, and subsequently cannot afford to continue to pay 
their own farmhands. Their whole community is therefore affected by the damming of the 
river, as everyone struggles for money to buy basic resources. As Memo’s father 
prophetically says at the beginning of the film, “When they dammed up the river, they cut 
off our future” (Sleep Dealer). The embrace of neoliberal policies—increased 
privatization, free markets, and free trade—therefore does not create a “city of the future” 
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where increased access to the global economy means increased social justice; rather, it 
condemns people of colour to a colonial past.   
Moxyland and Sleep Dealer challenge representations of the future that suggest 
virtual spaces are realms free from the arena of politics. Instead, both texts consider how 
virtual spaces create the illusion of cosmopolitan arenas where everyone participates 
equally when, in fact, they do not. Focus on techno-utopian fantasies of “free mobility” in 
virtual spaces can erase the historical violence of the past, and in turn conceal current 
neoliberal frameworks that contribute to the ongoing exploitation of people of colour. 
Thus, even though Memo is able to move to Tijuana where the technological wonders of 
node-work draw him in, Memo’s migration to Tijuana is still primarily a matter of socio-
economic necessity rather than choice. Sleep Dealer suggests the illusion of free mobility 
and cosmopolitan citizenship is in fact a reflection of how advanced capitalism forces the 
poor to migrate towards urban settings in search of work, only to be restricted by national 
borders or more powerful nations. As Rosi Braidotti argues, global migration acts as a 
driving force of empire, and “the dense materiality of bodies caught in the very concrete 
conditions of advanced global societies flatly contradicts advanced capitalism’s claims to 
being ‘immaterial,’ ‘flowing,’ or virtual” (6). The consolidation of a world-wide capitalist 
economy has therefore not led to increased mobility and freedom, but rather the 
solidification of new boundaries and borders that inhibit the movement of certain of 
bodies. Though this is not “settler colonialism,” it presents a new kind of dependent 
colonialism in which people of the global South are subject to economic power of the 
global North, revealing the ways advanced capitalism has reshaped social relations 
globally and locally. Old systems of domination are thus perpetuated and represented 
172 
 
through new mechanisms, including the ideological construction of cyberspace as the 
frontier of our new, cosmopolitan future. Moxyland and Sleep Dealer therefore not only 
critique the ideological assumptions of cyberpunk, they also link epistemological 
critiques of disembodiment to the material structures that enable them: chiefly, the 
economic, political, and social structures of racialized capitalism.  
 
Bodies of Resistance 
Postcolonial science fiction not only highlights the relationship between the 
genre’s colonial gaze and the logic of advanced capitalism, it suggests that alternate 
understandings of the concept of progress and community will be necessary. In order to 
facilitate these alternate understandings, more self-reflective practices and a form of a 
“listening respect” (Bignall) is required in the global North. Postcolonial sf suggests self-
reflective practices will include re-thinking Western epistemological biases and how they 
affect social policy and development. Though Moxyland appears to be the more 
dystopian of both texts, Moxyland imagines resistance to hegemonic forces by drawing 
attention to the importance of embodiment. In Beukes’s novel, it is precisely people’s 
embodied difference that reveals how ICTs can contribute to the continuation of 
neocolonial regimes. Thus, even though the novel ends on a rather ambiguous note with 
Kendra and Tendeka’s deaths, by doing so Moxyland asks readers to consider how one’s 
position in global networks is, in fact, a matter of life or death. Both Kendra and Tendeka 
accepted the utopian possibility of becoming parts of technological networks but mostly 
because they could not imagine an alternative. Tendeka in particular struggles to imagine 
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an alternative to his poverty, and exemplifies the differences in the capacity to aspire, or 
articulate visions of a different world, between the global North and South. This 
difference in the capacity to aspire and imagine real change is not due to Tendeka’s 
individual failure—as Appadurai argues, the capacity to aspire “is not evenly distributed 
in any society” because “the better off you are (in terms of power, dignity, and material 
resources), the more likely you are to be conscious of the links between the more and less 
immediate objects of aspiration,” and the more likely you are to have access to networks 
where expressions of imaginary/symbolic realms can affect socio-political life (188). 
There is no illusion of a universal “we” in Moxyland, as even the capacity to hope for 
different socio-economic relations in the future is unevenly distributed. Kendra and 
Tendeka thus exemplify the limited choices offered to those of different social, cultural, 
and economic positions. Conversely, Lerato and Toby are able to survive by the end of 
Moxyland because they adopt a competitive neoliberal ethics—both use technology to 
further their socio-economic standing. By presenting characters who live or die based on 
their ability to navigate the conditions of a neoliberal corporate state, Moxyland’s 
resistance takes the form of a question: what enables some people to thrive under 
societies of control while others must die? 
As previously mentioned, Moxyland’s ending does appear to be the more 
dystopian of the two texts, but Moxyland also offers glimmers of hope by rejecting 
simplistic representations of, and solutions to, South African struggles. Moxyland 
constructs this hope through several means, but one notable example is through the 
novel’s recurring imagery of “ghosts.” Ghosts, traditionally relegated to the realm of the 
fantastic, haunt the fringes of Beukes’s novel. Not only is Kendra physically branded by 
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the logo of the corporation “Ghost,” Moxyland is carefully attuned to the dynamics of 
visibility and invisibility in a context where historically certain groups of people have 
been systematically disenfranchised, forced and segregated into rural townships, and 
hidden from view. By drawing on spectral imagery and the idea of haunting, Moxyland 
confronts the psychological traumas of forced dislocation, alienation, and homelessness 
in the aftermath of colonization in South Africa. Such imagery is important to the novel’s 
critique of the enduring violence and exploitation encountered in supposedly postcolonial 
settings. As Avery Gordon argues, “What’s distinctive about haunting is that it is an 
animated state in which a repressed or unresolved social violence is making itself known, 
sometimes very directly, sometimes more obliquely” (xvi). In Moxyland, spectral images 
function primarily as a means of making visible that which is absent, liminal, lingering, 
or haunting. Specifically, Moxyland makes evident the enduring legacy of apartheid in 
South Africa. Beukes’s novel examines the continued experiences of disenfranchisement 
in South Africa by linking the “invisibility” of people of colour in cyberpunk to the 
“invisibility” of racialized capitalism. 
 However, ghosts are also ways of reorienting our futures; as Gordon suggests 
ghost stories “not only repair representational mistakes, but also strive to understand the 
conditions under which a memory was produced in the first place, toward a 
countermemory, for the future” (Gordon 22). The notion of a “countermemory, for the 
future” seems paradoxical, but it is similar to Fredric Jameson’s claim that sf’s utopian 
impulse may serve the function of “transforming our own present into the determinate 
past of something yet to come” (288). Gordon argues that ghosts are specters of the past 
dependent upon present social relations to be experienced and understood; thus, “this 
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sociality, the wavering present, forces a something that must be done that structures the 
domain of the present and the prerogatives of the future” (179). Ghosts, like sf texts, are 
liminal spaces that defamiliarize us, and in doing so always exemplify the “utopian 
dimension of haunting” (Gordon 181). In this context, the dystopian cyberpunk 
tendencies in Beukes’s novel might be reconfigured as attempts to envision more ethical 
alternatives to understanding current postcolonial struggles. Like Memo’s attempt to 
construct a “future with a past,” Moxyland suggests that recognizing and examining a 
“haunted” past can enact countermemories against which alternative visions of the future 
may be imagined. 
Thus, while Moxyland ends on an ambiguous note, Beukes also infuses moments 
of profound hope in the novel. Again, the key to this narrative of hope lies in Gordon’s 
argument that ghosts reorient the past and present in order to offer future alternatives. 
Writing about Toni Morrison’s Beloved (1987), Gordon argues that one must consider an 
apparently counterintuitive aspect of haunting—namely, that  
the force of the ghost’s desire is not just negative, not just the haunting and staged 
words, marks, or gestures of domination and injury. The ghost is not other or 
alterity as such, ever. It is (like Beloved) pregnant with the unfulfilled possibility, 
with the something to be done that the wavering present is demanding. (183) 
 
Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, Morrison’s work, and Raymond Williams’s concept 
of the “structure of feeling,” Gordon takes an embodied approach to hauntings. She 
argues that ghosts point to the need for a different way of knowing and writing about the 
world, and that perhaps sensuous knowledge might provide this alternative since it “is a 
different kind of materialism, neither idealistic nor alienated, but an active practice or 
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passion for the lived reality of ghostly magical invented matters” (205). Gordon’s 
sensuous knowledge requires awareness of one’s own complicity in certain ways of 
knowing and being.  
There are no explicit “ghosts” in Moxyland per se, but Kendra can be understood 
as being haunted—that is, through her photography, she, more than any other character, 
experiences moments of sensuous knowledge in which “the tangle of the subjective and 
the objective, experience and belief, feeling and thought, the immediate and the general, 
the personal and the social” (Gordon 200) present themselves to her. Drawn to the use of 
analog rather digital media, Kendra notes that, “what resonates with me about 
photography is the sense of immediacy. Catching the transitive before it slips away” 
(132). Her love of analog photography is not a yearning for a return to a pre-digital era 
but rather a desire for embodied experience—not the hyperreality of what Toby calls 
“anti-septic” digital media that are “dead without context” (171) but the capturing of a 
sensuous knowledge. 
Kendra is particularly drawn to a photograph that belongs to Mr Muller, the 
elderly man who develops her film. The picture is an image of the “mangled wreckage of 
a truck engine embedded in the sludge of a dried-up irrigation pond, framed by grape 
vines shrivelled from the temperature rise none of the farmers wanted to believe in” (84), 
and she is affected primarily by the feeling the image evokes: 
The image is beautiful, almost black and white, although he shot in colour … But 
it’s the evocative simplicity of the context, of the meaning he’s brought to a 
landscape that’s impressive. It’s easy to gut-wrench with people … but investing 
an inanimate object with the same quality is an accomplishment. (85)  
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Later, when Kendra experiences the shock of a violent protest, she will associate this 
photograph with Tendeka’s bomb—the “rubble, people screaming, broken glass and 
blood, a torn-apart car” (265). By experiencing a “rememory” that links the photograph’s 
eerie aftermath to the brutality at Tendeka’s protest, Kendra is able to see beyond the 
moment to recognize the state’s “complete overreaction to a peaceful protest” (267), and 
eventually the ways in which her own body is violently manipulated by state and 
corporate control.  
Not long after the protest, and now wanting out of the sponsorship program, 
Kendra is murdered by Ghost, presumably because she is a potential threat to the 
company. While corporate governance appears to continue unconstrained, the deaths of 
Tendeka and Kendra defamiliarize the quotidian assumption that participation in global 
markets is inevitable. As Graham Murphy and Sherryl Vint argue,  
perhaps one of the reasons cyberpunk seems both dated and paradoxically so 
relevant is that the ideological assumptions of neoliberalism have become as 
ubiquitous as information technology … perhaps to such a degree that stories 
about [global capitalism and] its planetary triumph no longer strike us as 
futuristic. (xvii) 
 
Even Mr. Muller considers participation in neoliberal practice and ideology inevitable, 
and, appalled by the protestors, asks, “What are they protesting anyways? Capitalism? As 
if there’s an alternative” (265). Ironically, or perhaps appropriately, he lives in the 
notorious white-only area of District Six; coming from the wealthier half of the 
population, he sees no reason for change.  
While, as Murphy and Vint suggest, the pervasiveness of neoliberalism may 
have rendered cyberpunk archaic by those privileged enough comfortably to assume the 
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continuation of global capitalism, in South Africa cyberpunk parallels the continued 
struggles of anti-privatization movements, which culminated in the establishment of 
organizations like the Anti-Privatisation Forum (now defunct) and grassroots township 
organizations that, discontented with increasing economic and social inequality, continue 
to protest state policies. Like Tendeka’s opposition to being “disconnect[ed]” (38) from 
his cellphone and cut off from his access to capital, township movements emerged in the 
early 2000s as residents retaliated against their disconnection from water and electricity 
when they could not afford rising costs and were subsequently denied access to basic 
resources. Bond argues this “people power” has driven increasing pressure for 
decommodification and resistance to oppressive governance in the country.  
 Beukes’s novel is sensitive to the complex manner in which the personal, public, 
economic, material, social, and cultural realms interact in South Africa. Without wishing 
to reduce the complexity of apartheid in South Africa to a series of explorations into 
ghostly matters, I would argue that Moxyland articulates an intricate web of hope, 
longing, and despair emerging from the struggles of a specific historical context. One 
could, perhaps, even call this melancholia—a loaded term in postcolonial theory and 
discussions of South Africa, but one which, following Ranjana Khanna, may be seen as 
describing an affect that allows colonial critique and “points the way toward a political 
future free of the failures of postcolonial states and misguided biopolitics” (Khanna). 
Beukes’s characters are not perfect, and her futures are less than ideal, but they reveal the 
unsettling realities of those who continue to struggle with the often-invisible aftermath of 
repressive regimes. If, as Gordon argues, a “haunting is a shared structure of feeling, a 
shared possession, a specific type of sociality” that is “both tangible and tactile as well as 
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ephemeral and imaginary” (201), then South Africa’s continued struggles expose the 
underlying shadow of a country that continues to live with ghosts. 
Sleep Dealer offers a different form of resistance beyond critique of neocolonial 
regimes of power by examining how global networks can also bring people together. The 
expansion of the Internet and World Wide Web as well as developments in information 
communication technologies are central to the emergence of transnational networks of 
power (Castells 1996), a point I have explored in most of my discussion of Sleep Dealer 
and its exposure of neocolonial frameworks so far. However, Memo’s relationship with 
Rudy also exemplifies the potential for a form of “counterpower” in the network society 
(9). In Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (2012) 
Manuel Castells argues that “mass self-communication provides the technological 
platform for the construction of the autonomy of the social actor, be it individual or 
collection, vis-à-vis the institution of society” (7). Castells sees this new form of 
communication as enabling not only the “process of sharing meaning through the 
exchange of information,” but also a “decisive sourc[e] of power-making” (6-7). Using 
technological metaphors reminiscent of cyberpunk, Castells identifies power as forming 
through the mechanism of connecting “programmers” with “switchers.” Programmers are 
those that have “the capacity to program each one of the main networks on which 
people’s lives depend (government, parliament, the military…etc.),” and switchers are 
those that formulate connections between the programmers to coordinate, establish, and 
enforce the structures and ideologies upon which power relies, such as “media moguls 
introduced in the political class, financial elites bankrolling political elites…academic 
institutions financed by big business, etc.” (Castells 9). For Castells, “counterpower” is 
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exercised “by reprogramming networks around alternative interests and values, and/or 
disrupting the dominant switches while switching networks of resistance and social 
change” (9). I argue that Sleep Dealer explores exactly this potential for counterpower by 
using nodes, specifically Rudy Ramirez’s nodes, to eventually retaliate against 
privatisation and militarisation of what should be social resources. 
To begin, Memo and Rudy are linked through the very technology that kills 
Memo’s father and subject’s Memo to the exploitative conditions of the infomaquiladora. 
Interestingly, however, Memo’s connection to Rudy is enabled through the artistic use of 
nodes; namely, through Luz’s memories of Memo and her stories about him. Though she 
initially records these memories for monetary purposes, she also does so because she 
believes in the art of writing and the power of storytelling. For Luz, storytelling through 
her nodes permits her to bond with people. As she says, “I hate that there’s so much 
distance between people. The only thing nodes are good for is to destroy that 
distance…to connect us… to let us see” (Sleep Dealer). Thus, it is through her node work 
that Rudy discovers Memo and learns about Memo’s past life in Santa Ana del Rio. 
Connecting through nodes affectively moves Ramirez, inciting him to leave San Diego 
and his job in drone warfare. Rudy eventually helps Memo break the Del Rio Water dam, 
which has privatized water and led to drought below the dam in Santa Ana del Rio. 
Importantly, however, Memo and Rudy must work together to achieve this—in order to 
find common ground, Rudy has to first recognize that he wants to rectify his mistakes and 
listen to Memo, and Memo must be willing to use Ramirez’s knowledge (of the network) 
to suit his own purposes. Working through the boundaries that separate them, Memo and 
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Rudy work against capitalism’s tendency towards increased divisiveness and 
competition.  
Postcolonial sf such as Sleep Dealer exposes the immanent potential for utilizing 
the very tropes of sf to construct lines of flight from the genre’s imperial logic. Hence, 
Sleep Dealer draws on the sf trope of robots used as labour in order to reveal how the 
same virtual networks which permit this exploitation also enable two characters to form 
an affective connection across cultural differences. For Martín Cabrera, this connection is 
important on several levels as “it proposes a much-needed transnational alliance between 
Chican@s and Mexicans [sic] in order to resist neocolonial capitalist exploitation and 
military control on both sides of the border” (595). Memo’s Mexican background and 
Rudy’s Chicano background exemplify the transnational effects of migration and how it 
renders certain bodies vulnerable under policies such as NAFTA which propelled 
Mexican migration to the US, while resulting in increased unemployment, poverty, and 
border control for those migrating from the interior to border regions in Mexico. Memo 
and Rudy’s relationship thus pointedly highlights the various differences in transnational 
migration (from rural to urban centres as well as between Mexico/US). By doing so, 
however, Memo and Rudy’s “south/north solidarity network” also avoids “any nostalgic 
return to a pristine national origin at the same time that it shows the vulnerabilities of the 
transnational system of capitalist exploitation” (Martín Cabrera 595).  
Memo and Ramirez therefore also exemplify the ethical project that Bignall points 
out is crucial to a postcolonialism not founded upon imperial frameworks: they partake in 
the “the practice of an attitude of listening respect” (Bignall, Postcolonial 206) where 
desire manifests as a social interaction between two bodies that realize their power to 
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create more joyful, productive encounters. Both Memo and Ramirez recognize their 
situated differences as people from different sides of the US/Mexico border, but through 
attentiveness to their material differences and well as willingness to listen to other 
perspectives, Memo and Ramirez create common notions that result in their ability to act 
against Del Rio Water and support Memo’s local community. Their act, in fact, 
represents the ways social production is “desiring-production itself under determinate 
conditions” (Anti Oedipus 29). Bignall argues that recognizing individual and collective 
desire as inseparable is critical as, 
[t]his means that widely practised individual performances of a postcolonial ethos 
become actualised as the collective phenomenon of postcolonial society: the 
institutions, structures and modes of discourse and thought that make possible the 
public performance of a postcolonial ethos and, in turn, provide the context for 
the ongoing constitution of postcolonial subjectivity. (Postcolonial 207) 
By constructing critical alternatives to the epistemologies of empire and by collectively 
building common practices towards alternate futures, Memo and Ramirez create a 
postcolonial mode of relation. In other words, their personal relationship and regard for 
one another’s well-being (their postcolonial ethos) translates to larger, social postcolonial 
acts—Ramirez initially destroys the dam for Memo’s family, but his act of kindness also 
allows Santa Ana del Rio to enjoy the river as a communal resource once again. 
“Postcolonialism” in Sleep Dealer is therefore defined by the ways difference itself is 
seen as an affirmative relationship, created through the ability of disparate bodies to 
construct common notions towards more joyful, non-imperial practices of relationality. If 
postcolonialism is therefore the construction of an attitude, rather than simply critique, 
“[i]t is an attitude of friendly relation or sociability, which becomes sensible only in 
terms of collective participation” (Bignall, Postcolonial 206).  
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 It is important to emphasize that the idea of a common notion here refers 
simultaneously to “practice” and “attitude” (Bignall, Postcolonial 206), meaning that 
postcolonial action and ethics exist hand-in-hand. It is through the act of plotting and 
enacting their plan against the Del Rio Water company that Memo and Rudy resist the 
tendency of neoliberalism to create competition and privatisation; instead, in a highly 
symbolic moment in the film, the drone that Rudy pilots to bomb the dam shoots a 
missile at the exact same spot Memo’s father had thrown a rock at earlier in the film. 
Using the forms of militarization that supposedly protect the dam’s water from being 
stolen, Rudy and Memo’s pasts come together at this moment in order to enact a 
“countermemory” towards creating new futures. Memo’s memory of his father is thus 
overlaid with a new memory that re-establishes common ownership of the water over a 
history of struggle against privatisation. Martín Cabrera, in an essay challenging Hardt 
and Negri’s notion of the commons, argues that Sleep Dealer posits that oppositional 
agency requires “a political decision to struggle from within the system” (595). I agree 
and would add to this only that it is a collective political decision that allows Memo and 
Rudy to succeed, and that collectivity is part of the value of Hardt and Negri’s notion of 
the commons. As Martín Cabrera points out, passive resistance (as perhaps Luz 
represents) is not enough; instead, the film emphasizes that “the potentiality of the 
commons can only be actualized when we actively disobey and when we actively 
‘connect and fight’” (Martín Cabrera 602). Indeed, in Sleep Dealer’s closing scene Memo 
notes that he cannot return to Santa Ana del Rio, but “maybe there’s a future for me here, 
on the edge of everything. A future with a past…if I connect and fight” (Sleep Dealer). 
Memo’s comment suggests he sees the nodes as offering a form of counter-power 
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through which he might become a code “switcher,” if you will, by fighting and actively 
reprogramming the ways in which we connect with others. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, Moxyland and Sleep Dealer are both committed to viewing 
technology as embodied in order to disrupt epistemological frameworks that might 
contribute to the continuation of neocolonial regimes of power. Discussions of the global 
dynamic of technology can, for instance, elide the question of embodied difference and 
contribute to the construction of the bodies of people of colour as commodities and 
resources to be used. By focusing on how technology impacts people in diverse 
geographical settings, both texts resist theories of globalization that erase difference—
either through their emphasis on the processes of informationalization or through 
depicting technologies as neutral platforms. To clarify, Moxyland and Sleep Dealer do 
not suggest that a culture’s “local” environment and context is “fixed,” and that global 
networks disrupt this homogeneity. Rather, both texts draw attention to the ways in which 
we must be attuned to embodied difference when examining the intersection of 
technology and politics. Through careful forms of sociability, global networks can be 
transformed into more ethical encounters. Postcolonial science fiction such as Moxyland 
and Sleep Dealer link diverse global socio-political struggles through their shared ethical 
commitments which include an emphasis on the materiality of information, an orientation 
towards mapping local struggles onto global movements, and a desire to foster alliances 
opposed to the logic of racialized capitalism. Just as Memo repurposes ICTs to fight back 
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against privatization, so too do Moxyland and Sleep Dealer appropriate cyberpunk 
technologies/themes to utilize sf’s best critical tools while challenging the genre’s 
colonial drive. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Transversal Politics and Ethics in Postcolonial SF 
This chapter explores the ways “postcolonialism” in postcolonial sf can be seen as a 
transversal ethical framework which privileges difference while also remaining 
committed to shared political action. Through the work of Simone Bignall, Gilles 
Deleuze, and Nira Yuval-Davis, I offer a working analysis of how a transversal 
perspective can reveal the shared ethical stance that carries through and is a central 
quality of postcolonial science fiction. I take the term “transversal” from Yuval-Davis’s 
work on transversal feminist politics. Yuval-Davis notes that she first heard the term from 
Italian feminists in 1993, and that she has since borrowed it to express her emphasis on 
“universality in diversity” and her critique of identity politics (125). For Yuval-Davis, the 
productive potential of the idea of transversal politics lies in its “ai[m] to be an alternative 
to the universalism/relativism dichotomy which is at the heart of the 
modernist/postmodernist feminist debate” (125). The question of universalism versus 
relativism is also at the core of postcolonial sf where scholars such as Rieder point out the 
inherent problems of categorizing texts as “postcolonial” whether they are addressing the 
different contexts of settler colonialism or dependent colonialism. Postcolonial scholars 
have also long recognized the complex social reality of people of colour and the global 
South. Accordingly, any simplistic categorization of “postcolonial” texts and shared 
agendas should be problematized as attempts to create universal and homogenous 
generalizations. However, this does not mean that feminists, or in this case postcolonial 
sf, must resort to relativism either. Drawing on Gayatri Spivak, Yuval-Davis asks, “Are 
effective politics and adequate theoretical analysis inherently contradictory?” Spivak 
would say no, claiming that, “Deconstruction does not say anything against the 
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usefulness of mobilizing unities. All it says is that because it is useful it ought not to be 
monumentalized as the way things really are” (65). A transversal perspective can 
therefore help theorize the connections between different postcolonial political projects 
and make claims for seeing a unified resistance, but it must also remain attuned to the 
fact that such theorization does not paint a complete picture, nor is it representative of all 
postcolonial conditions. 
Without falling into cultural relativism or conversely positing universal claims, 
transversality can help think through how postcolonialism functions as a political and 
ethical commitment. This is because transversality is a form of coalition politics where 
differences are recognized and given voice; transversality is attentive to the need of not 
perpetuating a logic of domination that silences certain voices in the act of privileging 
others (Yuval-Davis 126). As I will explore in more detail below, postcolonial science 
fiction can take from transversal politics the idea that the boundaries of a coalition 
“should be set not in terms of ‘who’ we are but in terms of what we want to achieve” 
(Yuval-Davis 126). In this chapter, I expand on Yuval-Davis’s notion of transversal 
politics by using Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s concept of ontological difference to 
talk about postcolonialism. I offer an alternative understanding of “difference” to Yuval-
Davis, who aims primarily to avoid the trap of falling into any form of essentialism. I do 
this more as a form of conceptual experimentation, however, in order to consider how 
difference might be formulated in alternative ways beyond the paradigm of 
universalism/relativism that Yuval-Davis critiques but continues to draw on. Thus, 
Yuval-Davis’s point about the importance of seeking coalitions that exist outside of this 
binary is still a central driving force of the analysis below. In particular her emphasis on 
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forming coalitions that are committed to a certain ethical stance—which is mindful of 
reiterating imperialist frameworks and formed based on the desire for mutual action—is 
central to the idea of postcolonial sf as being simultaneously attuned to a politics of 
location while sharing several points of commonality. 
Much contemporary scholarly work in postcolonial science fiction, for instance, 
has divided postcolonial sf (even unintentionally) along material/discursive lines; 
scholars primarily focus either on the genre’s investments in colonial discourse, or 
conversely on the historical economic and political struggles of the “Third World.” 
However, divorcing questions of representation from the material circumstances in which 
narratives are produced (and vice versa) fails to acknowledge the ways in which the 
structures of colonialism operate in a bi-directional manner: epistemological frameworks 
affect and are simultaneously affected by specific material circumstances. This also 
means that colonial structures (aesthetic and political) manifest differently in various 
national contexts, though it is important to note that there are also still many points of 
commonality emerging from similar economic conditions or engagement in shared 
cultural productions like science fiction. Mapping out these differences while seeking 
points of convergence is crucial for moving beyond the framework of identity politics 
and cultural relativism. Thus, attempts to define what exactly “postcolonialism” or 
“postcoloniality” is in the genre will fail without positioning the term as a relational one 
(with shared interests) rather than a universal designation. Despite the challenges of 
defining postcolonialism, I argue for the importance of the term and for a way of 
understanding it as a transversal politics premised upon political solidarity, which is 
189 
 
established through the shared values of dialogue, “listening respect” (Bignall), a politics 
of location, and a commitment to establishing ethical encounters with difference.  
 
Science Fictional Assemblages: SF, Postcolonialism, and Ethics of Relationality 
In this section I examine Geoff Ryman’s Air: Or, Have Not Have (2005) and 
Lauren Beukes’s Zoo City (2010) as exemplars of the way science fiction (sf) can provide 
a framework for creatively imagining and enacting a postcolonial ethics. While a number 
of other postcolonial sf texts might replace Air and Zoo City, I have chosen these two 
novels in particular because their thematic similarities are a consequence of shared 
generic images. Specifically, Air and Zoo City foreground the “fusion” of two characters 
and their altered embodiment in order to critique the violence and imperialism implied in 
western epistemological traditions that imagine the self as an essential, unified being. 
Differences in the socio-political critiques offered in Ryman’s and Beukes’s novels are 
due to the particular geographic regions that each text draws upon. Zoo City highlights 
the historical aftermath of apartheid in South Africa while Air offers a critique of the 
digital divide that defines the late twentieth, early twenty-first century expansion of 
information communication technologies. Despite their situated differences, I argue that 
both novels express similar ethical commitments as a result of the process by which they 
link critiques of the “self” with critiques of colonial structures. In doing so, Air and Zoo 
City outline the possibilities for a postcolonialism based on “careful forms of sociability” 
(Bignall, Postcolonial, 220) that emphasizes the effect of micropolitical relationships on 
the emergence of alternative macropolitical relations.  
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My argument is therefore two-fold in that it seeks to position Air and Zoo City as 
representative of the possibilities of postcolonial sf, while also contending that this 
unique subgenre offers a potential framework for thinking through the material/discursive 
divide that frequently characterizes postcolonial literary analysis. Texts that have been 
defined as postcolonial sf include, for example, works by Lauren Beukes, Amitav Ghosh, 
Nalo Hopkinson, Larissa Lai, and Ian McDonald. Recent scholarly work on these authors 
often replicates binary geopolitical structures, with one approach concentrating primarily 
on postcolonial sf’s deconstruction of colonial discourse, while the other emphasizes the 
very real historical, economic, and political struggles of the “Third World.” Despite this 
bifurcation, extrapolating from both these approaches one can say that a general quality 
of postcolonial sf is thus its focus on and exploration of “difference”—whether social, 
cultural, technological, or economic—in the historical aftermath of colonialism. By 
focusing on the question of difference, however, an important question emerges: how 
does a postcolonial sf (and its study) avoid replicating the structures of the colonial gaze? 
In other words, how does sf criticism negotiate an understanding of the “postcolonial” in 
which explorations of difference are not subsumed into the logic of what Graham Huggan 
calls “marketing the margins”?35  
At stake in the discussion of a postcolonial sf, then, is whether discussions of 
cultural, ethnic, or social difference can occur in ways that do not risk appropriating 
subaltern identities or presenting idealized and mythologized “others.” As scholars 
                                                          
35 In Huggan’s The Postcolonial Exotic: Marketing at the Margins (2001), Huggan identifies the tensions 
between what he calls “postcolonialism” as “loosely enabled oppositional practices” and “postcoloniality” 
as the commodification of postcolonial discourses and its “regime of cultural value” (6) in advanced 
capitalism. 
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attempt to define postcolonial sf, many of the questions which have plagued postcolonial 
theory arise: does defining postcolonial sf as a subgenre revert to idealistic/exploitative 
identity politics and contain its subversive potential? Can connections be forged between 
different global visions of sf, or does such a subgenre necessarily revert to a form of 
cultural relativism? Despite, indeed because of, these challenges, this chapter argues for 
the importance of exploring a notion of postcolonial sf that might be defined by shared 
ethics, attuned to both a material and discursive critique of colonialism. This approach 
hinges on the way Air and Zoo City redefine “difference” in a non-imperial light, thereby 
ultimately challenging the subject/Other dichotomy of the colonial gaze in sf. Air and Zoo 
City intersect with postcolonialism across three layers: first, by exploring ontological 
difference as it relates to postcolonial theory; secondly, by exploring how ethical 
encounters might be fostered through affective connections with others; and lastly, by 
considering how these ethical encounters simultaneously nurture social transformation. 
Thus, postcolonial sf can be understood as a “mode of awareness” (Csicsery-Ronay, 
“SF,” 387), or more specifically, as a strategy and a mode of relation committed to both 
critiquing colonial frameworks and assembling an alternative, non-imperial ethics of 
relationality.36 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 While I draw heavily on Istvan Csicsery-Ronay’s analysis of science fictionality as a “mood or attitude” 
(Seven Beauties 3), my discussion of sf as a mode differs slightly from Csicsery-Ronay’s, who contends 
science-fictionality is a mode characterized specifically by the hesitation between two gaps: “a historical-
logical one” and an “ethical one” (Seven Beauties 3). 
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Layer 1: Reconstructing Difference, Rethinking Bodies of Relation 
Air and Zoo City’s exploration of ontological difference is key to understanding 
how both novels reframe the idea of the “Other,” and is therefore also central to the way 
each novel challenges the structure of the colonial gaze in sf. Air focuses on Chung Mae, 
a peasant woman from Kizuldah, “the last village in the world to go online” (1). In the 
process of connecting to “Air” Mae becomes linked with the consciousness of her elderly 
neighbor, Mrs. Tung. Zoo City also focuses on a central female protagonist, Zinzi 
December, and is set in Johannesburg, South Africa. Zinzi is a recovering drug addict 
who—along with her “animal,” Sloth—is hired to solve the kidnapping of a young pop-
star. By portraying bodies as complex assemblages, Air and Zoo City contest theories of 
embodiment that envision subject-formation as a process generated through a negative 
dialectic. In sf, John Rieder identifies this antagonistic subject/object relation as the 
“structure of the colonial gaze” (7), which manifests in either overtly imperialistic stances 
towards alien others (as exhibited in the early sf of John Campbell and Edgar Rice 
Burroughs, for instance) or through depicting the tensions between human and 
nonhumans others as fraught but necessarily exploitative (as in Octavia Butler or C.J. 
Cherryh’s writings).  
It is through their physiological connections to other beings that Mae and Zinzi 
challenge theories of embodiment that consider the relationship between self and other as 
primarily antagonistic or possessive. Dialectical processes of transformation are 
problematic not only because they posit a necessarily aggressive relationship between 
difference and lack, self and other, but also problematic because they are ultimately 
driven by the desire to negate this difference (Bignall, Postcolonial 101-2). 
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Understanding desire as a process initiated through one’s negative “lack” means that 
one’s subjectivity can only be affirmed through the objectification and appropriation of 
others. Hence seeing the relationship between subjectivity and difference as premised 
upon dialectical philosophies means difference must be either suppressed or eliminated 
through unification, a direction which becomes ethically problematic for postcolonialism. 
Against the tradition of much western philosophy, Air and Zoo City imagine an 
alternative mode of being that foregrounds a non-dialectical process of becoming, a move 
that does not require the objectification or elimination of “Others.” As philosophers 
whose work is principally concerned with non-dialectical thought, Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari may help reveal the ways in which Air and Zoo City resist portraying 
ontology and subsequently identity as a stable, pre-determined essence. 
A large part of Air and Zoo City’s critique of the colonial gaze arises from their 
portrayal of ontology itself as anchored in multiplicity and difference. Both protagonists 
thereby represent identity as a sort of cyborg figuration in which bodies function as a 
nexus of complex material and immaterial links to one’s environment. Though Mae and 
Zinzi initially reject any connection to others because it hinders their capacity to function 
“normally” in everyday life, soon these physical connections (with Air and Sloth) force 
Mae and Zinzi to reconsider how they perceive their own selfhood, and later, how they 
understand their roles within the communities they are a part of. For instance, Mae 
discovers that “Air” is not just a technology but also a way of understanding embodiment 
as constructed through environmental dynamics rather than an individual quality only. 
Similarly, Zinzi comes to understand her physical connection to Sloth as evidence of the 
bonds that have always tied her to others, even prior to her “animalled” state. Ultimately, 
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Mae and Zinzi reveal that “a body’s structure is the composition of its relation” including 
its internal and external relations (Deleuze, Expressionism 218), and both characters 
come to see their bodies and selfhood as an already machinic assemblage. Mae and 
Zinzi’s physical connection to non-human others challenges the negative dialectic that 
characterizes most western philosophies of transformation, thereby also contesting 
transcendental definitions of what it means to be “human.” 
Indeed, Air and Zoo City reject the universal claims of humanism by representing 
the body as an assemblage of constantly evolving and coterminous forces in which one’s 
body is only ever a “momentary body” (Rothfield 208). Mae and Zinzi’s transformations 
are therefore not about changing from the “human” to something “other”; instead, their 
physiological changes represent what Deleuze and Guattari call the expressions of a 
difference of force. For Deleuze and Guattari seeing bodies as a difference of force 
means recognizing how bodies are always in a process of becoming. This is because 
bodies express what they call the “double articulation” of virtual becoming and actual 
being. While the virtual has many definitions in Deleuze’s writings, here I focus 
primarily on the virtual as a plane of immanence characterized by constant change and 
varying intensities. Virtual content is conceived of positively as a “chaotic ground” 
(Bignall, Postcolonial 105) or force that is productive of complex being, and not 
negatively as a lack of reality or an absence that must be overcome (as much Lacanian 
psychoanalysis contends). Actual being arises from the differenciation of forms from this 
plane of immanence, in which difference is created by bodies that develop, or become 
actual, along divergent paths. Accordingly, incorporeal virtuality might be seen as the 
struggle of differing possibilities to become actualised and the inherent 
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forces/connections/possibilities that remain unexpressed. Importantly, the virtual and 
material act in concert, as there is no ontological difference between them. The 
relationship between the virtual and actual affirms difference precisely because this 
approach recognizes that bodies are always in a process of becoming.37 
Like Deleuze and Guattari, Air and Zoo City posit that bodies are not stable, 
essential individuals; rather, the self is a constantly changing assemblage defined by an 
internal (virtual) difference as well as an external, actualised difference. Ryman’s Air 
makes literal the double articulation that is the virtual and the actual in order to explore 
the ways in which bodies are already machinic assemblages and “identities” the result of 
complex shifting relations. For instance, it is primarily through the “coming of Air” 
(79)—and access to a virtual, global network—that Mae begins to think differently about 
her own selfhood and relationship to her community. Air begins by clearly identifying 
“Mae [as] the village’s fashion expert” (1). With the arrival of Air’s test run, however, 
Mae finds herself merged with a technology reminiscent of the world-wide-web but 
directly accessed through one’s mind. Air has no material substance per se and can 
therefore only be explained by how it affects Mae, who describes Air as simultaneously 
intensely physical and yet also disembodied—both “an extra weight in her head like a 
load to be carried” (66) and “as if [a] balloon was pumping you up, filling you with air” 
(69). As Neil Easterbrook points out, Air “rides waves of central metaphors” (240), and 
indeed Air’s intangible nature means that it can only be described in figurative language. 
                                                          
37 Due to limitations in space and the complex nature of Deleuze’s differential ontology, the discussion 
here of the virtual/actual is necessarily truncated. Deleuze’s Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza is an 
excellent introduction to understanding his theory of embodiment, as well as Michael Hardt’s companion 
text to Deleuze’s works, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy (1995) and Laura Guillaume and 
Joe Hughes’s Deleuze and the Body (2011). 
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What exactly is Air then? If Air might be understood as a science fictional 
rendering of the plane of immanence, it is appropriate that Air exists virtually as a force 
rather than a material place or thing. While Air is still a technology developed by the 
U.N. and Gates, its capacity to affect how Mae sees the world around her renders it a 
symbolic figuration which expresses the “difference internal to a body as it transforms 
over time” (Bignall, Postcolonial, 102). By physiologically connecting with Mae, Air 
also affects Mae’s internal composition or her relational becoming. Mae discovers Air’s 
capacity to effect change in those it encounters: “In Air, one mind occupied the same 
space as another. Stimulation of one imprinted brain correlated to increased activity in 
another” (207). This is not a fantastical example of “shared thinking,” as Mae notes, 
“One brain works in a way very different from another” (208). Rather, Air’s capacity to 
incite “increased activity” in the people or bodies it brings together reveals the ways in 
which “an existing mode [Mae in this case] always exists as already affected by objects 
in partial and particular relations” (Deleuze, Expressionism 244). That is, Air uses the 
language of technological systems to articulate the ways in which bodies already exist as 
a site of multiple connections. The coming of Air is therefore the emergence of Mae’s 
“awareness of one’s condition of interaction with others, that is to say one’s capacity to 
affect and to be affected” (Braidotti, “Ethics,” 136), what one might also see as an 
increased awareness of an ethics of relationality. 
The new assemblage Mae forms with Air is neither technological nor material but 
is perhaps ethical in that it creates another way for Mae to nudge the world around her 
towards less violent, more affirmative postcolonial relations. She uses the information 
provided in Air to help her community, first by creating a thriving business and sewing 
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circle and secondly by helping her village survive the everyday challenges of life in 
Kizuldah and the torrential floods characteristic of their mountainous ecosystem. When 
the Kru (teacher) inside Air challenges Mae to embrace the possibilities Air opens up and 
to “[start] thinking in this new train” (69), Mae learns how to use Air to strengthen the 
other “bodies” to which she belongs: those of her family, friendships, and village. 
“Thinking in this new train” entails understanding being as already composite, a fact 
made all the more clear when Mae learns that “Mrs. Tung had been a traveler in Air. 
Before there was Air” (374). Mrs. Tung’s memories reveal the ways in which she also 
understood the multiplicity of being, and the transformative potential of seeing people in 
this light. This is why, for instance, a younger Mrs. Tung travelling in Air could “half see 
who this [child] Mae will be—oh, clever, yes, but not in any way that school can capture” 
(374). Mrs. Tung’s desire to “love” this potential in Mae into life (374) exemplifies the 
ways in which one is inevitably affected by external relationships, affirming the positivity 
and productivity of difference. For Mae, this means that that “we have always had 
Airselves” (310), and that “If we live in Air at all, then we have always lived there, from 
the beginning” (310). Seeing bodies/subjectivity as existing in partial and transformative 
states is more than affirming the old adage that change is inevitable (a potentially 
dangerous adage when taken to its imperial extreme)—instead, Mae learns that it is 
precisely because bodies are in a process of becoming that she is able to actively 
contribute to forming new, positive futures for her village.  
Zoo City continues this project of seeing ontological generation as an ongoing and 
multi-dimensional process of collaboration rather than imperialistic aggression. While Air 
more clearly draws out the virtual/actual dimensions of bodies, Zoo City demonstrates 
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how recognizing bodies as relational constructs requires also seeing desire as a social 
force. According to psychoanalytic theory, desire is located within the individual 
person—for Deleuze, however, desire is both a produced, social mechanism and an 
affirmation that arises between disparate bodies as they are mutually affected. Deleuze’s 
articulation of internal and external differences demonstrates how desire is constructed 
between bodies through the connections and affiliations they form. Desire is movement, 
metamorphosis, and the product of encounters that increase the power of bodies to act. 
For Deleuze, then, conceiving of desire as a social force means rejecting the very idea of 
“identity,” as bodies are always in the process of assembling and connecting with others 
in new ways. 
Just as Air enables Mae to better understand her connections to the world around 
her, Sloth enables Zinzi to begin to recognize the ways she simultaneously affects and is 
affected by the environment around her. In Zinzi’s “Former Life” (37), she is depicted as 
having a certain amount of class privilege, and the nostalgia she often feels for her former 
life is really nostalgia for a return to this privilege and the “creature comforts of [her] 
parent’s Craighall house with the pool and the gardener” (348). However, after her 
brother dies, Zinzi is unable to access this privilege because her body is visibly marked 
by the presence of an animal. Hence, it is only after Zinzi is placed in a specifically 
“racialized” position in this society—that is, it is only after Zinzi is animalled—that she 
begins to identify the detrimental effects of social inequality upon individual people. In 
the novel Odi Huron (a wealthy, white businessman) is also revealed to have an animal, 
but he is not publicly shamed in the same way because his access to money and resources 
means he can afford to hide his crocodile. The animalled of Zoo City, on the other hand 
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(as refugees and people of colour), are “visible” zoos, or those whose bodies are marked 
and criminalized by the public and who must work any job they can to survive as 
outcasts. Thus, race and class are intimately bound in the novel. As a visible “mark,” 
animals function in this society as a form of racialization, which identifies zoos as, 
“Murderers, rapists, junkies. Scum of the earth” (15). On a psychological level, this 
dehumanization is also a form of punishment, eventually internalized by zoos like Zinzi 
who claim that, “The truth is we’re all criminals” (15). 
Zinzi’s internalized oppression and invalidation is symptomatic of processes of 
racialization in colonial relationships, a point Frantz Fanon eloquently argues in Black 
Skin, White Masks (1952). In “The Lived Experience of the Black Man,” Fanon examines 
a situation in which a black man admits to feeling guilt regardless of his innocence 
because ultimately “Sin is black and virtue is white” (118). The black man’s insistence on 
feeling guilty whether a crime has been committed or not is more than an expression of 
feeling inferior—as Fanon pointedly states, it is “a feeling of not existing” (118). A 
similar case could be made regarding the zoos of Beukes’s novel who feel blameworthy 
regardless of the circumstances that may have led them to acquire an animal. For 
instance, Zinzi repeatedly blames herself for her brother’s death, seeing this as an 
inevitable consequence of her drug habits. Internalizing the rhetoric of “sin” and 
criminality associated with zoos, Zinzi uses this as justification for all her behaviour—
when she is confronted by Benoît over her email scams and selfishness, she argues, “I’m 
an addict! It comes with the fucking territory” (257). Zinzi is unable to see the ways 
material structures—such as the segregation and social alienation of zoos—are systemic 
factors that continue to position her as “a wretch” (Fanon 118), thereby simultaneously 
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enabling her to internalize this racialized oppression as deserving punishment for her 
innate depravity. In turn, this also affects Zinzi’s ability to see beyond her own immediate 
feelings to acknowledge the pain she causes others. It is not until Sloth that Zinzi begins 
to recognize how an environment and one’s relationship to others are critical factors in 
self-identification. 
Zinzi’s status as animalled is thus simultaneously a “curse” and “gift” (13); 
though she internalizes her supposed punishment, Zinzi’s actual connection to Sloth 
becomes a vital and meaningful part of her life. This is because of the nature of their 
symbiotic relationship—Sloth’s bond to Zinzi requires her to continually think about her 
capacity to affect him through her behaviours. For Zinzi this means a radical reorientation 
of the ways she understands her body and her connection to the world around her. If the 
technology in Ryman’s novel is a web-like force that decenters Mae’s notion of 
subjectivity and highlights the interdependence of internal and external relations, Zinzi’s 
posthuman body joined with Sloth uses the concept of feedback systems to illustrate this 
interdependence. Like all of the animalled, Zinzi cannot be separated from Sloth because, 
“the feedback loop of the separation anxiety is crippling” (142). While this feedback loop 
functions negatively when they are separated, it also contributes to positive feedback and 
more reflective practices as Zinzi and Sloth must be accountable for each other’s well-
being. Notably, their feedback loop depends on Zinzi and Sloth’s difference in order to 
produce active and reflective dialogue. Subsequently, Zinzi protects Sloth and learns to 
understand her impacts on his feelings and livelihood. Though one might argue Zinzi 
protects Sloth for her own benefit (if he dies so does she), Zinzi’s life is mutually bound 
with Sloth’s in a manner more akin to Donna Haraway’s notion of companion species. 
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Their lives fall into a routine of co-habitation—when Zinzi can’t see in the dark, Sloth 
guides her; when Sloth whimpers, Zinzi knows that he thinks something is wrong; and 
when Zinzi returns to her self-destructive habits, Sloth refuses to engage with her until 
she changes (265). 
Most importantly, Zinzi and Sloth’s relationship is a transformative one, as 
exemplified by the figurative language used to describe their relationship. Often depicted 
as a sort of posthuman machine in which Sloth “drives [her] like a Zinzi motorbike” (12), 
“squeezing [Zinzi’s] shoulders like handlebars” (212), Zinzi and Sloth form a new 
assemblage that simultaneously transforms the way Zinzi views her own body. In the 
process of allowing Sloth to affect and direct her body—a “becoming-animal” if you 
will—Zinzi’s connection with Sloth reveals that the capacity to be affected “is not a 
personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the effectuation of a power of the pack that 
throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel” (Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand 240). It 
is not only through feedback loops that Zinzi becomes more aware of her connection to 
others; it is also through cooperative action as a “pack” with Sloth that throws her sense 
of self into question. By recognizing that their relationship is mutually affective, Zinzi 
sees the ways in which her body and subjectivity are constantly evolving forces, as well 
as the ways more positive, productive relations might be developed. For instance, after a 
brief relapse when she is shunned by Sloth, Zinzi tries to begin the process of undoing the 
harm she has caused others, sending out warning emails to those who may be scammed 
through her boss Vuyo. Sloth’s constant feedback and his ability to help her act in 
different ways show Zinzi that she can affect the environment around her in ways she had 
not previously considered. Thus, Sloth helps Zinzi begin the process of reversing her 
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internalized guilt by requiring that she recognize the structures that reinforce social 
prejudices as well as her own complicity in acting them through—not because she is 
innately immoral but because she had not seen the ways she could act otherwise until 
Sloth required her to take better care of the bodies she is a part of.  
 
Layer 2: Affecting Others and the Question of Ethics 
It is crucial to see Mae and Zinzi’s physicality as expressing the pluralism of 
being, rather than viewing them simply as individuals with multi-faceted personalities. 
This is because if ontology is seen as an assemblage, then, for Deleuze, the question of 
ethics is inextricably linked to being as we are always in the process of interacting with 
other bodies through partial connections, meeting them “bit by bit” (Bignall, “Affective” 
88). Such connections determine the degree to which a subject is marked by their 
environment, and identifying these interconnections becomes crucial to reducing bad or 
harmful relations. Bignall contends that the ethical task for Deleuze is therefore the task 
of creating mutually joyful encounters, or encounters that affect both bodies in a way that 
increases their power to act and become active. In other words, an ethics attuned to 
bodily complexity,  
entail[s] that one must not simply strive to unite with bodies that one perceives to 
be wholly sympathetic and similar, but more precisely with the sympathetic facets 
of diverse bodies that comprise one’s social milieu…This ethics is therefore 
concerned with finding agreement, not by eliminating actual difference and 
privileging identity, but in the context of the actual diversity of bodies that 
express Being in infinitely multiple ways. (Bignall, “Affective” 89) 
Encounters with others cannot always be controlled, and one cannot foretell the ways in 
which a body will be affected or how it will subsequently respond. However, as Bignall 
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points out, because bodies are comprised of multiple parts, the ethical challenge is 
finding the “bits” and ways in which mutual understanding can be reached such that new 
relationships are formed based on this agreement and affective relation.  
By reimagining bodies as composed of internal and external relations, Air and Zoo 
City also reimagine an ethics based on nurturing “joyful passions” and increasing one’s 
“power of action,” a notion Deleuze similarly developed through his reading of Spinoza’s 
“common notions” (Expressionism 273-80). The development of common notions might 
be briefly summarized as the attempt to establish mutual understanding but it also entails 
the process of mapping out the historical context of disagreements in order to identify 
what structures and misunderstandings have led to such conflicts. Common notions thus 
“internally determine the mind to understand the agreements of things, as well as their 
differences and oppositions” (Deleuze, Expressionism, 276). Importantly, ethics for both 
Spinoza and Deleuze is not a question of espousing predisposed morals or judgements. 
Rather, the ethical question is an ongoing one in which the body navigates different 
encounters by enhancing its understanding and power to act through mutual 
comprehension and dialogue with others. Levi Bryant argues that this “ethics of the 
event” in Deleuze is characterized by “the question of the work of ethics [that] concerns 
not the application of a pre-existing rule to an existing situation, but rather how a 
collective is to be assembled or composed in light of the appearance of these strange new 
actors, these strangers, or how a new collective is to be formed” (29). Here one can see 
how Deleuze’s notion of differential ontology and ethics are interwoven, as both do not 
appeal to transcendental or pre-determined formulas.  
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Air and Zoo City perform the “work of ethics” in which “rather than thinking 
ethics on the model of judgment, it would be more accurate to think the ethical as a sort 
of construction or building” (Bryant 29). Confronted with changing bodies and 
communities, Mae and Zinzi must create sustainable futures that foster more “joyful 
passions” for their families and loved ones. In their new social, economic, cultural 
contexts, Mae and Zinzi are not guided by a moral process of doing “right” and “wrong,” 
but are instead depicted as working through the complex task of formulating new ways of 
living with a diverse group of people in their new environments. By working through 
developing new communities of practice, Mae and Zinzi perform a relational (and 
postcolonial) ethics, guided by a desire to collaborate with others through attentive 
listening, constant learning, and a willingness to change daily habits. Easterbrook 
identifies exactly this ethical dimension in Air, contending, “Air abandons the moral alibi, 
the claim that some universally transhistorical code or merely subjective whim grounds 
ethics…and turns instead toward useful, productive ethical engagements, built almost 
entirely from heuristic openness” (250). Indeed, Mae and Zinzi are placed in situations in 
which they must determine how to act in response to the changes they experience 
physically, socially, and culturally, and in such a way that makes both their lives and 
those around them more positive experiences. 
Sloth is only the beginning of a series of related events that compels Zinzi to think 
about the ways in which her actions affect others and what an idea of “careful sociability” 
(Bignall, “Affective,” 79) might mean. As a fellow aposymbiot and Zinzi’s lover, Benoît 
also plays a large role in her life. When Benoît discovers Zinzi’s scam emails he asks her 
if she thinks about the impact she has on those she lies to and the pain that she causes 
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others as a result (including himself). Zinzi claims, “It wasn’t on purpose” and “It wasn’t 
to hurt you” (257), but Benoît responds by asking Zinzi, “Like your letters are not to hurt 
people? You don’t care about anyone else, Zinzi” (257). When Benoît reveals to Zinzi 
that her email “formats” appropriate the real life stories of people who, like himself, have 
seen their families torn apart by war and resorted to acts of violence to protect them, she 
is shocked at her own egocentricity. It is at this moment that Zinzi feels in her chest, “the 
poison flower [burst] open, an explosion of burning seeds. I imagine Mr and Mrs Barber 
experienced something similar whenever they finally realized that the bearer bonds were 
forged. It is the death of hope” (259). The Barbers are but one couple Zinzi has helped 
dupe, and though her role is limited to writing the initial emails to them, Zinzi sees that 
she is complicit in robbing the couple of their life savings and undoubtedly causing pain. 
Understanding how she has hurt Benoît enables Zinzi to claim responsibility for the ways 
she has also hurt others, destroying their “hope” of better futures. 
Though this incident in Zinzi and Benoît’s relationship seems trivial, it is the 
catalyst in the novel for “a certain idea of careful sociability, which expands the realm of 
practical ethics beyond rights-based and state-mediated discourses of justice, to include 
unmediated qualities of interpersonal relationship as defining aspects of political and 
ethical life” (Bignall, “Affective,” 79; my emphasis). In an insightful move, Bignall uses 
Deleuze’s theory of embodiment to construct a notion of postcolonial agency that 
“incorporates a positive and creative role for ontological difference and gives rise to an 
ethic of joyful sociability based on material practices of self-awareness, listening respect 
and attentiveness to the other” (“Affective” 100). Arguably, what is most promising 
about Deleuze’s ontological vision—and the ethical project Bignall extrapolates from 
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this—is its articulation of desiring-production, which sees desire as a social force 
between two or more bodies. There is nothing “lost” in this vision precisely because 
desire is seen as produced through the affective connections formed in an encounter 
between two people. While these are not always joyful encounters, even sad ones can 
increase our power of action through sustained attempts to understand our relationship 
with others and why they might incite such reactions. As Bignall explains, this requires 
re-thinking the link between interpersonal relationships and political life.  
Part two of Zoo City begins immediately after Benoît discovers Zinzi’s scam 
emails, and though the section opens with Zinzi’s relapse and return to “[r]ock fucking 
bottom” (265), in Zinzi’s most uncertain moment—relapsed, heartbroken, and upset with 
herself—she begins to reconstruct the ways she interacts with her environment. While in 
the novel’s first half, Zinzi is depicted as largely self-absorbed, in the second half of Zoo 
City Zinzi becomes increasingly self-aware, making connections between events taking 
place in her life and events taking place in the greater community of Johannesburg. This 
change manifests most clearly through the mysterious emails Zinzi receives throughout 
the novel—emails that include statements such as, “When you eat, you are eating things 
from planes” (38). Almost immediately after Benoît has expressed his disappointment in 
her and Zinzi has relapsed, she begins to question why she has received such strange 
emails, and what her role is in this unusual event. Initially believing that the emails might 
be “bad muti, a hack spell from a rival syndicate” (280), she wonders if they are instead 
desperate pleas for help and begins to see that it might be “victims sending [her] 
messages” (287) about their animal murders. Consequently, Zinzi discovers that the 
mysterious email about “eating things from planes,” comes from Patrick Serfontein 
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(294), a homeless aposymbiot whose shelter provided food donated from airlines. Zinzi’s 
attempt to solve Patrick’s murder leads her away from her self-destructive habits as she 
engages with her community in an effort to address a social injustice. 
The mysterious email story-line seems tangential to the novel’s primary narrative 
arch about Zinzi’s hunt for the famous singer Songweza; however, it is important to note 
that it is not until Zinzi decides to investigate these brutal murders that she begins to 
participate in acts of care which involve no monetary gain. Following what Rosi Braidotti 
might call an “ethics of radical immanence,” Zinzi is increasingly attuned to the 
dynamics of her environment. As Braidoitti notes, such an ethical positioning is 
composed around the idea of “sustainability” which entails “a re-grounding of the subject 
in a materially embedded sense of responsibility and ethical accountability for the 
environments s/he inhabits” (“Affective” 7). As a kind of politics of location, such an 
ethics sees an individual as co-extensive with her/his environment. Bryant offers a similar 
perspective by speaking of ethics as “a question of ethical ecology or the composition of 
collectives in response to events that buffet collectives” (29). Thus, Zinzi discovers that if 
she is “busy trying to dig [herself] out of the plague pit that’s [her] life right now” (276), 
this also entails taking the effort to actively listen to others and attempt to understand her 
role in shaping the community around her. Being an aposymbiot makes clear to Zinzi the 
condition of being unable to escape the ties that bind her to others, and her responsibility 
in sustaining more joyful relations. In the end, though Zinzi says, “you don’t get to 
choose the ghosts that attach themselves to you” (17) or the encounters into which one is 
thrown, Zinzi can be accountable for the ways she interacts with various forces in her 
life.  
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Like Zinzi, Mae’s discovery of the “work of ethics” is gradual, and the beginning 
of Air primarily focuses on Mae’s endeavours to further her own career and pay off her 
family’s debts. Mae’s self-interest, however, changes when she begins to develop a 
“question map.” When Air first arrives, Mae decides to use her access to the new 
technology to develop her fashion business, creating a questionnaire to survey the fashion 
needs and wants of her village. As Easterbrook points out, Mae’s question map is a 
critical turning point in the novel, as it exemplifies the ways in which “the most mundane 
sequence produces a most marvelous result” (250). This is because “mapping” becomes a 
crucial tool for Mae and her village, functioning on both a practical and ethical level. 
Pragmatically, the questionnaire enables Mae to survey the village’s response to Air and 
gather knowledge about how each understands what exactly Air is. The written 
information collected in this survey enables Mae to receive government funds for 
assisting with building her school and business. However, Mae’s question map also 
functions ethically, inciting collaboration and discussion amongst the villagers about how 
they will respond to the changes rendered by Air, and how they will collectively 
empower themselves in a rapidly changing future. Though Mae is the only one with 
constant access to Air, she uses her skill according to the needs identified by her 
village—helping Kwan with her Eloi website, for instance, and preparing her village for 
the technological challenges they will face.  
As a central conceptual image, “mapping” thus reveals the ways in which Mae 
creates a network of support towards the common goal of strengthening her community’s 
ability to survive and prosper. Interestingly, Air itself is described as a technology in 
which “formatting” entails “mak[ing] a complete map of minds, and that’s what exists in 
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Air” (10). Constructing Air as a technology is therefore a project that requires 
discovering sustainable ways to link individuals with larger communities and to mediate 
social differences between individual cultures (such as Kizuldah) and global ones (such 
as the U.N.). Mediation between these two disparate bodies requires finding ways of 
interacting that are mutually beneficial and where one body will not overpower the other. 
Mae realizes that continuous negotiation is crucial to creating futures viable for all parties 
involved when she thinks about how “all our lives…are going to change” with the 
coming of Air, and notes that if her primary reason for constructing the questionnaire is 
her business, “the second is also to help the village to decide: What do we want to do for 
the future?” (76-7).  
Mae’s question—“What do we want to do for the future?”—is never directly or 
completely answered, and for good reason. As Deleuze and Guattari contend, mapping 
itself is a project “entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the 
real…[i]t fosters connections between fields…[and] is open and connectable in all of its 
dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification,” 
transforming and responding to the particular communities it represents (Thousand 
Plateaus 12). Mapping is therefore intentionally open-ended and always under 
construction as it responds to various social changes, such as the coming of Air. If “ethics 
is concerned with affective relations among bodies in a composite or collection, and those 
assemblages that fit together in such a way so as to enhance the power of acting among 
the elements of the collective” (Bryant 33; my emphasis), Mae’s ethical response to Air is 
the construction of a map, or communal project, that enhances her village’s capacity for 
survival. Though it is born out of Mae’s self-serving necessity, the question map 
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encourages active community involvement as Kizuldah must decide how to use Air in 
order to collectively create futures more attuned to their needs. 
 
Layer 3: Social Transformation 
Constructing ethically accountable futures in Air and Zoo City therefore means 
addressing the contemporary historical relations that confine and limit the possibilities for 
communities to transform themselves according to their particular social needs. By 
identifying the ways internal and external relations affect a body, Deleuze and Guattari 
also insist that “[t]here is no such thing as the social production of reality on the one 
hand, and a desiring-production that is mere fantasy on the other” (Anti-Oedipus 28). If 
desire is produced through the relationship between multiple bodies, not only does this 
support the notion of an intrinsic ethical dimension to all social relations, it also 
maintains that “social-production is purely and simply desiring-production itself under 
determinate conditions” (Anti-Oedipus 29). In other words, desiring-production is 
interdependent with and develops out of social-production. For instance, Zoo City links 
contemporary racial segregation and xenophobic violence against refugees to the colonial 
logic of apartheid in South Africa. Thus, despite the end of apartheid nearly two decades 
ago, Beukes’s novel highlights the ways in which xenophobia is actualised through social 
structures that continue to segregate “foreigners,” confining them to “Zoo City,” a 
metaphorical “quarantine camp” (99). Similarly, Ryman’s novel addresses contemporary 
debates about the digital divide in the global South, offering perspectives on both the 
dangers of technocultural globalization and a view of the enduring resilience of those so 
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often labelled “have nots.” By directly addressing these contemporary issues, both novels 
suggest that social transformation of material, macropolitical structures is required in 
order to also eliminate the epistemological habits that justify their continuation. Read 
together, Air and Zoo City perform the dual project of critiquing macropolitical structures 
and constructing micropolitical resistances, a project that scholars such as Bignall see as 
vital to postcolonial endeavours. 
Though Zoo City appears to focus primarily on Zinzi’s personal growth, 
significantly, this personal development is a response first and foremost to the conditions 
of the world in which she lives. Zoo City is a place where, “you do what it takes, you take 
the opportunities” (346) to survive because being shut-off from the rest of Johannesburg 
means that “a dead zoo in Zoo City is low priority even on a good day” (11). The 
segregation of aposymbiots in Zoo City is the outcome of material practices supported by 
social prejudice, resulting, for instance, in the banning of zoos from certain public 
establishments or from wealthier housing communities. As Zinzi notes, “[i]t was 
inevitable I’d end up in Zoo City. Although I didn’t realise that until after the fifth rental 
agency had sneered over their clipboards at Sloth and told me they didn’t have anything 
available in the suburbs” (61). Forced out of economically wealthier communities, 
aposymbiots also face limited job options and access to public resources. Police and 
security guards, for example, are often “animalists” (99) who primarily serve the interests 
of non-zoos and wealthier gated communities. Beukes’s novel therefore clearly critiques 
the continuation of material structures that regulate boundaries that continue to isolate the 
“other,” a critique which is undeniably linked to the aftermath of apartheid.  
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Zoo City’s very form critiques the ways writing, media, and language contribute 
to the dehumanization of certain peoples—the novel is interspersed with journalistic 
writing, scientific publications, and online documentary film reviews that all claim to 
understand the real difference of aposymbiots as “non-human others.” As previously 
noted, aposymbiots are racialized bodies, and their constant mistreatment in the novel 
exemplifies the ways in which people of colour continue to be “marked” and exploited 
under regimes still invested in colonial epistemologies and racialized practice. One 
newspaper reporter, for instance, describes a theft which involved “gangsters [who] had a 
lion with them,” noting that it, ““[m]akes me wonder if we don’t need a pass system for 
zoos after all!” (35). The association of zoos and aposymbiots with apartheid’s pass laws 
is clear, but Beukes’s novel also links such xenophobia to other similarly destructive 
ideologies, “[b]ecause who knew there was a caste below untouchable?’ (99). In an 
interview with Clarkesworld magazine, Beukes puts it succinctly:  
Zoo City is…about the burden of the past, guilt and redemption, magical spirit 
animals inspired by myth that may be the devil on your back or the guardian angel 
on your shoulder or the spirits of your ancestors manifested in furry form, about 
inner city slums and refugees and what society does with—and to—our outcasts. 
Zoo City is set right now in the dilapidated slums of Johannesburg. (Jones) 
Recognizing the affinity between “outcasts” and “our” role in the everyday choices we 
make as part of these segregating systems is what makes Zoo City a particularly 
compelling novel. While Zoo City is not unique in its critique of the continuation of 
racialized policies and practice in South Africa, it is exemplary in its ability to tie a 
materialist critique with advocacy for the construction of less violent and more 
sustainable futures. Accordingly, Zoo City ends with a simple act of kindness—as Zinzi 
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drives off to find Benoît’s family, the reader is left pondering this event and what exactly 
“care” means in our relationship with others. 
Air is also deeply invested in the politics of global change, examining what 
changing technological contexts might mean for communities outside of global economic 
centers. Foregoing the judgement on whether or not technological expansion is “good” or 
“bad,” Ryman’s novel asks what new relationships will emerge from our technological 
connections: will these new relationships be beneficial and positive for all affected? If 
they aren’t, what relationships or social relations have been fostered such that harm and 
suffering occur instead? These are critical questions for the coming of Air, and while 
supposedly “Air…would make everyone a Have” (191), as Mae points out to her 
international friends, Air only exacerbates the scarcity of resources available to Kizuldah. 
In Air’s mundane world, technological information is an invaluable resource and not all 
countries or communities have equal access. Furthermore, while Air promises to be a 
useful tool, because it is forced on Mae’s village with little communication or concern for 
cultural consequences, Air becomes instead an invasive and dominating technology. 
Angered by this lack of communication and care, Mae asks her friend Bugsy Harris, an 
editor from the U.S., “Can you help me by telling your powerful friends that those who 
are as dependent on you as children, should at least be asked what we want done to our 
heads?” (234). Without access to information about the coming of Air, Kizuldah is 
thrown into a crisis, and Air’s arrival is often juxtaposed with images of imperialist 
invasions from Mrs. Tung’s memory. Air’s arrival is therefore also a moment that makes 
clear the divisive effects of unequal technological access.  
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Technology is thus presented as a social structure that solidifies the differences 
between Karzistan and other countries, functioning as a boundary separating the 
“information haves and have-nots” (9). Such separation and difference is seen as 
detrimental, as a lack if you will, which positions Mae and her village as somehow 
deprived, dehumanized, and without the skills privileged by the global North and more 
technologically wealthy countries. Mae is infuriated by the label of “have-not,” arguing, 
“I’m sure that it is a good thing. I am sure the people who do this think they do a good 
thing. They worry about us, like we were children…We don’t have time for TV or 
computers. We face sun, rain, wind, sickness, and each other…But how dare they? How 
dare they call us have-nots” (19). While Mae notes that it is precisely the values 
privileged by the global North—access to info, money, business—that produce the 
concept of a have-not, she also makes clear Kizuldah’s capacity to survive change. If, 
under the state of advanced capitalism, information is a resource capable of further 
ghettoizing certain communities, Mae commits to learning how Air works in order to 
level the inequalities that others have created for her. 
Importantly, therefore, Ryman’s novel refuses to represent Kizuldah’s residents as 
victims, focusing instead on the ways Mae’s community learns to re-build itself in the 
process of responding to shifting global environments. Part of this challenge entails 
figuring out the cultural differences and misunderstandings that arise because, “[i]t 
assumed so much, this machine—that you understood what the signs meant, that you 
could read, that you could guess what lay behind each door or each word” (55). Even 
though “technologies are not culturally neutral” (Escobar 68) and the U.N. format does 
not take into account these cultural and economic differences, Mae acts as a mediator 
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whose sustained effort to understand the ways both communities (Kizuldah and the world 
of Air) function enables her to produce creative solutions to the quandaries posed by 
Air’s arrival. For instance, while Air uses the image of an owl to connote “education,” in 
Karzistan the owl represents death; hence, villagers become scared of learning about Air 
when confronted with this symbol. Mae must “[ask] them to call me Madam Owl, so that 
they would come to think in a different way about the owl” (124) and in this way 
provides a very local and specific social adjustment. 
By “cultivating awareness of the virtual existence of things” Mae comes to 
“[understand] that the actual is never given, but is in fact produced in a movement of 
becoming” (Bignall, Postcolonial, 112). In other words, recognizing the qualitative 
difference between the virtual and the actual also means recognizing that actual reality 
contains the possibility of being constructed otherwise. Thus, when Air is forced upon 
Kizuldah, Mae states that if change is immanent and “everything dies,” the “only thing 
[she] can do is help it be reborn, so we can survive” (158). Mae works to create 
connections between her village, the government, and people like Bugsy in order to 
actively reshape Kizuldah’s relationship with Air towards communal and non-imperial 
collaboration, renewing Kizuldah’s political agency. Mae is not, however, the only 
character that learns to negotiate Air—Kwan, the women of her sewing circle, and indeed 
the whole village eventually participate in the struggle to shape Kizuldah’s future. 
Indeed, one could say Mae enacts a postcolonial agency, which “opens onto the concrete 
task of performing non-imperial interpersonal ethics as well as the strategic material 
transformation necessary for the expression of postcolonialism as a collective social 
ethos” (Bignall, Postcolonial, 207). Just as Zinzi’s relationship with Sloth enables her to 
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engage differently with the world around her, Mae’s experience in Air enables her to 
imagine new ways of using Air against the very structures that imposed it on her. Mae 
and Zinzi trace the conditions that confine them in order not only to critique but also to 
resist partaking in the same logic, beliefs, and practices that perpetuate relationships 
founded on domination and subservience. By fostering more equitable relationships, Mae 
and Zinzi work towards the creation of materially sustainable futures defined by 
collaboration, care, and new definitions of community. 
Texts such as Air and Zoo City ask questions about the junctures we will face as 
we “[walk] together into the future” (Air 390). For example, what do we need to do so 
that tomorrow is not characterized by the violence against others we exhibit today? And 
how can we create new visions of a “postcolonial” future that will materialize into more 
ethical practice? Without providing easy answers or truisms, Air and Zoo City offer both 
hope and hesitation as their protagonists step into the uncertain futures of tomorrow, 
carrying nothing but a commitment to shaping more responsible encounters with the 
families and communities they are a part of. By explicitly foregrounding these questions 
in sf, both novels transform science fiction’s world building into a strategy of 
postcolonial experimentation that strives to understand the complexity of problems facing 
diverse global communities. While this analysis has examined the ways Air and Zoo City 
share similar ethical projects, another strategy for outlining their postcolonial potential 
might entail tracing the relationship between Mae and Zinzi as women of colour. My 
focus on the question of ontological difference and interpersonal ethics draws out only 
one aspect of the complex internal/external relations that define communities. However, 
sharing the desire to construct an understanding of “postcolonialism” also means that 
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ultimately both novels critique structures that solidify and exploit difference—whether 
this is through the epistemological frameworks valued in western philosophy, the 
practices of multinational corporations (like Air), or through the persistence of colonial 
relations (such as the prejudice against zoos). Postcolonial sf therefore asks its reader to 
participate in a similar project by remaining attuned to both the perils of globalization and 
the promises of transnational collaboration. 
 
The Promises and Perils of Global SF Film 
Viewing postcolonialism as premised upon a shared ethical commitment is central to 
reimagining the truly productive potential of postcolonial sf. Rather than seeing the genre 
as yet one more way capitalism appropriates and resells difference by marketing the 
margins, postcolonial sf can be seen as the manifestation of a collective ethos, or desire, 
to imagine lines of flight from the colonial logic that binds us. For example, while genre 
scholars generally acknowledge that “genres are not inert categories shared by all…but 
discursive claims made by real speakers for particular purposes in specific situations” 
(Altman, Film/Genre, 101), discussions of postcolonial sf also need to consider the risks 
of attempting to define postcolonial sf as specifically “non-Western” science fiction, 
thereby erasing the socio-political complexity of texts such Rivera’s Sleep Dealer, which 
oscillates between the boundaries of the global North and South. As I examined in 
chapter four, the film’s critique of migration and labour is specific to the context of the 
Mexico/US border and NAFTA, but Sleep Dealer also expresses affinities with migrant 
workers in the global South generally whose raced/gendered social positions render them 
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particularly vulnerable to the exploitative frameworks of neoliberal capitalist regimes and 
anti-immigration racism. Sleep Dealer thus has much in common with a film such as 
Neill Blomkamp’s District 9 (2010).  
If Air and Zoo City are exemplary of the ways postcolonial sf confronts readers 
with the question of how we understand difference, District 9 is exemplary of the 
potential for postcolonial sf film to affectively produce these questions through spectacle. 
Through District 9 I explore two main tensions, or risks, generated through postcolonial 
science fiction film: the first tension occurs when film reproduces the colonial gaze, and 
the second tension occurs when spectators must negotiate between their affective 
responses and the film’s historical context.  As a visual medium, postcolonial sf film, 
perhaps more so than literature, risks objectifying and commodifying difference. 
Postcolonial sf that I have explored thus far, however, emphasizes the importance of 
historicizing national, social, and cultural difference in order to avoid replicating sf’s 
tradition of erasing difference in its representation of the future. In the remainder of this 
chapter I examine how postcolonial sf film—because of its visual medium and 
international distribution—presents a unique case in which the colonial gaze of sf is 
directly performed, and challenged, through the viewer’s engagement. To do so, I will 
first examine how sf’s “spectacle” offers the potential to foster affective connections, 
particularly through the ways generic conventions (such as the trope of the alien other) 
are utilized within global contexts. Using genre in this way, however, also risks 
dehistoricizing the material realities and locations that films, such District 9, draw on. As 
films move through different social contexts and are marketed to a wide range of people, 
spectators must negotiate the gap between the extrapolative futures presented onscreen 
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and the contemporary realities such films reflect upon. This gap (or as Csicsery-Ronay 
calls it, a “hesitation”) is clearly evident in sf literature through Suvin’s notion of 
cognitive estrangement; however, it is also expressed (albeit slightly differently) in film 
as what may traditionally be defined as the hesitation between affect and cognition, or 
spectacle and narrative in film. The gap between contemporary realities and unknown 
futures is where genre becomes both a particularly useful tool and a potentially restricting 
lens. 
Using the film District 9 as a representative test case, this section will explore the 
gap that characterizes the promises and perils of postcolonial sf film. I argue that it is the 
spectator who must navigate the tension between the affective and the historical as part of 
a form of “careful sociability” (Bignall) demanded by many forms of global sf. In The 
Address of the Eye (1992) Vivian Sobchack argues that spectators “[share] cinematic 
space with the film but must also negotiate it, contribute to and perform the constitution 
of its experiential significance” (10). District 9 makes explicit the ways spectators are 
implicated in the performance of the film’s logic. However, despite its very dystopian 
overtones, District 9 also expresses a utopian hope for change through its capacity to 
foster “affective” encounters, or assemblages, between spectators and the screen. Affect 
here is not the same as emotion; rather, following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick affect can be 
considered the “complex interleaving of…causes, effects, feedbacks, motive, long-
standing states such as moods and theories” (104). Affect is “troubling and has a utopian 
potential because it always exceeds and escapes the emotions by which we reduce and 
misname it” (Bould, Science 71). District 9 incites this sort of affective response in that it 
is simultaneously engaging and yet troubling in its representations of racial difference. 
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Because of these tensions, District 9 forces the spectator to navigate the film’s allure 
through “careful forms of sociability” attuned to both the film’s significance in terms of 
genre and in terms of racial and national histories. 
To briefly summarize the plot of District 9: the film revolves around an alien 
space ship that stops above the city of Johannesburg. When the aliens are released from 
the ship, they are treated as refugees and segregated in what is known the eponymous 
District 9. Called by the derogatory name “prawns,” the aliens are treated with little 
regard. A large corporation known as MNU, or Multi-National United, acts as a mediator 
between the aliens and humans. In reality, however, MNU is more interested in obtaining 
alien weaponry, and as a sociologist interviewed in the film states, the “temporary 
holding zone [becomes] militarized and soon [a] slum” (District 9). The alien slum 
alongside the film’s use of “real” interview footage of people who are unhappy with the 
alien’s presence in their country clearly invokes the history of xenophobia against 
refugees in South Africa. The film itself is presented as a mockumentary (following 
Blomkamp’s earlier short on the subject, “Alive in Johannesburg”), though this verité 
style reverts in the second half of the film to a blockbuster action flick. District 9 focuses 
primarily on Wikus Van De Merwe, an officer for MNU assigned to manage the 
relocation of the aliens to new districts. Wikus becomes “infected” during the assignment 
and soon discovers he is slowly transforming into a prawn himself.  
As District 9 reveals, the “promises” of a global sf lies in its potentials to use the 
vocabulary of science fiction to relate to global concerns—specifically, District 9 uses 
the trope of alien others as satire, critiquing racist ideologies and practices that persist 
today. The epitome of this critique is presented in the film’s beginning when an 
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interviewee states, “If they [the aliens] were from another country we might understand, 
but they’re not even from this planet at all” (District 9). The irony here, of course, is that 
historically refugee camps and townships in South Africa have succumbed to very similar 
fates as the fictional District 9. Mass relocation, poverty, xenophobic violence, and abuse 
are not fictional stories only but the realities of colonial regimes and their aftermaths. The 
aliens, then, are a clear representation of “difference” (I resist claiming they represent 
“black” identity for reasons that I will unpack below). 
However, District 9 does more than simply “represent” xenophobia by utilizing 
the full potential of sf film and its history of spectacle. Like many films about bodily 
mutations (such as David Cronenberg’s The Fly, for instance), District 9 foregrounds the 
grotesque transformation of Wikus’s body. The prawns are constructed in the tradition of 
the abject in horror films—they are slimy, dark, tentacled, crustacean-like characters. On 
screen and off, we are forced to confront their alienness and difference. As Andrea 
Hairston points out,  
As audience members feel revulsion for these vomit-inducing creatures, we are 
forced to confront the human tendency toward xenophobia…The Prawns are a 
graphic embodiment of our subjective perception of those we consider Other. The 
[film’s] plot is a satiric depiction of how we, a universal we, behave toward 
reviled Others (331). 
As spectators, our horror at alien bodies is presented as a symptom of the same logic in 
which raced bodies are constructed as animalistic and dehumanized.  
Importantly, District 9 uses spectacle to implicate the viewer as the film’s satire 
hinges on the viewer’s response to grotesque images and their subsequent self-reflection. 
District 9 is therefore an example of what Steven Shaviro calls an “affective map” which 
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“do[es] not just passively trace or represent, but actively construct[s] and perform[s], the 
social relations, flows, and feelings that they are ostensibly ‘about’” (Post Cinematic 6). 
That is, District 9 is not just about xenophobia—through its use of verité and 
mockumentary conventions and through its use of grotesque imagery, District 9 performs 
and implicates the viewer in the very ideologies it critiques. Initial disgust at the alien 
bodies that leak black fluids, grow their young in the dead bodies of cows, and have a 
fondness for cat food, has to be mediated through the film and spectator’s self-reflexivity.  
Wikus’s transformation is therefore all the more horrifying and grotesque since it 
not only depicts the leaky boundaries between human and non-human bodies, but also 
because it disrupts the boundaries between film and spectator. Wikus digs teeth out of his 
mouth, pulls decaying fingernails off himself, and sprouts black thistle-like skin, but what 
is most disturbing is that the anomalous and abject organism he represents cannot be 
contained by the film screen. As spectators, we are drawn into the narrative logic of the 
film, a spatial and mental transgression that reveals the ways the grotesque “infects” the 
viewer. By using the grotesque and sf, District 9 disrupts boundaries between screen and 
spectator performing the critique of racist ideologies and continued divisions between 
self and other. This is the “promise” of global sf. By using sf’s generic vocabulary and its 
inclination towards spectacle, sf has the ability to both draw in viewers and encourage 
self-reflexivity. 
However, despite District 9’s satiric inclinations, it also risks dehistoricizing the 
contexts from which the film draws on. For instance, Wikus’s transformation can be read 
as a sort of “going native,” which turns his bodily transformation into the symbolic image 
of the “other” and a one-sided representation of raced identities. By focusing on a white 
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protagonist’s transition to the “other side,” the film’s engagement with racist ideology 
focuses primarily on critiques of the colonial gaze, or, more specifically in this case, a 
white gaze. Wikus’s transformation as a white man is therefore not an exploration of 
racial difference but a representation of the “ways which blackness and poverty are 
painted through a prejudiced white gaze” (Jansen van Veuren 573). As satire, this is a 
critical perspective that the film draws heavily on. As sf and Hollywood blockbuster, 
however, the dichotomous representation between white and black identity, and the 
metamorphosis to “going native,” is an over-simplistic engagement with the very 
complex dynamic of race in South Africa. For instance, refugees in South Africa are 
often treated differently according to where they are from—recently, Somali refugees in 
particular have been the target of incredibly violent xenophobic attacks in South Africa.  
Furthermore, though the film does not explicitly draw on historical fact, the 
separation of aliens in District 9 hearkens back to the very real urban laws implemented 
under apartheid including the Group Areas Act of 1950. The effects of this act can still be 
felt today in the segregation between wealthy urban areas and the shanty-towns that 
continue to lack reliable access to basic resources including water and electricity. In 
addition to the separation of districts and townships, the film’s constant reference to “sex 
with the alien” (District 9) is not just due to fear of miscegenation but undoubtedly a 
reference to the Immorality Acts and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act in South Africa 
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that prohibited interracial sex between whites and non-whites and remained in effect until 
1985. 38 
 Much of this socio-historical context, however, is lost in the film’s simplification 
and stereotypical depiction of two “races” pitted against each other. As Mocke Jansen 
van Veuren argues, “The film is unable, within its own vocabulary, to deal effectively 
with the black body” (573), and I would add to this, unable to deal effectively with the 
more complex dynamics that shaped race relations in South Africa, including the 
economic motives of segregation and the tensions between different refugee groups in 
Southern Africa. The representation of the Nigerian gang in the film is an explicit 
example of the manner in which the film fails to present a more nuanced engagement 
with ethnic, religious, and cultural tensions within Africa. Symbolically the aliens come 
to represent a vague “non-white” identity, but the film explicitly points out one specific 
national identity as cannibalistic, violent gang members. The film, in fact, makes sure to 
note that it is Nigerians that are associated with the scams, interspecies prostitution, and 
illegal weapons trade in District 9. By referring to this gang collectively as “the 
Nigerians” and failing to offer any positive representation of a Nigerian outside of the 
gangs, the film appeals to stereotypes about Nigerian 419 scammers and reduces a 
diverse nation of people to a singular, homogenous group of criminals. The film thus fails 
to offer a more nuanced representation of historical tension between Nigeria and South 
Africa that is the result of competing economies, xenophobic attacks against migrants, 
disagreement over Nigeria’s history of military rule and South Africa’s history of 
                                                          
38 These laws were amended to have “non-whites” include not just blacks but South Asians and 
“coloured” people. Communities that were racially integrated were often discursively constructed and 
represented as “diseased, unhygienic slums” (Marks and Bezzoli 268). 
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apartheid, and more recently competition between the two countries over a permanent 
African seat on the UN Security Council. 
 Ultimately, the depiction of Nigerians and the lack of more diverse 
representations of black identity in the film are subject to the same critique: while the 
film engages with the general question of racist ideologies—how we are scared of and do 
not understand difference—it fails to articulate how apartheid functioned through a 
complex network of social, legal, and economic structures which are specific to a South 
African context. This is one of the dangers posed by global sf for audiences attempting to 
work through a film’s meaning—global sf risks erasing the specificity of national settings 
when the use of generic spectacle obscures how exactly genres function differently in 
other national contexts. Specifically, the film’s use of the grotesque (what I previously 
cited as offering potential for critical investigations of difference) is also the very factor 
that presents challenges for global audiences approaching films like District 9 solely 
through the lens of genre, as District 9 focuses heavily on spectacle while detracting from 
historical critique.  
When reading global sf texts, then, much negotiation occurs between the spectator 
and screen, as audiences must navigate the tension between historical context (like the 
explicit mention that the alien space ship lands over Johannesburg and not New York or 
Tokyo) and sf’s use of spectacle. Accordingly, like Air and Zoo City, films such as 
District 9 require a form of “careful sociability.” As previously mentioned, Bignall 
defines careful sociability as an ethics of relationality, “which expands the realm of 
practical ethics beyond rights-based and state-mediated discourses of justice, to include 
unmediated qualities of interpersonal relationship as defining aspects of political and 
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ethical life” (Postcolonial 79). While Bignall discusses the notion of careful sociability 
primarily in relation to previously colonized regions, I argue this ethical approach to 
engaging in non-imperial and self-reflexive discussions is crucial to the experience of 
films such as District 9 which confront the viewer with unresolved feelings and questions 
about our complicity in xenophobia. District 9 requires audiences to consider their own 
situated locations as well the location in which the film takes place, and the points of 
commonality or difference that link both social positions. 
As scholars such as Shaviro argue, films might therefore be best taken as “events” 
that generate “cinematic affect” (Post Cinematic 23). Tracing the affective capacities of 
the film event is not so that we can ultimately discover a “truth” or a moral; rather, 
Shaviro contends that viewing cinema as an affective event is “an approach [that] is 
affirmative and transformative, rather than critical or evaluative: it evokes the capacity of 
the cinematic apparatus to produce and multiply ‘lines of flight’ instead of dwelling on its 
role in confirming and enforcing oppressive standards and ideologies” (Post Cinematic 
24). The ideas that viewers form by negotiating the gap between genre and history does 
not just produce empathy or a cosmopolitan celebration of difference—rather, it produces 
ongoing analyses of the ways certain people and bodies continued to be marked as 
exploitable and disposable. 
For instance, in thinking about the film’s problematic use of the alien trope as 
representative of difference, one cannot ignore the ways the film (however superficially) 
also links the racialization of bodies to their economic value. When Wikus is taken in 
after his “transformation” begins, the MNU doctor notes that Wikus’s body “represents 
hundreds of millions, maybe billions, of dollars’ worth of biotechnology” (District 9). As 
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the film’s introduction notes, alien weaponry presents a lucrative market for armaments 
manufacturers. Because Wikus’s transformation enables him to use alien weaponry, he is 
thereby reduced to a “tool” just like the prawns in District 9, or the dehumanization of 
Mexican cyberworkers turned robots in Sleep Dealer. Though the film fails to highlight 
the diverse communities of refugees and the varying townships in South Africa, it does, 
interestingly, portray how a global capitalist market is reminiscent of colonial logic in its 
exploitation of certain bodies and peoples for the sake of increased profits.  
District 9 is problematic in its “white man crossing over” narrative—but it also 
leaves many unresolved feelings that require the spectator to work through various ways 
of how we are to understand the aliens, Wikus’s relationship to them, and our relationship 
to the film. A film spectator engaged in carefully negotiating these tensions performs a 
certain mode of awareness akin to Bignall’s notion of postcolonial ethics. Thinking about 
science fiction film in light of this hesitation and negotiation between history/genre, and 
affect/cognition, may help illuminate not just the limitations of global forms of sf but the 
promises and potentials of utilizing genre as a critical tool in transnational contexts. 
 
Conclusion 
District 9 is not the only science film to deal extensively with the question of 
difference—in fact, sf frequently engages questions about sexual, racial, or cultural 
difference primarily through the figure of the alien.39 However, postcolonial sf such as 
                                                          
39 There are a number of scholarly works that examine how the figure of the alien in sf represents various 
forms of difference, including, for example, Jenny Wolmark’s Aliens and Others: Science Fiction, Feminism 
and Postmodernism (1994), Patricia Melzer’s Alien Constructions: Science Fiction and Feminist Thought 
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District 9 is unique in that it represents the consolidation of a “constellated community” 
(Altman 160) in the genre that is particularly attuned to deconstructing sf’s engagement 
with colonial frameworks and imagining postcolonial alternatives. Rick Altman defines a 
constellated community as a group that “cohere[s]…through repeated acts of 
imagination” (161) as spectators imagine that they participate in a larger generic 
community. Genres are therefore inevitably affected and shaped by fan communities that 
imagine themselves as part of a greater social network, and who share in mutual 
enjoyment, experience, and knowledge of genre texts. Constellated communities are 
generated through elective affinity and brought together by “[n]ot only industry 
discourse, but critical language, passing comments and chance encounters [which] 
provide the reference points that permit genre fans to imagine—perhaps unconsciously—
the absent community with which they share a particular taste” (161). Postcolonial sf 
brings together a community that ‘shares in the particular taste’ of politicizing sf and 
utilizing the genre as a tool for social critique. It is important to note, however, that 
unlike Altman’s suggestion that constellated communities might be formed 
unconsciously, postcolonial sf is formed consciously through the collective efforts of 
authors, fans, and scholars who aim to deconstruct sf’s participation in reiterating 
colonial ideologies. As a generic community, it is through sf’s lateral communication—
or its “exchanges between viewers of the same film or fans of the same genre” (Altman 
162)—in the form of online discussions (such as RaceFail09) and scholarly theorizations 
that postcolonial sf finally consolidates as a genre.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
(2010), and Elana Gomel’s Science Fiction, Alien Encounters, and the Ethics of Posthumanism: Beyond the 
Golden Rule (2014).  
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Altman’s notion of constellated communities points to how genres such as 
postcolonial sf can function as a transnational network that brings together a diverse 
group of people. Postcolonial sf such as Air, Zoo City, and District 9 bring together 
reading communities and spectators who are interested in using sf’s conceptual tools 
towards the creation of non-imperial social relations. Accordingly, postcolonial sf is not 
just defined by its generic qualities, or by the ways it redresses sf’s reiteration of colonial 
tropes—postcolonial sf is primarily defined by the constellated community it serves. 
Altman points out that genres do not come into being only “when a body of texts shares a 
sufficient number of semantic or syntactic elements”—rather, this “production-driven 
definition needs to be matched by a reception-driven definition recognizing that genres do 
not exist until they become necessary to a lateral communication process, that is until 
they serve a constellated community” (162). Texts such as District 9, despite its many 
problems, are indicative of a community’s need for new ways of talking about sf and for 
imagining a particular kind of sf that could challenge racist and imperial paradigms. As I 
examine in more detail in the conclusion of this dissertation, the term “postcolonial sf” 
thus comes to represent the consolidation of a way of reading and engaging with sf texts 
shared by a community of authors, fans, and scholars.  
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CONCLUSION: Towards Postcolonialism as Process 
In the introduction to this study, I suggested that in thinking about what unites 
postcolonial science fiction as a genre, scholars have been torn between two main 
approaches: one approach concentrates primarily on how the genre deconstructs colonial 
discourse, while the other approach emphasizes how postcolonial sf points to the very 
real economic and political process of decolonization in the global South. Scholars such 
as Jessica Langer and Eric D. Smith similarly acknowledge that a divide between 
discursive and materialist approaches presents a challenge to defining postcolonial sf as a 
genre, and is symptomatic of the challenges faced by postcolonial studies in general. 
Where a discursive approach to postcolonialism privileges questions of identity and 
epistemology, a materialist approach emphasizes the need to remain cognizant of local 
and material anti-imperial resistances. As scholars attempt to define postcolonial sf, many 
of the questions that have plagued postcolonial theory thus arise: for instance, does 
constructing the idea of a “postcolonial” genre revert to idealistic/exploitative identity 
politics? Or as Graham Huggan might ask, does postcolonial sf market the margins? 
Furthermore, can connections and affinities be forged between different global 
articulations of sf, or does the subgenre necessarily revert to a form of cultural 
relativism? The bifurcation between discursive/material approaches is therefore 
problematic not only because it complicates how we understand postcolonial sf but also 
because it highlights what is at stake when discussions of postcolonialism must choose 
between affirming difference through identity focused approaches, or choose instead to 
maintain a collective sense of agency against imperial violence in diverse geopolitical 
contexts. 
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I see two main reasons why scholars have struggled to define postcolonial sf, and 
why discussions of the genre have replicated the discursive/material divide of 
postcolonial theory. First, there has been more emphasis on deconstruction in scholarly 
work on postcolonial sf and thus more focus on the genre’s critiques of colonialism. This 
is a necessary and important project; however, it also fails to address how the subgenre 
emerges through the material practice of a community of scholars, fans, and authors who 
are actively engaged in constructing futures (science fictional and otherwise) which are 
premised upon non-imperial, more equitable forms of relation. Furthermore, the emphasis 
on deconstruction is symptomatic of a second, and perhaps primary, reason theorizations 
of postcolonial sf are often problematic: attempts to theorize the genre remain complicit 
with colonial epistemological frameworks by privileging dialectical philosophies of 
transformation grounded in the negativity of difference. Under dialectical frameworks, 
difference is seen as “lack” or negation, and must be therefore suppressed or eliminated 
in the desire towards unification. Bignall eloquently argues that dialectical philosophies 
of transformation in Western philosophical traditions replicate the very binary structures 
postcolonial theory attempts to re-think. Bignall notes that  
the model of dialectical process is problematic from a postcolonial perspective, 
since the trajectory is driven simultaneously by difference conceptualised 
negatively as lack or opposition, and by the desire to negate this difference in the 
movement towards unity and recognized presence. (Postcolonial 100) 
Thus, constructing postcolonial thought on the traditions of Western epistemology—
which are founded upon necessarily antagonist relations between self and other—only 
continue to perpetuate imperialistic tendencies. For postcolonial sf this means that the 
genre is caught between the problematic space of affirming cultural difference while 
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attempting to avoid replicating a colonial gaze and marginalizing this “other” form of 
science fiction. 
In chapter five of this dissertation I suggested that one way of understanding what 
unites postcolonial sf is its commitment towards fostering mutual understanding and non-
imperial interpersonal ethics. Against the tradition of pitting discursive approaches to 
postcolonialism against materialist/Marxists analysis, Bignall, in an insightful move, uses 
Deleuze’s theory of embodiment to construct a notion of postcolonial agency that 
“incorporates a positive and creative role for ontological difference and gives rise to an 
ethic of joyful sociability based on material practices of self-awareness, listening respect 
and attentiveness to the other” (“Affective” 100). For Bignall, through the conscious 
practices of “self-awareness, listening respect and attentiveness to the other” emerges a 
common commitment, or attitude, towards fostering collective understanding and non-
imperial interpersonal ethics conducive to creating the postcolonial ethos necessary for 
less violent, more equitable futures. I view postcolonial sf as participating in these 
postcolonial practices of “self-awareness” and “attentiveness to the other.” 
The idea of postcolonialism as an attitude is not necessarily ground-breaking, and 
similar arguments can be found in the works of such diverse scholars as Gayatri Spivak, 
Rey Chow, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, and Paul Patton. The alliance of 
postcolonialism and science fiction, however, is one that has solidified as a cycle in the 
genre only fairly recently, and it is an alliance that deserves careful consideration. Texts 
such as Air and Zoo City perform such a vivid postcolonial ethos specifically because 
they are science fiction. By mediating the boundaries of the real and the speculative, the 
present and the future, postcolonial sf dismantles the regulatory fictions of colonial 
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practice while creating space for dialogue about what a postcolonial ethos might look 
like. Smith articulates a very similar point in his recent study on the genre, noting, 
“Postcolonial SF is, in this sense, simply ‘the attempt to think a material thought’ within 
the alienating enclosures of global capital on the one hand and the corollary 
aestheticization of the political on the other” (195; my emphasis). As Air and Zoo City 
exemplify, postcolonial sf brings to the foreground sf’s generic capacity to critique the 
present while constructing visions of an alternative future defined by more “careful forms 
of sociability” (Bignall, Postcolonial 220).   
Postcolonial sf is thus a way of exploring what postcolonialism means without, as 
Haraway says, the “risk of lapsing into boundless differences and giving up on the 
confusing task of making partial, real connections” (161). Indeed, the subgenre emerges 
out of a reading community’s response to similar desires and goals, revealing the ways in 
which postcolonial sf is a strategy of reading, writing, and ethical relation. Before 
concluding we might return to the question posed at the beginning of this dissertation: 
how does sf explore “postcolonialism” and difference without being subsumed into the 
logic of the colonial gaze? To answer obliquely, the question itself is part of the process 
of enacting “careful forms of sociability” and characteristic of the desire for a non-
imperial “mode of awareness” (Csicsery-Ronay 387) which distinguishes this emerging 
subgenre. The potential and importance of exploring a notion of postcolonial sf therefore 
lies not in defining yet another marketable subgenre—it is not a matter of what 
postcolonial sf is but rather what it might do and what it is capable of giving rise to in the 
process of working through the perplexing conditions of life in the twenty-first century. 
In an encouraging indication of this development, thinking through the potentials of 
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postcolonial sf is not only symptomatic of a wider discourse surrounding diversity in the 
genre, it also realizes the emergence of communities of practice (between authors, fans, 
and scholars) concerned with the material rights and ethical relations of a growing, global 
community. 
The emphasis on creation, constructing common notions, and collectivity is 
significant for understanding not only postcolonialism as process, but also for considering 
the ways postcolonial science fiction is a strategy of postcolonial experimentation. 
Authors, fans, and scholars alike use the conventions of the genre to actively create the 
conditions of postcoloniality. Thus, scholars of postcolonial sf must themselves be 
attuned to the dangers of reiterating a colonial gaze in their analysis of the genre. 
Specifically, by conceiving of desire as the actualisation of concrete relations (as per 
Deleuze and Bignall), one sees that a concrete definition of postcolonial sf is not only 
impossible but undesirable. In other words, postcolonial sf can be viewed as an 
assemblage generated from specific generic qualities and their reception by a particular 
reading community—thinking of the subgenre as an assemblage recognizes the 
importance of postcolonial sf’s formal qualities as well as the possibilities inherent in 
using these texts in new and creative ways. Confining the body of postcolonial sf to a set 
of textual qualities prevents the creative potential of the genre from developing new ways 
of understanding postcolonialism beyond its material/discursive and global/local divides. 
Accordingly, one of the reasons postcolonial sf might be particularly useful is for its 
ability to produce new ways of understanding postcolonialism, reorienting old 
frameworks that have confined the possibilities for merging postcolonial theory with 
democratic practice.  
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As I have suggested throughout this dissertation, several sf authors are already 
part of this communal project towards exploring what “postcolonialism” means in the 
twenty-first century. So far, the genre has brought together authors, fans, and scholars 
from such diverse contexts as South Africa, Canada, the United States, India, and Japan 
to name but a few places from which communities have engaged with the idea of 
postcolonial sf. As I examined in chapter two through my reading of Evolution’s Shore 
and Kirinya, Ian McDonald is one example of an author whose work addresses the 
complexities of globalization while remaining committed to a nomadic politics of 
location. His novels frequently take place in the global South, ranging from Kenya in 
Evolution’s Shore, to India in River of Gods (2004), and Turkey in The Dervish House 
(2010). When asked in an interview about his use of so-called “Third World” settings, 
McDonald responds, 
I’d use the expression “Third World” only in the sense that I include Northern 
Ireland as a Third World country: a society of two significant social groups that 
have been set against each other by historical engineering; a skewed economic 
infrastructure based on the public sector, with a highly economically significant 
samurai elite (the RUC)…a post-colonial process of disengagement that failed 
half-way through; physical marginalisation…the sense of cultural inferiority that 
forces both social groups into re-engineering of their cultural tropes ...My point is, 
there’s more dynamic for change in “Third World” societies than in the West. 
(Gevers) 
His use of non-Western settings is not cultural appropriation (as he is sometimes 
criticized for) but rather insightful critiques of the complex dynamic and force between 
the global North and global South. 
Similarly, Geoff Ryman’s development of “mundane” sf is a project that attempts 
to imagine new ways of living in the world, and thus also new ways of engaging with sf’s 
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imperial past. Ryman’s mundane/postcolonial fusions, in fact, provide a line of flight 
from the fantasies of disembodiment that plague cyberpunk. His work therefore often 
emphasizes the importance of materialist, postcolonial critiques. The mundane movement 
specifically differs from traditional notions of sf in the “dream” that it strives towards. 
Ryman identifies the “mass market SF” dream as one of escape, of leaving earth, the 
body, and death behind. The mundane movement, however, does not buy into this dream. 
Instead of partaking in typical sf tropes, mundane sf includes, “no FTL [faster than light], 
no FTL communications, no time travel, no aliens in the flesh, no immortality, no 
telepathy, no parallel universe, no magic wands” (“Take the Third”). It is a movement  
not just about a near future, but also a far future, one in which there are new 
wonders to take the place of the old ones…a future in which things really 
change…These new humans won’t be us... They will not be us because they value 
different things, speak differently, think differently, and respond differently in 
emergencies. (“Take the Third”)   
Mundane sf is specifically grounded on Earth, focusing on the social, cultural, and 
ontological changes that may occur in an increasingly technological world. Air: Or Have 
Not Have is often raised as an example of Ryman’s mundane sf movement, as it reflects 
his belief that technology is a constantly changing force of human relations, and that 
technoscientific development will contribute to the emergence of a “Fourth World” if we 
do not recognize the colonial frameworks implicit in our ideologies of progress. As I 
explored in chapter five, and as Vint and Bould argue, Air “explores issues of cultural 
specificity and hegemony,” addressing “the transformative effects of information 
technologies and economic globalisation on human social existence, but it significantly 
decentres the perspective of Western, technological elites” (Routledge 197).  
237 
 
McDonald and Ryman have very different perspectives on the type of sf they 
write. Their projects, however, share the same desire to imagine the world differently, 
and to find a space in an increasingly technoscientific empire in which to engage 
positively and ethically with different subjectivities. This space of constructivism is 
produced primarily through the image of the “future” human in their novels, thereby also 
reorienting how sf constructs the image of the posthuman “other.” Specifically, 
McDonald’s Chaga series ends with the vision of an alien infested future, and Ryman’s 
Air ends with the birth of a “monstrous” child of the future who is born blind and 
physically altered. These future beings are different ontologically and epistemologically 
because they represent the emergence of new postcolonial notions in each novel. 
Regardless of how future humans are presented in the McDonald and Ryman’s texts, all 
characters are required to exhibit the kind of listening respect essential to non-imperial 
relations—survival in these futures is determined by the ability of communities to 
construct postcolonial relations with different people and beings. Furthermore, by 
creating characters attuned to the discursive, material, and historical exploitation of 
“difference,” McDonald and Ryman challenge sf’s complicity in reiterating colonial 
ideologies. Thus, McDonald’s and Ryman’s work actively seeks to construct an 
understanding of the postcolonial “which then opens onto the concrete task of performing 
non-imperial interpersonal ethics as well as the strategic material transformation 
necessary for the expression of postcolonialism as a collective social ethos” (Bignall, 
Postcolonial, 207; my emphasis). As these authors exemplify, postcolonial sf is therefore 
attuned to both the genre’s internal tropes, and the ways in which authors, scholars, and 
fans are also accountable for creating a collective, postcolonial ethics.  
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What further distinguishes contemporary postcolonial sf from texts previously 
engaged with questions of cosmopolitanism is postcolonial sf’s ability to oscillate 
between the historical realities of specific geographic regions (as Beukes does in South 
Africa or Rivera in Mexico) while imagining their possible futures. These futures are 
hardly perfect, but they reveal transformation as immanent and commitment as necessary 
towards shaping more ethical futures. In the recent endeavor to define postcolonial sf a 
wide variety of authors have been put forward as examples of the subgenre, including 
Ursula K. Le Guin and Robert Heinlein. While Le Guin may certainly exhibit a 
cosmopolitan ethics in her work, particularly in the Hainish Cycle, Le Guin does not 
explicitly draw on specific historical settings in the ways authors such as McDonald (in 
the context of Kenya or Turkey), Beukes (in South Africa), or Vandana Singh (in the 
context of India) do. Postcolonial sf film is also a growing field with films such as 
Wanuri Kahiu’s short Pumzi (2009), Blomkamp’s District 9 (2009), Edwards’s Monsters 
(2010), and Damir Lukacevic’s Transfer (2010). These authors and filmmakers 
exemplify a shift in the genre, where authors and filmmakers consciously use the 
discourse of science fiction to engage with both the local singularity in which texts are 
produced while simultaneously recognizing the commonality of “our plural collective 
planetary condition” (Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 126). By reassembling the genre’s 
conventions, postcolonial sf challenges sf’s complicity with colonial ideologies and their 
troubling reiterations in the contemporary contexts of empire. 
If postcolonial sf is a body of texts composed of complex, rhizomatic parts 
functioning in concert as strategy of resistance, then postcolonial sf has much in common 
with Hardt and Negri’s “multitude.” Hardt and Negri define the multitude as “internally 
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different, multiple social subject[s] whose constitution and action is based not on identity 
or unity (or, much less, indifference) but on what [they have] in common” (Multitude 
100). The project of the multitude is premised upon the openness and willingness of 
diverse communities to communicate, collaborate, and commit towards a common 
political process (Multitude 106). Bignall notes that while Hardt and Negri’s definition of 
what the multitude might look like is fairly vague, evidence of the emergence of the 
“common” might actually be seen in the political standpoint of postcolonialism and 
attempts to outline this collective social practice (Postcolonial 207). I see postcolonial sf 
as a concrete example of collective social practice where a subgenre has emerged from a 
sense of shared ethical commitment amongst a diverse group of writers, scholars, and 
fans alike. Postcolonial sf creates a space for dialogue about what postcolonial relations 
might look like, and for several of the authors explored here, this means not only 
critiquing the continuation of colonial frameworks, it also entails “a common 
commitment to creating the mutual understandings and the social conditions that reflect, 
develop, reinforce and support the idea and the attitude of postcoloniality” (Bignall, 
Postcolonial 207). The importance of exploring a notion of postcolonial sf therefore lies 
not only in diversifying the genre; rather, the importance of the genre lies in its ability to 
realize the emergence of communities actively engaged in giving meaning to 
“postcolonialism,” and thus actively engaged in constructing the conditions for more 
ethical relations and material practice in our collective, global future. 
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